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Summary
This thesis consists of ve self-contained chapters, which can be read independently. All
chapters deal with the role of the government in the economy. Chapter 1 re-considers the
cost of progressivity of the tax-transfer schedule when intertemporal responses are taken
into account. Chapter 2 deals with the public provision of private goods and asks whether
universal or means-tested provision is the better alternative. Chapter 3 is concerned with
the optimal supply of public goods when the government relies on possibly distortionary
income taxation. Chapter 4 uses insights from behavioral economics to study the spill-
overs between taxation and regulation of cue-triggered consumption goods. The nal
chapter, Chapter 5, evaluates the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in Europe
based on a large microsimulation model. Apart from Chapter 5, which is entirely applied,
all chapters contain theoretical contributions. Chapter 1 also applies the theoretical
insights to U.S. data.
Chapter 1, Intertemporal Tax Wedges and Marginal Deadweight Loss, is written jointly
with Jes Winther Hansen. In this chapter, we re-examine the e¢ ciency of tax reforms in
an explicitly dynamic setting. When income is taxed annually under a progressive tax
schedule individual marginal tax rates vary from year to year. The resulting intertemporal
tax wedges give taxpayers an incentive to shift income to years when they face low
marginal tax rates.
Traditional assessments of the deadweight loss of income taxation have used a sta-
tic framework that ignores intertemporal substitution and may have produced biased
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estimates. Using a fully dynamic model, we derive an expression for the marginal dead-
weight loss of income taxation entirely in terms of empirically observable elasticities and
quantities. The expression can be separated into a distortion arising from the level of
marginal tax rates and a distortion due to intertemporal tax wedges. We show that
ignoring intertemporal substitution will lead to an underestimate of the marginal dead-
weight loss of a tax reform that increases intertemporal tax wedges and an overestimate
when intertemporal tax wedges decrease. In some cases, a marginal tax increase can
even improve overall e¢ ciency if the reduction in intertemporal tax wedges is su¢ ciently
strong.
In order to quantify the e¤ects of ignoring intertemporal substitution in taxable in-
come we analyze three stylized tax reforms on a U.S. panel data set with about 34,000
nationally representative tax units. Our simulations are performed for a large range of
behavioral elasticities as a reection of the uncertainty that exists in the literature on
the size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Overall, we nd substantial bi-
ases from ignoring intertemporal responses even for small elasticity values. These results
suggest that tax progressivity may be much more costly than previously thought.
Chapter 2, Public Provision of Private Goods: Optimal Provision Schemes, is concerned
with the design of the modern welfare state. Specically, the chapter deals with the design
of provision schemes when the government wishes to supply certain private goods to the
most needy groups in society. Ideally, the government would want to condition access to
the public provision on an individuals underlying ability but only income is observable.
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Thus, provision schemes must be either means-tested, at the risk of distorting income
decisions, or universal. However, many publicly provided goods such as health care or
education are consumed in discrete quantities, i.e., from a single supplier. As a result,
a policy that makes a certain good available in a xed quality to all citizens potentially
distorts individual consumption choices.
In this chapter, I show that optimal provision schemes are de facto means-tested in the
sense that the public supply is targeted at the poor. The optimum can be reached either
through a formal means-test or under universal provision by subsidizing purchases of
market alternatives to the publicly provided good. Intuitively, the government can avoid
any income distortions from a means-test by adjusting the income tax to compensate
those not included in the public program.
The result also has implications for the optimal tax treatment of private purchases of
publicly provided goods in countries that have implemented universal provision of, e.g.,
health care. The chapter demonstrates that the optimal policy involves a subsidy that
e¤ectively decreases with income. The maximal subsidy is always less than the cost of
servicing a single individual in the public sector.
Chapter 3, Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis, is joint work with Claus
Thustrup Kreiner. This chapter also deals with the governments role in goods provision
but focuses on public goods, which by nature are enjoyed by everyone. Our analysis is
motivated by the continuing contention that surrounds the academic literature on the
optimal supply of public goods.
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The existing literature is dominated by two di¤erent strands. One has no system-
atic link between expenditures and the nancing scheme, besides budget balance, and
emphasizes the distortionary costs of taxation and the marginal benet of public goods
as the main determinants of the optimal supply. The other applies the so-called benet
principle, which builds on the exibility of the non-linear income tax and constructs the
nancing scheme to eliminate any distributional e¤ects. This latter approach has focused
on conditions when the original Samuelson rule applies.
In this chapter, we present a fully general analysis of the optimal supply of public
goods based on the benet principle. We derive an intuitive criterion for assessing the
desirability of a marginal expansion of a public good that identies the correlation be-
tween ability and the marginal willingness to pay for the public good as the determinant
of any deviations from the Samuelson rule.
The chapter also o¤ers a synthesis of the two di¤erent approaches in the literature
by showing that both derive from the same basic formula. The only di¤erence lies in the
restrictions imposed on the nancing scheme. In addition, we provide a generalization
of the conditions for the applicability of the Samuelson rule. We show that correlations
between income and the marginal willingness to pay that are not driven by ability do
not lead to a departure from the rst best. Finally, we demonstrate that the traditional
focus on the MCF in analyses of public goods provision is only justied in special cases.
In Chapter 4, Taxation, Regulation, and Cue-Triggered Consumption, I study optimal
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policy when demand is a¤ected by external cues. Exposure to a visceral cue, as when
a smoker sees a cigarette, increases consumption of the cue-related good. The major
challenge for welfare economics is whether cue-induced demand e¤ects reect a rational
response or misguidings of the mind.
The chapter presents a simple, unied framework that embodies rational choice as well
as boundedly rational decisionmaking. The model permits an analysis not only of optimal
tax policy but also of the e¤ects of cue regulation. I show that it is optimal to subsidize
cue-triggered consumption when there are no errors in individual decisionmaking. The
optimal subsidy decreases with the degree of cue regulation. In contrast, it is optimal
to tax sin good purchases when individuals are boundedly rational. The optimal sin tax
decreases as cue regulation is tightened.
The fact that increased cue regulation leads to less reliance on the tax instrument is
a novel result that holds regardless of the degree of individual rationality. I nally show
that hassle policies such as smoking bans in public places are generally ine¢ cient.
Chapter 5, An Evaluation of the Tax-Transfer Treatment of Married Couples in Euro-
pean Countries, is written jointly with Herwig Immervoll, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, and
Claus Thustrup Kreiner. We present a comprehensive analysis of various aspects of the
combined tax and transfer treatment of married couples. The chapter uses the EU-
ROMOD microsimulation model to carefully estimate individual tax burdens in the 15
pre-enlargement EU member states.
We begin our analysis by carefully mapping the precise nature of jointness in the tax-
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transfer schemes in each of our sample countries. We nd that many tax-transfer schemes
in Europe display negative jointness where the tax rate on one person depends negatively
on spousal earnings. The presence of negative jointness is driven by the interaction
of family-based transfers and individual or almost-individual taxes. This nding also
demonstrates that the usual sharp distinction between individual and joint tax systems
is too simplied.
We next consider the incentives for secondary earners to supply labor and study the
welfare e¤ects of reforms that change the relative taxation of spouses. We set up a simple
model of family labor supply and focus on the participation margin because the empirical
ndings indicate strong responsiveness of female labor supply along this margin along this
margin. Our ndings suggest that, in most European countries, lowering the tax burden
on secondary earners is associated with large welfare gains.
Finally, the chapter simulates marriage penalties for hypothetical households. We nd
large marriage penalties at the bottom of the income distribution (but not at the top)
in most countries. These are due primarily to the family-based transfers and therefore
marriage penalties at the bottom in practice go hand in hand with negative jointness.
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Summary in Danish
Denne afhandling består af fem kapitler, der kan læses uafhængigt af hinanden. Alle
kapitler beskæftiger sig med statens rolle i samfundsøkonomien. Kapitel 1 omhandler
e¢ ciensomkostningerne forbundet med en progressiv skatteskala, når intertemporale re-
sponser tages med i betragtning. Kapitel 2 spørger om statslige ydelser bør være uni-
verselle eller målrettede. Kapitel 3 studerer det optimale udbud af o¤entlige goder, når
staten er henvist til at benytte potentielt forvridende beskatning. Kapitel 4 anvender ind-
sigter fra adfærdsøkonomi til at studere sammenhængen mellem beskatning og regulering
af såkaldte cue-udløste forbrugsgoder. Endelig foretager Kapitel 5 en evaluering af skatte-
og overførselssystemet rettet mod gifte par i Europa baseret på en stor mikrosimulation-
smodel. Alle kapitler, bortset fra Kapitel 5, som udelukkende er anvendt, indeholder
teoretiske bidrag. Kapitel 1 benytter endvidere amerikanske data til at drage en række
politikkonklusioner.
Kapitel 1, Intertemporal Tax Wedges and Marginal Deadweight Loss, er skrevet sammen
med Jes Winther Hansen. Dette kapitel kaster et nyt blik på e¢ ciense¤ekterne af indkom-
stskattereformer i en eksplicit dynamisk model. Når indkomst beskattes årligt under en
progressiv skatteskala vil den enkeltes marginalskat variere fra år til år. Dette resulterer
i intertemporale skattekiler, der giver skatteyderen et incitament til at ytte indkomst til
de år, hvor hans marginalskat er lavest.
Traditionelt har studier af dødvægtstabet forbundet med indkomstbeskatning benyt-
tet en statisk ramme og dermed ignoreret intertemporal substitution, hvilket kan have
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ført til fejlbehæftede estimater. I en fuldt dynamisk model formår vi at udtrykke det
marginale dødvægtstab ved indkomstbeskatning alene som en funktion af empirisk ob-
servérbare elasticiteter og mængder. Udtrykket kan opdeles i en forvridning, der skyldes
marginalskatterne, og en forvridning, der kan tilskrives intertemporale skattekiler. Vi
viser, at man ved at ignorere intertemporal substitution undervurderer det marginale
dødvægtstab ved en skattereform, der øger de intertemporale skattekiler, og modsat
overvurderer forvridningstabet ved en reform, der mindsker de intertemporale skattekiler.
I visse tilfælde kan en højere marginalskat endda føre til e¢ ciensforbedringer, hvis den
fører til en reduktion af de intertemporale skattekiler af tilpas størrelse.
For at få et indtryk af den kvantitative betydning af at ignorere intertemporal sub-
stitution i skattepligtig indkomst analyserer vi tre stiliserede skattereformer ved hjælp
af et amerikansk paneldatasæt med omkring 34.000 representative skatteenheder. Vi
gennemfører simulationer for en bred vifte af elasticiteter for at afspejle den usikker-
hed, der hersker i litteraturen omkring størrelsen af de intertemporale responser. Vi
nder generelt, at det marginale dødvægtstab er særdeles følsomt overfor selv beskeden
intertemporal substitution. Vores resultater antyder, at skatteprogressivitet er forbundet
med større omkostninger end hidtil antaget.
Kapitel 2, Public Provision of Private Goods: Optimal Provision Schemes, beskæftiger
sig med indretningen af den moderne velfærdsstat. Mere præcist studeres den mest hen-
sigtsmæssige tilvejebringelse af private goder, som staten ønsker at stille til rådighed
for de svageste grupper i samfundet. I en ideel verden ville staten betinge adgangen til
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de o¤entlige ydelser på individual produktivitet, men kun inkomst er observérbar. Som
et resultat må udbudet af o¤entlige goder enten målrettes ved hjælp af en indkomst-
grænse (hvilket risikerer at forvride indkomstbeslutningen) eller være universel. Mange
o¤entligt tilvejebragte goder såsom sundhedsbehandling eller uddannelse forbruges dog
kun i diskrete mængder fra en enkelt udbyder. Derfor risikerer en politik, der stiller et
privat gode af en fastsat kvalitet til rådighed for alle borgere, at forvride individuelle
forbrugsbeslutninger.
Dette kapitel demonstrerer, at den optimale udformning af o¤entlige ydelser de facto
anvender en indkomstgrænse til at målrette det o¤entlige udbud til de svageste grupper.
Optimum kan nås enten ved brug af en formel indkomstgrænse eller med universelle
ydelser ved at subsidiere private køb af alternativer til det o¤entligt tilvejebragte gode.
Staten kan undgå, at indkomstgrænsen forvrider indkomstbeslutningen ved at tilpasse
indkomstskatten, så de udeladte grupper bliver kompenseret.
Resultatet har også betydning for den optimale skattebehandling af private køb af
ydelser, der i øvrigt tilvejebringes af det o¤entlige i et universelt system. Det kunne
fx. være køb af private sundhedsforsikringer. Kapitlet viser, at den optimale politik
inkluderer et subsidium, der aftager med indkomst. Det maksimale subsidium er altid
mindre end omkostningen ved at servicere et enkelt individ i det o¤entlige system.
Kapitel 3, Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis, er resultatet af et samarbejde
med Claus Thustrup Kreiner. Dette kapitel beskæftiger sig ligeledes med statens rolle i
tilvejebringelsen af visse ydelser, men fokuserer i stedet på o¤entlige goder, der kommer
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alle til gode. Vores analyse er inspireret af den fortsatte uenighed, der hersker i den
akademiske litteratur om det optimale udbud af o¤entlige goder.
Den eksisterende litteratur er domineret af to forskellige tilgange. Den første forudsæt-
ter ingen systematisk sammenhæng mellem udgifter til det o¤entlige gode og nansierin-
gen, udover kravet om budgetbalance. Denne tilgang understreger forvridningsomkost-
ningerne ved beskatning og fordelingshensyn som de vigtigste faktorer, der bestemmer
det optimal udbud. Den anden tilgang anvender det såkaldte benet principle, der bygger
på eksibiliteten af den ikke-lineære indkomstskat og eliminerer enhver fordelingsmæssig
e¤ekt ved udformningen af nansieringsplanen. Denne anden tilgang har fokuseret på at
identicere nødvendige betingelser, for at den oprindelige Samuelson regel gælder.
Kapitlet præsenterer en helt generel analyse af det optimale udbud af o¤entlige goder
baseret på benet principle. Vi udleder et intuitivt kriterie, der kan afgøre, hvornår
en marginal udvidelse af udbudet af et o¤entligt gode er ønskværdig. Dette kriterie
identicerer korrelationen mellem individuel produktivitet og betalingsvilligheden for det
o¤entlige gode som afgørende for enhver afvigelse fra Samuelson reglen.
Kapitlet præsenterer samtidig en syntese af de to tilgange i den eksiterende litter-
atur ved at demonstrere, at de begge kan udledes fra den samme grundlæggende formel.
Den eneste forskel består i de restriktioner, der pålægges nansieringsplanen. Vi præsen-
terer endvidere en generalisering af de nødvendige betingelser, for at Samuelson reglen
holder. Det demonstreres, at korrelationer mellem indkomst og betalingsvillighed, der
ikke skyldes den underliggende produktivitet, ikke fører til afvigelser fra Samuelson re-
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glen. Endelig viser vi, at den traditionelle fokus på MCF i analyser af det optimale udbud
af o¤entlige goder kun er berettiget i særlige tilfælde.
I Kapitel 4, Taxation, Regulation, and Cue-Triggered Consumption, studerer jeg den
optimale politik overfor forbrugsgoder, hvor efterspørgslen er påvirket af såkaldte cues.
Når en forbruger udsættes for et cue, som når en ryger ser en cigaret, øges forbruget af det
relaterede gode. Den store udfordring for velfærdsøkonomi består i at afgøre, hvorvidt
cue-påvirket efterspørgsel er udtryk for en rationel respons eller ej.
Kapitlet præsenterer en simpel ramme, der tillader både rationelle beslutninger og
begrænset rationalitet. Modellen tillader en analyse af såvel den optimal skattepolitik
som af e¤ekterne af cue regulering. Jeg viser, at det er optimalt at subsidiere cue-
udløst forbrug, når forbrugerne er fuldt rationelle. Det optimale subsidium er aftagende
i graden af cue-regulering. Derimod er det optimal at beskatte forbruget af syndgoder,
når fobrugerne lider af begrænset rationalitet. Den optimale skat aftager med graden af
cue-regulering.
Resultatet, at forøget cue-regulering fører til mindre anvendelse af skatteinstrumentet,
er et nyt og gælder uanset graden af individuel rationalitet. Endelig demonstreres det,
at politikker såsom forbud mod rygning på o¤entlige steder generelt er ine¢ ciente.
Kapitel 5, An Evaluation of the Tax-Transfer Treatment of Married Couples in European
Countries, er skrevet i samarbejde med Herwig Immervoll, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, og
Claus Thustrup Kreiner. Vi præsenterer en omfattende analyse af forskellige aspekter af
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skatte- og overførselssystemets behandling af gifte par. Kapitlet benytter EUROMOD
mikrosimulationsmodellen til omhyggeligt at estimere individuelle skattebyrder i 15 EU-
medlemslande (samtlige medlemslande fra før udvidelsen i 2004).
Vi indleder vores analyse med nøje at kortlægge den præcise karakter af afhængighed
mellem ægtefæller i skatte- og overførselssystemerne i hvert af de 15 lande. Det viser sig,
at mange skattesystemer i Europa udviser negativ afhængighed, hvor skattesatsen for
den ene ægtefælle afhænger negativt af den anden ægtefælles indkomst. Tilstedeværelsen
af negativ afhængighed skyldes samspillet mellem familie-baserede overførsler og indi-
viduel eller næsten-individuel beskatning. Dette mønster demonstrerer endvidere, at den
traditionelle skarpe skelnen mellem individuelle og fælles skattesystemer er forsimplet.
Næste punkt i vores analyse er arbejdsudbudsincitamenterne for second earners og
implikationerne heraf for velfærdse¤ekterne af forskellige reformer, der ændrer den rela-
tive beskatning af ægtefæller. Vi opstiller en simpel model for en families arbejdsudbud
og fokuserer på deltagelsesbeslutningen, fordi empirien tyder på, at kvinders arbejds-
markedsdeltagelse er særdeles følsom overfor skatteincitamenter. Vores resultater indik-
erer, at der i de este europæiske lande er store velfærdsgevinster forbundet med at
reducere skattebyrden for second earners.
Endelig simulerer kapitletmarriage penalties for hypotetiske husholdninger. Vi nder,
at der er store skattemæssige omkostninger ved ægteskab i bunden af indkomstfordelin-
gen (men ikke i toppen) i de este lande. Disse kan primært tilskrives famlie-baserede
overførsler, og derfor gårmarriage penalties typisk hånd i hånd med negativ afhængighed.
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Chapter 1
Intertemporal Tax Wedges and
Marginal Deadweight Loss
Jes Winther Hansen Nicolaj Verdelin
University of Copenhagen and EPRU
September 2007
Abstract
This paper demonstrates the importance of accounting for intertemporal sub-
stituition in taxable income when evaluating the e¢ ciency loss of income taxation.
Ignoring intertemporal substitution, which recent empirical evidence suggests is
substantial, leads to biased estimates of the deadweight loss of taxation. This
points to the problem of using a static approach to estimate the deadweight loss
and holds signicant implications for income tax progression. Using an empirically
applicable expression for the marginal deadweight loss, we conduct simulations of
tax reforms on U.S: panel data and nd sizable biases.
Keywords: Intertemporal substitution; Intertemporal tax wedges; Marginal deadweight
loss; Income taxation
JEL classication: H21; H24; D91
We are grateful to Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, and seminar participants at
the University of Copenhagen for helpful comments. All remaining errors are ours.
Chapter 1: Intertemporal Tax Wedges and Marginal Deadweight Loss
1 Introduction
Studies of income taxation have traditionally restricted attention to static models. In
practice, however, income is taxed annually, which makes the study of income taxation
an inherently dynamic question. The combination of annual income taxation and a pro-
gressive tax schedule causes individual marginal tax rates to change when the taxpayers
income varies over time. This recurrent variation in marginal tax rates gives rise to in-
tertemporal tax wedges between di¤erent years. These wedges distort the intertemporal
allocation of income by creating an incentive for intertemporal substitution because tax-
payers can reduce their overall tax liability by shifting income to years when they face low
marginal tax rates. This paper demonstrates that intertemporal substitution in taxable
income is important for assessing the e¢ ciency of tax reforms  even for modest elastic-
ities of intertemporal substitution. The previous studies by Harberger (1964), Browning
(1987), and Feldstein (1999) that have developed and used the static framework to eval-
uate the deadweight loss of income taxation have ignored intertemporal substitution and
may have produced biased estimates.
We simulate marginal tax reforms on U.S: data for a range of values for the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution in order to quantify the biases from intertemporal
responses. To lay the foundation for the empirical simulations, we rst derive a simple,
empirically applicable expression for the marginal deadweight loss of income taxation in
a dynamic setting. We show that the distortions from a marginal tax reform arises both
from the level of the marginal tax rate and from the intertemporal tax wedges. Account-
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Percent of
group
Average
MTR
Average absolute MTR
change (pct. points)
Full sample 37.7% 7.6
At least one tax change 76.1% 38.6% 10.0
One change 25.1% 37.9% 10.6
Two changes 26.6% 38.4% 10.5
Three changes 24.4% 39.5% 8.7
High-income taxpayers
At least one tax change 93.2% 45.4% 5.5
Table 1: Intertemporal tax wedges, 1996 1999.
The rst column shows the distribution of taxpayers according to the number of times their marginal tax
rate changed between 1996 and 1999. High-income taxpayers have taxable income above $100,000. The
second column lists the average marginal tax rates over the period for these groups. The third column
displays the average absolute di¤erence in marginal tax rates between contiguous years. The table is
based on a trimmed sample that, e.g., excludes observations with a change in marital status (see Section
4). Sources: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 panel, and NBERs TAXSIM model.
ing for intertemporal substitution leads to higher estimates of the marginal deadweight
loss if the reform increases intertemporal tax wedges, e.g., by raising the tax rate in one
of the top brackets. Analogously, it leads to lower estimates if intertemporal tax wedges
are reduced. In some cases, a marginal tax increase can even improve overall e¢ ciency if
the reduction in intertemporal tax wedges is su¢ ciently strong. The underlying intuition
resembles the Ramsey tax problem where the e¢ ciency cost of a tax on one good (in-
come in one year) depends on pre-existing taxes on other goods (income in other years).
These insights are important for evaluating the costs of, e.g., the Earned Income Tax
Credit, time-limited transfers such as the U.S: dependent exemption, and the progression
of income tax rates.
The practical importance of intertemporal tax wedges can be illustrated by considering
17
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Figure 1: E¤ective marginal tax rates in California for di¤erent tax units, 1999.
Combined state and federal e¤ective marginal income tax rates. Source: NBERs TAXSIM model.
the nationally representative Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) sample
for the U.S. Table 1 illustrates the year-to-year variation in marginal tax rates for this
sample. The rst column shows the distribution of taxpayers according to the number of
times their marginal tax rate changed between 1996 and 1999. An estimated 76% percent
of survey respondents experienced at least one change and as many as 24% saw changes
every year. The second column lists the average marginal tax rates over the period for
each of these groups. The nal column illustrates the size of the variation in marginal rates
by calculating the average absolute di¤erence in marginal tax rates between contiguous
years. For instance, the marginal tax rate changed on average 8.7 percentage points
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from year to year for the group of taxpayers experiencing three changes. Changes in
the marginal tax rate are even more common for high-income taxpayers. Among those
taxpayers with taxable income in excess of $100,000 in at least one year, a full 93%
experienced a marginal tax change. Overall, the table shows that intertemporal tax
wedges are common and sizable. The presence of intertemporal tax wedges reects the
complex shape of the U.S: income tax schedule as illustrated in Figure 1, which displays
marginal tax rates for di¤erent families with taxable income below $325,000. The kinks
in the tax schedule imply that marginal tax rates may change considerably from year to
year, even for small changes in income.
Taxpayers can substitute taxable income intertemporally through an intertemporal
reallocation of labor supply or by merely changing the timing of income. Labor supply
can be adjusted by working overtime or taking on additional jobs, the timing of salaries
and bonuses is exible to some degree, and there is almost full discretion over the exercise
of stock options and the realization of asset gains. Generally, high-income earners are
expected to have more exibility in adjusting their incomes but many of these options are
also available to lower income groups. The opportunity to take advantage of intertemporal
tax incentives depends crucially on taxpayersability to anticipate future marginal tax
rates. Some events are di¢ cult to predict, e.g., divorces, layo¤s, and loss of earnings
ability due to illness. Others are more easily anticipated such as promotions, tax bracket
creep, and expiration of time-limited tax credits. All these factors contribute to the
individual propensity to substitute income over time.
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While intertemporal substitution has long been recognized in the empirical literature
on labor supply, only a few studies have produced direct estimates of elasticities of in-
tertemporal substitution in taxable income. This response has commonly been regarded
as a short-term, temporary adjustment around the time of a tax reform. It is important
to recognize, however, that an annual progressive income tax gives a recurrent incentive
to shift income intertemporally. Goolsbee (2000) studies the OBRA93 tax reform, which
raised marginal tax rates at the top. He nds evidence of substantial intertemporal substi-
tution for high-income earners around the time when the reform was implemented. While
Goolsbee focused on a tax reform, Looney and Singhal (2006) exploit the expiration of the
U.S: tax exemption for dependents to estimate the response to year-to-year variation in
marginal tax rates. Their ndings suggest considerable intertemporal shifting of earned
income for families with middle incomes around $60,000. Overall, the limited empirical
evidence indicates that intertemporal substitution in taxable income is non-negligible.
In our empirical simulations, we consider three tax reforms for the U.S. First, a
marginal increase in the 36% federal rate, which was the second-highest federal rate
applicable in 1999. We nd that accounting for intertemporal substitution substantially
increases the estimate of the marginal deadweight loss of the 36% rate in accordance
with the prediction that the reform increases intertemporal tax wedges. Second, we
consider an increase in the lowest federal rate, the 15% rate. As expected, accounting
for intertemporal responses decreases the estimated marginal deadweight loss of the 15%
rate. Finally, we analyze a more complicated reform that introduces phase-out of the
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personal tax exemption. Because it lowers a severe intertemporal tax wedge, this reform
improves e¢ ciency in many scenarios. As a preview of our numerical results, we estimate
the marginal deadweight loss of the 15% federal rate in a static framework to be 7% of
tax revenue for an elasticity of taxable income of 0:2. Accounting for tax bracket mobility
and intertemporal substitution, with an intertemporal cross-price elasticity of  0:05, the
estimate drops to 5:4%, which is a decrease of 23%. A cross-price elasticity of  0:05
corresponds to, e.g., a mere 0:5% decrease in taxable income this year in response to a
10% increase in the net-of-tax marginal rate next year. The sensitivity of the estimated
marginal deadweight loss to intertemporal responses, even when these are very small, is
a general nding of our empirical simulations.
The study of income taxation in a dynamic setting has recently attracted considerable
interest. Werning (2007) demonstrates the optimality of marginal tax smoothing with a
non-linear tax in a model with aggregate uncertainty when there is no idiosyncratic skill
mobility. In another recent paper, Gaube (2007) solves for the optimal income tax in a
two-period, two-type model under the assumption that income is taxed annually. While
we do not attempt to solve the optimal dynamic tax problem, we provide an empirical
account of the intertemporal e¢ ciency costs that are a key determinant of optimal taxes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set up a dynamic model of income
taxation and present our theoretical analysis. We begin the quantitative analysis in
Section 3 by considering the problem of calibrating behavioral elasticities and proceed to
the empirical simulations in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Marginal Deadweight Loss in a Dynamic Setting
By far the most prevalent way of taxing income is by means of an annual income tax.
Although this can be supplemented by some redistribution based on lifetime income
(e.g., asset-tested benets for retirees), such policies constitute a minor part of most tax
systems. Annual income taxation gives taxpayers an incentive to shift income over time
in order to reduce their tax liabilities when facing a progressive tax schedule.
In this section, we develop an expression for the marginal deadweight loss of income
taxation in a dynamic setting. This expression allows us identify the bias from ignor-
ing intertemporal substitution in taxable income and forms the basis for the empirical
simulations in Section 4. The novel aspect of our approach is to isolate the distortions
from the intertemporal tax wedges. These dynamic distortions are precluded in previous
studies using a static approach.
The analysis builds on a simple extension of a static model with two goods. Each
taxpayer has a nite planning horizon of N periods and a well-behaved utility function
U (c1; z1; :::cn; zn; :::cN ; zN), where the subscript n refers to the time index. The taxpayer
gets utility from a consumption good, c, and disutility from income, z. To simplify the
exposition the interest rate is assumed to be zero, but the model can readily be generalized
to incorporate discounting. Also, there is no uncertainty and no restrictions on savings
between periods. Income is taxed in each period using a piece-wise linear tax schedule.
The tax function T (z) constitutes a net payment to the public sector, embodying both
taxes and transfers, and is constant over time. It is convenient to express the taxpayers
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problem as an expenditure minimization problem
min
fcn;zng
NX
n=1
[cn   zn + T (zn)]   [U (c1; z1; :::cn; zn; :::cN ; zN)  u] ; (1)
where  is a Lagrange multiplier and u is the utility level. From (1) we obtain a sequence
of compensated demand functions, cn = cn (T; u), and compensated income supply func-
tions, zn = zn (T; u).1 The value function for the minimization problem is the expenditure
function, e (T; u) =
P
[cn   zn + T (zn)].
The deadweight loss of taxation (also called the excess burden) is based on a con-
ceptual experiment where the government imposes taxes, thereby distorting prices, and
returns the revenue to the taxpayer lump sum. The deadweight loss is the amount of
income in excess of tax revenue that the taxpayer is willing to give up in return for a
removal of all taxes.2 The e¢ ciency impact of a tax reform is expressed as the change in
the deadweight loss, which is the change in taxpayer expenditure less the change in tax
revenue
DWL = e

T^ ; u

  e

T ; u

 
NX
n=1
h
T^ (z^n)  T (zn)
i
;
where T (z) is the pre-reform tax function and T^ (z^) is the post-reform tax function. The
associated sequence of compensated income supply functions are zn and z^n, respectively.
In this section, we consider a tax reform consisting of a change in the tax rate tj in
a single tax bracket j.3 The change in tj changes the tax function T (z) in all periods.
1We do not consider taxpayers who are located at kink points in the tax schedule. Theoretically,
there may be bunching at kink points, but the literature has not found evidence that such behavior is
widespread, e.g., Saez (2002). Further, if the income distribution is continuous and there are a nite
number of kink points, individuals located at these points have measure zero.
2See Auerbach (1985) for a thorough theoretical exposition of the deadweight loss of taxation.
3In Appendix B, we analyze a general tax reform where marginal tax rates in several tax brackets
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However, the taxpayer only experiences a marginal tax change in periods when she is
taxed in bracket j at the margin. Since the reform changes T (z) in all periods, it can
be interpreted as a permanent tax reform before the rst period. This is similar to the
reform underlying the deadweight loss in the static model, except that in our case the
single static period is partitioned into N sub-periods.4
The marginal deadweight loss of tj for each taxpayer is the e¢ ciency e¤ect of a
marginal change in tj. We use the following notation: n is the taxpayers marginal tax
rate in period n and 
 is the set of periods where n = tj, i.e., the periods where the
taxpayers marginal tax rate changes (because the taxpayer is taxed in bracket j at the
margin). The intertemporal tax wedge between periods n andm is the absolute di¤erence
in marginal tax rates, jn   mj. We have
dDWL
dtj
=
de (T; u)
dtj
 
NX
n=1
dT (zn)
dtj
=
NX
n=1
(
@T (zn)
@tj
 
X
m2


@cn
@ (1  m)   (1  n)
@zn
@ (1  m)
)
 
NX
n=1
"
@T (zn)
@tj
  n
X
m2

@zn
@ (1  m)
#
:
In each period there are e¤ects on expenditure from the mechanical change in tax liability
(absent behavioral responses) and from responses in c and z to the marginal tax rate
changes in all periods m 2 
. Analogously, tax revenue in each period changes both
change simultaneously.
4Alternatively, the deadweight loss can be interpreted as the e¢ ciency cost of a tax reform from the
moment the reform is announced. This requires that we regard bracket j before and after the reform
as two separate tax brackets. However, the model cannot capture the deadweight loss from unexpected
changes in the tax schedule.
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mechanically and as a result of responses in taxable income.
By the envelope theorem, behavioral responses have no rst order e¤ects on the
taxpayers minimized expenditure. As a result, the marginal deadweight loss can be
expressed solely as the revenue implications of the responses in taxable income
dDWL
dtj
=
NX
n=1
n
1  tj zn
X
m2

"nm; (2)
where "nm  [(1  m) =zn]  @zn=@ (1  m) is the compensated elasticity of taxable
income in period n with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate in period m.5 We have
also used that m = tj for all m 2 
 by denition. The compensated elasticity of
taxable income neatly sums up all relevant behavioral responses, including labor supply,
tax avoidance, and the form of compensation, as emphasized by Feldstein (1999), as well
as changes to the timing of income, whether due to intertemporal substitution in labor
supply or the timing of reporting.
For each period where tj is the marginal tax rate, there (a) is an intratemporal dis-
tortion of income within the period, captured by the own-price elasticity, "mm, and (b)
are changes in income in all other periods because of intertemporal substitution, which
is captured by the cross-price elasticities, "nm for n 6= m. Compensated own-price elas-
ticities are always non-negative. The intertemporal cross-price elasticities are intuitively
expected to be non-positive such that an increase in m implies a (partial) increase in
period n income, which is now relatively cheaper. Throughout this paper we will assume
5Only compensated responses count towards the marginal deadweight loss. Income e¤ects do not
matter since the denition of the deadweight loss assumes that tax revenue can be returned to the
taxpayer lump-sum.
25
Chapter 1: Intertemporal Tax Wedges and Marginal Deadweight Loss
that the cross-price elasticities are negative, but at this point we do not impose further
restrictions. Expression (2) is easily empirically applicable since it is based on elasticities
that are, in principle, directly observable. Crucially, these elasticities are not structural
parameters but depend on the economic environment, the tax schedule in place, and the
tax reform in question.
The ultimate aim of this section is to provide a framework allowing us to assess the
bias from ignoring intertemporal substitution in taxable income when computing the
marginal deadweight loss. In order to achieve this we introduce the static elasticity, .
The static elasticity is dened as the compensated response in income to a permanent
change in the marginal net-of-tax rate for a taxpayer who faces the same marginal tax
rate,  , in all periods. Since  is derived for a constant marginal tax rate, the static
response involves no intertemporal substitution in taxable income due to intertemporal
tax wedges
n 
1  
zn
dzn
d (1  ) =
NX
m=1
"nm: (3)
This response is equivalent to the response in a static model, which, by denition, has
no tax bracket mobility. Using (3), we can rewrite (2) as (see Appendix A for details)
dDWL
dtj
=
tj
1  tj
X
m2

zmm
+
X
m2

X
n6=m

n
1  tj zn"nm  
tj
1  tj zm"mn

: (4)
Equation (4) identies the bias from ignoring intertemporal tax wedges and substitution
in taxable income. The rst term is the static e¤ect. This reects that an increase in
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the marginal tax rate, tj, creates an e¢ ciency loss because the taxpayer substitutes away
from income toward leisure. This distortion is present in all periods where the taxpayer
faces the marginal tax increase and arises from the level of tj. The static e¤ect disregards
tax bracket mobility and hence corresponds to the traditional static Harberger-Browning
formula for the marginal deadweight loss. In addition, there is a dynamic e¤ect captured
by the second term. Individual marginal tax rates vary over time due to the shape of
the tax schedule. When tj increases, income is substituted over time toward other tax
brackets, which are now relatively cheaper. As a consequence, there is a revenue loss
from substitution toward periods with lower marginal tax rates and a revenue gain from
substitution toward periods with higher marginal tax rates. This is a distortion from
intertemporal substitution in taxable income.
In Section 4 we evaluate (4) on a panel data set in order to quantify the bias. Failing
to take account of intertemporal substitution, as the static approach does, corresponds
to assuming that "nm = 0 for n 6= m. Although ignoring a margin of behavioral response
always leads to an underestimate of the total deadweight loss, the marginal deadweight
loss can be either positively or negatively biased depending on how the tax reform a¤ects
intertemporal tax wedges. From the dynamic e¤ect in (4), the bias tends to be negative
if intertemporal tax wedges are increased. In this case, the taxpayer generally faces
marginal tax rates that are lower than tj and hence raising tj increases the distortion
from intertemporal substitution. Likewise, the bias tends to be positive if intertemporal
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tax wedges are reduced.6 In the latter case, there is the possibility that a marginal tax
increase can improve overall e¢ ciency. The simple second-best explanation is that the
intratemporal distortion associated with a tax increase can be dominated by e¢ ciency
gains from reductions of intertemporal distortions. The reverse can also be true: lowering
a marginal tax rate can reduce e¢ ciency if intertemporal tax distortions are exacerbated.
Results:
1. Ignoring intertemporal substitution in income underestimates the marginal dead-
weight loss of income taxation when intertemporal tax wedges increase.
2. Ignoring intertemporal substitution in income overestimates the marginal dead-
weight loss of income taxation when intertemporal tax wedges decrease.
3. In some cases, an increase in a positive marginal tax rate can improve e¢ ciency if
intertemporal tax wedges decrease.
On a general note, (4) reveals that intertemporal substitution in taxable income adds to
the e¢ ciency costs of a progressive income tax. When there is income mobility, tax pro-
gression creates intertemporal tax wedges that distort the timing of income. Importantly,
income mobility in general also weakens the redistributional motive for tax progression
by making the distribution of lifetime income less unequal than the distribution in a
6If marginal tax rates are progressive, such that m  n () zm  zn, there is a clear case for
the biases described in the text. The biases can then only be of the opposite sign if there are strong
asymmetries in the cross-price elasticities.
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single year. Although our analysis does not pretend to speak of optimality, these insights
suggest that progressive income taxation may be less desirable than previously thought.
3 Empirical Evidence on Behavioral Elasticities
The analysis in Section 2 demonstrated that there can be biases from ignoring intertem-
poral substitution in taxable income when calculating the marginal deadweight loss of
taxation. In the remainder of the paper we simulate tax reforms using U.S: data in order
to stress the quantitative importance of these biases. The simulations require data on
tax bracket mobility, i.e., information on income and marginal tax rates for a panel of
taxpayers. We also need estimates of the behavioral elasticities in order to calibrate the
model. In this section, we briey review and discuss the relevant empirical evidence on
the elasticity of taxable income.
A key question is the size of the intertemporal cross-price elasticities of taxable income
but only a small number of empirical studies have produced direct estimates of these elas-
ticities. One common approach to estimating the behavioral responses to taxation is to
use a tax reform as a source of exogenous variation in marginal tax rates. Most studies
using this methodology attempt to eliminate the inuence of short-run intertemporal sub-
stitution on the estimation in order to obtain estimates of the permanent response. The
reason is that the short-run substitution is considered a temporary response around the
time of the reform. However, as stressed above, the incentive to shift income intertem-
porally is a recurrent phenomenon when there is tax bracket mobility and the short-run
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responses may very well be important. Goolsbee (2000) nds evidence of substantial
short-run intertemporal substitution in response to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act in 1993 (OBRA93) among high income corporate executives. The main specica-
tion results in an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the current net-of-tax rate
above one and an elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate the following year of about
 0:8. This suggests that most of the response to OBRA93 was transitory and that the
permanent response has an elasticity of less than 0:4. Importantly, most of the response
appears to be driven by the exercise of stock options. The corresponding elasticities for
salaries and bonuses only are much smaller and the cross-price elasticity is statistically
insignicant. It is di¢ cult to generalize the results, both because of the special nature
of executive compensation and because it is likely that OBRA93 was only anticipated in
the last few months of 1992, leaving a short time for anticipatory responses.
Instead of using direct estimates, the compensated intertemporal cross-price elastici-
ties can be approximated by exploiting the di¤erent responses to expected and unexpected
marginal tax changes. The relationship between any two periods m 6= n on the intertem-
poral income path, assuming that there are no unexpected changes in tax rates, can be
approximated by
ln zn = ln zm + nm [ln (1  n)  ln (1  m)] + nm; (5)
where nm is the Frisch elasticity and nm is an error term assumed independent of the
tax schedule.7 The Frisch elasticity measures the response in income to expected changes
7Empirically, factors that inuence income can also a¤ect marginal tax rates directly, implying that
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in the net-of-tax marginal rate along the income path.8 A tax reform, in e¤ect from
the rst period onwards, that changes the net-of-tax marginal rate in period m causes
a reallocation of income such that the entire intertemporal path of income shifts. The
compensated intertemporal cross-price elasticity of income in period n with respect to
1  m measures how much zn shifts as part of this response. Since (5) also holds on the
new income path, we can nd the compensated intertemporal elasticity by di¤erentiating
(5) with respect to 1  m
"nm = "mm   nm; (6)
where "nm  [(1  m) =zn] @zn=@ (1  m) is the compensated elasticity as before. It
can be shown theoretically that nm  "mm for all m (see, e.g., MaCurdy, 1981). Hence,
the intertemporal cross-price elasticity is non-positive: an increase in the marginal tax
rate in period m increases income in period n because income is substituted toward the
relatively cheaper period n. We assume that both " and  are constant over time, such
that we can use (6) to parameterize our simulations using only the static elasticity 
and the Frisch elasticity . In this case,  is also constant and non-negative and from
(3) the cross-price elasticities are "nm = [ + (N   1) ] =N    for all m and n. The
assumption of constant elasticities is not necessarily very realistic since it implies that
"nm is independent of the time interval between period m and period n. Intertemporal
the error term could be correlated with the tax rates. An example is the birth of a child. Our approx-
imation is valid as long as consistent estimates of the Frisch elasticity nm are available, i.e., estimates
that capture the correct, partial e¤ect of marginal tax rates on income.
8Mathematically, the Frisch elasticity is the response in earned income to changes in the net-of-tax
rate for a xed marginal utility of income. The Frisch elasticity is often referred to as the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
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cross-price responses are likely lower for longer time horizons, e.g., because of uncertainty
about future income, preferences, etc. Nevertheless, because there is not much empirical
evidence on this relationship, our main simulations will be calibrated assuming constant
cross-price elasticities. We conduct a robustness check of our results by relaxing this
assumption at the end of Section 4.
There is still considerable uncertainty in the empirical literature about the absolute
and relative magnitudes of these elasticities. Whether the Frisch elasticity or the com-
pensated elasticity is estimated depends on whether the variation in marginal tax rates
is expected or unexpected and most studies do not explicitly consider this aspect. In a
seminal paper, MaCurdy (1981) puts forward a framework for estimating intertemporal
labor supply and emphasizes the di¤erence between expected and unexpected changes in
the net wage. Estimating on a panel of white, married males, he nds Frisch elasticities
for labor supply in the range 0.1 0:2 and very small cross-price elasticities. Feldstein
(1995) exploits a panel of tax returns to study the elasticity of taxable income. He uses
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as a natural experiment and nds sizable elasticities well
above one for high income taxpayers. Gruber and Saez (2002) employ a similar empir-
ical strategy but use variation in marginal tax rates from various U.S: tax reforms in
the 1980s and add elaborate controls for mean reversion and distributional changes.9
Their main specication yields an estimate of 0:4 for taxable income and a somewhat
9Interestingly, mean reversion in the U.S: income distribution is well-documented in the literature on
the elasticity of taxable income. This supports the importance of a dynamic setting for the study of
income taxation.
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lower estimate for broad income. The results are mainly driven by responses among
high income taxpayers. Kopczuk (2005) reviews the earlier literature and demonstrates
that the results are sensitive to econometric specications and sample selection e¤ects.
Kopczuk also stresses that the availability of deductions is a very important determinant
of the elasticity of taxable income. In a recent paper, Ljunge and Ragan (2006) estimate
the response in earned income to a tax reform in Sweden. Their sample is a large and
detailed panel of administrative data and they use both static and dynamic empirical
specications. Their preferred estimate is 0:37 for the compensated elasticity of earned
income. In another interesting recent paper, Looney and Singhal (2006) estimate the
responses in income to changes in marginal tax rates due to the expiration of the tax
exemption for dependents, which occurs when the dependent turns 19 years old. Looney
and Singhal argue that any resulting changes in marginal tax rates have been expected
well in advance such that their estimate can be interpreted as a Frisch elasticity. They
nd an elasticity of earned income of 0:75 for middle incomes.
Based on the above evidence, we nd that a reasonable range for  and  is 0.2 0:8
for high incomes and somewhat smaller for low incomes. As a result, we consider cross-
price elasticities in the intervals  0:05 to  0:4 for high incomes and  0:01 to  0:1 for
low incomes reasonable. These ranges are, we believe, quite conservative. The reason is
that we wish to demonstrate the importance of recognizing intertemporal income shifting,
even if the responses are small.
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4 Simulated Tax Reforms on U.S: Data
4.1 Data
Our data set is from the 1996 panel of the U.S: Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP), which covers the years 1996 through 1999. SIPP is a nationally represen-
tative sample and the 1996 panel consists of 116,000 individuals. The data is collected
through interviews every four months with an appointed reference person in each house-
hold, who provides information for all its members. The survey contains information on
earnings and other sources of income ranging from interest income to retirement pen-
sions, demographics including age and gender, and family relationships. The latter allow
us to match individuals in the sample to construct families and couples. In addition to
information about di¤erent sources of income, our tax rate calculations require knowl-
edge of ler status and the number of qualifying dependents, including those eligible for
the Child Tax Credit (CTC). We identify dependents as those sample members who are
younger than 19, or 24 if they are full time students, and count them as eligible for the
CTC in a given year if they are under the age of 17 by the end of that year. Further, we
maintain the assumption that married couples le jointly and that single individuals le
as head of household whenever they have dependents. We exclude observations with a
change in marital status because the resulting tax implications are large and not likely
to be anticipated. We do not have information on itemized deductions and assume that
everyone claims the standard deduction. After trimming the sample by excluding tax
units with missing earnings data at some point during the panel, we end up with 33,826
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tax units.
To eliminate the inuence on marginal tax rates from unexpected changes in legisla-
tion, we convert all income gures into 1999-dollars and use the 1999 tax legislation in
all years.10 We then compute e¤ective marginal tax rates, not accounting for benets,
but including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Alternative Minimum Tax,
using NBERs TAXSIM model.11 Our calculations assume that the EITC take-up rate
is 100% among eligible taxpayers. Although it is not part of our main simulations, we
also use information in SIPP on receipt of TANF, Food Stamps, and SSI, combined with
state and federal rules, to compute phase-out rates for these programs. This allows us to
calculate e¤ective marginal tax rates including benet phase-out.
4.2 Simulations
In this section, we present the results of three simulated tax reforms. The purpose of our
simulations is to shed light on the quantitative importance of the distortions caused by
intertemporal tax wedges. As emphasized throughout the paper, these e¢ ciency costs
would not be captured in a static framework. We calculate the marginal deadweight
loss using equation (B-2) from Appendix B. This formula is similar to (4) but allows
for simultaneous changes in multiple tax brackets. The generalized formula is necessary
because the marginal tax rates may change between years for taxpayers who are a¤ected
10Since there were no federal tax reforms between 1996 and 1999, the unexpected variation could only
come from changes to state tax legislation.
11NBERs TAXSIM model is available on the Internet: www.nber.org/taxsim.
35
Chapter 1: Intertemporal Tax Wedges and Marginal Deadweight Loss
by a given reform in more than one year.12 We use the panel weights included in SIPP and
sum the individual marginal deadweight losses to obtain estimates that are representative
of the U.S: population. Throughout, the marginal deadweight loss is expressed as a
percentage of total tax revenue.
We present the results of our simulations for di¤erent values of the static elasticity
 and the cross-price elasticity "nm. This sensitivity test reects the uncertainty in the
literature about the central elasticities. Further, we consider di¤erent ranges for the two
elasticities across reforms to reect the composition of the group of a¤ected taxpayers. For
each set of parameter values, we express the bias from ignoring intertemporal substitution
by computing the percentage deviation of the marginal deadweight loss from the estimate
obtained for the same value of  under the assumption that all cross-price elasticities are
zero (the values in the rst row of each table).
Reform 1: Marginal tax increase in the 36% federal tax bracket
The rst reform raises the marginal tax rate for all taxpayers who are liable, at the margin,
for the 36% federal rate, which was the second-highest federal marginal rate applicable
in 1999. Specically, we raise the tax rate for taxpayers reporting taxable income in the
range $130,250$283,150 (single lers), $144,400$283,150 (head of household lers), and
$158,550$283,150 (married, ling jointly). On average, 313 tax units in our sample are
a¤ected by the reform in each of the four years, corresponding to 2,259,908 individuals
12We also correct for the di¤erence in tax bases that apply to the federal tax schedule and earnings-
based taxes and transfers. For instance, using only taxable income as the tax base would not capture
the marginal deadweight loss of the EITC for taxpayers with zero taxable income but positive earnings.
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0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8
0 DWL : 3.57 5.36 7.14 10.70 14.30
%-dev. : 0 0 0 0 0
-0.05 4.14 5.93 7.72 11.29 14.86
16.04 10.69 8.02 5.35 4.01
-0.1 4.72 6.50 8.29 11.86 15.43
32.08 21.39 16.04 10.69 8.02
-0.2 5.86 7.65 9.44 13.01 16.58
64.17 42.78 32.08 21.39 16.04
-0.4 8.16 9.94 11.73 15.30 18.87
128.34 85.56 64.17 42.78 32.08
Static elasticity ´
Cross-price
elasticity  "nm
Table 2: Change in the 36% federal bracket (Reform 1).
each year using panel weights. This reform a¤ects only high income lers, approximately
the top 2% of the taxable income distribution. On average, the reform is expected to
increase the intertemporal tax wedges since many of the a¤ected individuals are likely to
face lower marginal tax rates in adjoining years if their marginal tax bracket changes.
We consider values for  of 0:2, 0:3, 0:4, 0:6, and 0:8, and for "nm of 0,  0:05,
 0:1,  0:2, and  0:4. These values are motivated by the fact that the literature has
demonstrated fairly high responsiveness for high income earners. Results of the simulation
exercise for Reform 1 are in Table 2.
In general, the estimates for the marginal deadweight loss are sizable because of
the high average income of the a¤ected taxpayers. Not accounting for intertemporal
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substitution leads to substantial underestimates of the marginal deadweight loss of the
36% federal tax rate. This conrms the intuition that a number of the a¤ected individuals
face a lower marginal tax rate at some point during the panel years. As an example, if
 = 0:4 the baseline static marginal deadweight loss, shown in the rst row of the table,
is estimated to be 7:14% of tax revenue. This estimate ignores intertemporal substitution
in taxable income and corresponds to the static e¤ect. If instead the cross-price elasticity
is assumed to be  0:1, the estimate changes to 8:29% of tax revenue, which is an increase
of 16%. The additional e¢ ciency loss reects that a number of individuals a¤ected by
the reform shift income to years in which they are not subjected to the tax increase.
Reform 2: Marginal tax increase in the 15% federal tax bracket
The second reform involves an increase in the marginal tax rate for all taxpayers in the
15% federal tax bracket. This corresponds to individuals reporting taxable income in the
range $0$25,750 (single lers), $0$34,550 (head of household lers), and $0$43,050
(married, ling jointly). There is a high density of taxpayers in these income ranges and
on average the reform a¤ects 24,507 tax units, or 72% of our sample, in each of the four
years. This corresponds to 93,633,068 individuals using panel weights.
We choose lower values for the elasticities than those used for the high income earners
in Reform 1 to reect the ndings in the literature that low income taxpayers are less
responsive. Specically, we consider values for  of 0:1, 0:15, 0:2, 0:3, and 0:4, and for
"nm of 0,  0:01,  0:02,  0:05, and  0:1. The simulation results are in Table 3.
Ignoring intertemporal substitution implies large overestimates of the marginal dead-
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0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 DWL : 3.52 5.27 7.03 10.55 14.06
%-dev. : 0 0 0 0 0
-0.01 3.19 4.95 6.71 10.22 13.74
-9.23 -6.15 -4.62 -3.08 -2.31
-0.02 2.87 4.62 6.38 9.90 13.41
-18.46 -12.31 -9.23 -6.15 -4.62
-0.05 1.89 3.65 5.41 8.92 12.44
-46.15 -30.77 -23.08 -15.38 -11.54
-0.1 0.27 2.03 3.79 7.30 10.82
-92.31 -61.54 -46.15 -30.77 -23.08
Static elasticity ´
Cross-price
elasticity  "nm
Table 3: Change in the 15% federal bracket (Reform 2).
weight loss. This reects that the 15% rate applies to the lowest federal tax bracket,
which implies that taxpayers are likely to face higher marginal tax rates in surrounding
years. Raising the 15% rate is thus likely to reduce intertemporal tax wedges. As an
example, the static marginal deadweight loss is estimated to be 7:03% of tax revenue if
 = 0:2. If we allow for intertemporal substitution corresponding to, e.g., "nm =  0:05,
the estimate changes to 5:41% of tax revenue, which is a decrease of 23%. Because this
reform a¤ects such a large fraction of taxpayers, the estimates of the marginal deadweight
losses are sizable such that even a small bias is quantitatively important.
Reform 3: Marginal phase-out of exemptions
This reform raises the marginal tax rate for taxpayers reporting zero taxable income but
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who have positive AGI, and who did not receive benets. We interpret this reform as
a marginal phase-out of personal tax exemptions, i.e., a tax on earnings for individuals
reporting income below the threshold for the 15% federal rate. In order to keep benet
recipients una¤ected by the reform, benet phase-out rates would have to be reduced
in the same interval. This reform focuses on a group of individuals with zero taxable
income, because they are very likely to face higher marginal tax rates during the span of
the panel. We further invoke the restriction that individuals a¤ected by the reform did not
receive benets in order to exclude long-term benet recipients. The evidence on mean
reversion found in the literature suggests that the incomes of the remaining taxpayers
are very upward mobile, indicating the importance of intertemporal tax wedges for these
individuals. On average, this reform a¤ects 1,264 tax units in our sample in each of the
four years, corresponding to 6,760,126 individuals each year using panel weights.
For this reform we choose the same elasticity scenarios as for Reform 2. Specically,
we consider values for  of 0:1, 0:15, 0:2, 0:3, and 0:4, and for "nm of 0,  0:01,  0:02,
 0:05, and  0:1. The simulation results are in Table 4.
The reform improves economic e¢ ciency even for very small cross-price elasticities.
For instance, the static marginal deadweight loss is estimated to be 0:06% of tax revenue if
 = 0:2. If further "nm =  0:05, the estimate changes to  0:04%, which is lower by 155%.
This illustrates that e¢ ciency is improved when intertemporal substitution is taken into
account, even though we are considering a marginal tax increase. It is worth noting that
the static marginal deadweight losses in the rst row are all positive. Hence, the e¢ ciency
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0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 DWL : 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.15
%-dev. : 0 0 0 0 0
-0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.13
-61.88 -41.25 -30.94 -20.63 -15.47
-0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.11
-123.76 -82.51 -61.88 -41.25 -30.94
-0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.03
-309.39 -206.26 -154.70 -103.13 -77.35
-0.1 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08
-618.79 -412.53 -309.39 -206.26 -154.70
Static elasticity ´
Cross-price
elasticity  "nm
Table 4: Marginal phase-out of exemptions (Reform 3).
improvement is not due to a reduction of a static tax wedge (e.g., raising a negative
marginal tax), but occurs precisely because of intertemporal income shifting. However,
because the reform a¤ects such a small number of individuals and the tax bases are so
small, this result is of higher qualitative than quantitative importance. Nevertheless, it
highlights that accounting for intertemporal substitution in taxable income can reverse
policy recommendations.
Robustness of results
One concern with the above analysis is the assumption of constant intertemporal cross-
price elasticities. The evidence on intertemporal substitution deals only with the very
short run, typically neighboring years, such that there is little knowledge of cross-price
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´ ´ ´
"nm 0.3 0.4 "nm 0.15 0.2 "nm 0.15 0.2
Two cross responses
DWL : -0.1 6.07 7.85 -0.02 5.09 6.84 -0.02 0.05 0.06
%-dev. : 13.27 9.95 -3.53 -2.65 -21.30 -15.98
-0.2 6.78 8.56 -0.05 4.34 6.10 -0.05 -0.00 0.02
26.53 19.90 -17.65 -13.24 -106.50 -79.88
-0.4 8.20 9.99 -0.1 3.41 5.17 -0.1 -0.06 -0.05
53.06 39.80 -35.30 -26.47 -213.01 -159.75
One cross response
-0.1 5.73 7.52 -0.02 5.17 6.93 -0.02 0.05 0.07
7.03 5.28 -1.86 -1.39 -10.84 -8.13
-0.2 6.11 7.90 -0.05 4.78 6.54 -0.05 0.03 0.05
14.07 10.55 -9.30 -6.97 -54.18 -40.64
-0.4 6.87 8.65 -0.1 4.29 6.05 -0.1 -0.00 0.01
28.14 21.10 -18.59 -13.95 -108.37 -81.28
       Reform 1        Reform 2        Reform 3
Table 5: Sensitivity of results to di¤erent assumptions about intertemporal responses.
responses beyond a one-year horizon. However, it seems likely that there is considerably
less intertemporal substitution between years that are farther apart. We address this
concern by running our simulations under di¤erent assumptions about the cross-price
elasticities. In one scenario, we consider only cross-price responses in two adjoining
years. In another scenario, we consider only cross-price responses in one adjoining year.
The results are reported in Table 5 for selected elasticities.
Results for two cross responses are reported in the upper half of the table. Similarly,
the lower half of the table reports results for one cross response only. In the former
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case, we set the cross-price elasticities to zero in all but two contiguous years. Hence,
for marginal tax changes in 1997 and 1998 there are cross-price responses in neighboring
years, whereas for 1996 and 1999 there are responses in the two following and preceding
years, respectively. The results are not much a¤ected by the exact choice of years; only
the number of years with cross-price responses matters. Comparing the results to Tables
24 shows a dampening of the bias from ignoring intertemporal substitution. While this
was to be expected, the biases remain substantial.
A second concern is that benet phase-out has a large impact on marginal tax rates
for low income taxpayers in our sample (see Figure 2 in Appendix C), and that this
might inuence the results. In results not reported, we have addressed this concern
by repeating our simulations taking account of phase-out. This a¤ects the level of the
marginal deadweight loss but has no appreciable inuence on the bias from ignoring
intertemporal substitution.
Our analysis has not explicitly dealt with the role of uncertainty. Uncertainty about
future income prospects and tax rates a¤ects both the behavior and welfare of individuals.
Most likely, individuals will be less inclined to respond to future tax changes when the
changes are uncertain, which would be reected in lower elasticities of intertemporal
substitution. This is an empirical question that only concerns behavior and should be
kept in mind when considering the appropriate values of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Importantly, the available estimates of the elasticity of substitution reect
the underlying uncertainty in the empirical setting and therefore address this concern
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directly. On the other hand, we do not take the welfare consequences of uncertainty into
account. This requires assumptions about risk aversion and is beyond the scope of the
paper.
To simplify the exposition, our analysis assumes that the interest rate is zero. The
analysis can be extended to incorporate discounting but this has little signicance for
the results. A positive interest rate would a¤ect the level of the estimated marginal
deadweight losses, but has no appreciable, nor economically meaningful, e¤ect on the
bias from ignoring intertemporal tax wedges.
The main conclusion that emerges from the simulations is the importance of taking
into account the e¤ects of a tax reform on intertemporal tax wedges. Even cross-price
responses that are, by any standards, small often substantially changes the estimated
deadweight loss of raising a marginal tax rate slightly. This insight suggests that the
e¢ ciency of the current U.S: tax code may have to be reassessed and, specically, that
the deadweight loss of tax progression is higher than previously thought.
5 Conclusion
It is important to acknowledge that the practice of taxing income at the annual level
holds major implications for the study of income taxation. We have shown that a static
framework can produce substantially biased estimates of the marginal deadweight loss
of income taxation because it ignores intertemporal tax wedges and intertemporal sub-
stitution in taxable income. The failure to recognize intertemporal substitution leads to
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an underestimate of the marginal deadweight loss when intertemporal tax wedges are
increased and an overestimate when intertemporal tax wedges are decreased. In fact,
accounting for intertemporal substitution can reverse conclusions about the e¢ ciency of
tax reform. A general insight is that the e¢ ciency costs of tax progression are higher
once intertemporal responses are taken into account. However, there is still considerable
uncertainty about intertemporal responses to tax changes and it is crucial to improve our
working knowledge in this area in order to make precise policy recommendations.
An important feature of actual tax systems that has been ignored in the analysis is the
taxation of capital income. The literature on income taxation has traditionally focused
either on earned income or on capital income, often allowing limited interplay between
the two instruments. Indeed, most studies of earned income taxation have relied on sta-
tic models rendering analysis of capital taxation futile from the outset. Intertemporal
tax wedges hold implications for capital income taxation because changes to the timing
of income are accompanied by either a savings response or a response in the timing of
consumption. Changes in the incentive to save, for example through capital income tax-
ation, can increase the cost of intertemporal substitution of income and help to alleviate
the distortions from intertemporal tax wedges. This complex interdependency between
the tax incentives for intertemporal income shifting and the e¢ ciency of capital income
taxation is an interesting area for future research.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the Marginal Deadweight Loss
This appendix contains the derivation of the marginal deadweight formula in Section 2.
We consider a marginal change in the tax rate tj in a single tax bracket j. From the text,
we know that the marginal deadweight loss is expressed by
dDWL
dtj
=
NX
n=1
n
1  tj zn
X
m2

"nm; (A-1)
where "nm  [(1  m) =zn] @zn=@ (1  m) is the compensated elasticity of taxable in-
come in period n with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate in period m. The static
elasticity is the compensated taxable income response to a permanent change in the
marginal net-of-tax rate for a taxpayer who faces the same marginal tax rate,  , in all
periods
n 
1  
zn
dzn
d (1  ) =
NX
m=1
"nm: (A-2)
Using (A-2) in (A-1) gives
dDWL
dtj
=
NX
n=1
n
1  tj zn
X
m2

"nm
+
X
m2

tj
1  tj zmm
 
X
m2

tj
1  tj zm
NX
n=1
"mn
=
tj
1  tj
X
m2

zmm
+
X
m2

X
n6=m

n
1  tj zn"nm  
tj
1  tj zm"mn

;
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which is (4) from the text.
B General Tax Reform
This appendix considers the marginal deadweight loss from a general change, d , in the
tax function T (z). Each taxpayer solves the expenditure minimization problem in (1).
As in Section 2, n is the taxpayers marginal tax rate in period n, but now 
 is the set
of periods where the marginal tax rate changes following the reform. For each taxpayer
we derive the marginal deadweight loss of the reform as in Section 2
dDWL
d
=
de (T; u)
d
 
NX
n=1
dT (zn)
d
=
NX
n=1
(
@T (zn)
@
 
X
m2


@cn
@ (1  m)   (1  n)
@zn
@ (1  m)
)
 
NX
n=1
"
@T (zn)
@
  n
X
m2

@zn
@ (1  m)
#
:
There are no rst order e¤ects on the minimized expenditure from behavioral responses,
such that we can write the marginal deadweight loss as
dDWL
d
=
NX
n=1
X
m2

n
1  m zn"nm; (B-1)
where "nm  [(1  m) =zn] @zn=@ (1  m) is the compensated elasticity of income in
period n with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate in period m.
By inserting the denition of the static elasticity 
n 
1  
zn
dzn
d (1  ) =
NX
m=1
"nm;
47
Chapter 1: Intertemporal Tax Wedges and Marginal Deadweight Loss
we can rewrite (B-1) as
dDWL
d
=
NX
n=1
X
m2

n
1  m zn"nm
+
X
m2

m
1  m zmm
 
X
m2

m
1  m zm
NX
n=1
"mn
=
X
m2

m
1  m zmm
+
X
m2

X
n6=m

n
1  m zn"nm  
m
1  m zm"mn

; (B-2)
which forms the basis for our numerical simulations in Section 4.
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Figure 2: E¤ective low income marginal tax rates in California, 1999.
The black line displays combined state and federal e¤ective marginal income tax rates. The gray line
includes benet phase-out rates. Source: NBERs TAXSIM model.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal design of policy schemes for public provision
of private goods under asymmetric information by asking whether provision should
be universal or targeted through means-testing. Further, the paper determines the
optimal tax treatment of purchases of market alternatives to publicly provided pri-
vate goods when universal provision is implemented. Two important conclusions
emerge from the analysis. First, universal provision can never be justied as an
e¢ cient means of redistribution and may diminish the governments scope for re-
distribution. Instead, the optimum is always de facto means-tested. Second, it is
shown that the optimal tax policy under universalism involves lump sum subsidies
that decrease with income. Top incomes are likely not to be eligible for a subsidy.
A tax expenditure type policy that makes private purchases deductible from the
income tax base does not implement the optimum. The subsidy result follows from
an equivalence between equilibria with means-testing and equilibria with universal
provision and subsidization.
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Chapter 2: Public Provision of Private Goods: Optimal Provision Schemes
1 Introduction
There are numerous examples of governments providing private goods to their citizens.
Most prominent are the cases of health care, education and various forms of social in-
surance but the list is certainly longer, especially in Europe. While some government
involvement is common in most developed countries, the range and scope of the gov-
ernments role di¤ers vastly across countries. In the U.S., the right to public provision
tends to be means-tested and limited to fairly small groups, although public schooling is
a notable exception. In many european welfare states, on the other hand, the government
is typically the main provider of a number of private goods and provision is more often
than not available to all citizens.
From the perspective of optimal policy design universal public provision of private
goods gives rise to two basic questions. One concerns the justication for government
intervention in goods provision and has been studied at least since Musgrave (1959). The
other asks whether or when provision should be universally available and has received
much less attention. The focus of the present paper is to examine when universalism is
part of the optimal policy design.
There may be instances when universal public provision is justied per se because
private provision is hampered by a global market failure, or because the government
has direct preferences over the consumption patterns of all individuals. However, such
instances are not the topic of this paper. Instead, the present analysis assumes, as is
standard in public nance, that the design of government policies is guided by a desire
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to help the least well-o¤. Thus, government intervention in private goods provision is
justied only as a means to help the poor, either directly or through increased redistri-
bution. When the government cannot observe true needs directly (e.g., innate ability),
it is forced to rely on an imperfect signal such as income. This raises a basic question
of policy design; whether publicly provided goods aimed at the poor should be targeted
through means-testing or made universally available.
An argument in favor of universal provision must imply that it gives rise to an equi-
librium that is superior to any equilibrium attainable without universal provision. This
does not necessarily require that all agents consume the publicly provided good, but
the equilibrium must hinge on the good being available to all agents. To be precise,
this paper speaks of public provision when the government makes a certain private good
available in a predetermined quantity or quality to a possibly limited set of individuals.
Often there will be no direct link between individual consumption and individual expen-
diture. Instead, the program is nanced through the tax system and contributions are
compulsory. Public provision is universal if the good is made available to all members
of society. This denition does not invoke any direct restrictions on private provision.
A market alternative will be available if it is protable, i.e., if there is private demand
at protable prices. But universal provision implicitly forces everyone to purchase the
publicly provided good.
One of the main criticisms of public provision of private goods is that it violates the
principle of consumer sovereignty. It is generally best to leave the choice of consumption
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bundle to the individual consumer since she is presumably better informed about her own
preferences than the government. With heterogeneous consumers, a policy that forces
everyone to buy a certain good in a xed quality is bound to introduce ine¢ ciencies in
provision. The traditional argument in favor of government interference in goods provi-
sion refers to public goods and has no bearing on private goods. The private provision
of public goods is hampered by free-riding, which leads to ine¢ ciently low provision in
the laissez-faire equilibrium, This can be solved either by tax incentives or direct public
provision (see, e.g., Diamond, 2006). However, unlike public goods, private goods are
both rival and excludable and therefore do not su¤er from free-riding.
The fact that government provision comes at a cost does not rule out the scope for
benecial intervention. One such instance is when provision is ine¢ cient in the private
equilibrium. This can occur, for instance, when market interaction su¤ers from asym-
metric information. Indeed, it is well established that informational asymmetries may
cause markets to collapse entirely. While this may justify government provision, there
is no general presumption that governments can overcome these ine¢ ciencies if public
o¢ cials su¤er from the same informational barriers as do economic agents.
Paternalism has also been invoked in favor of government provision. If some agents are
boundedly rational and tend to, e.g., underconsume certain goods when left to themselves,
governments may benecially intervene by providing the goods in question directly. For
instance, social security is often justied by a concern that many may be saving too
little for retirement. But when consumers are heterogeneous, with respect to earnings
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potential, preferences or behavioral lapses, the benets of this type of policy typically
must be weighted against the cost of forcing people to enter the program.
Finally, in kind transfers have been suggested as an e¢ cient means of redistribution
when preferences di¤er in a systematic way between agents of di¤erent ability (Nichols
and Zeckhauser, 1982, and Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988). Specically, the government
can achieve more redistribution by including in the transfer package goods that are valued
less by the more able, than it can relying solely on a non-linear income tax. It is crucial
for this line of reasoning that transfers be means-tested.
Many publicly provided private goods such as education or health care are consumed
in discrete quantities. In these cases, the relevant decision margin is usually the quality
of the good consumed rather than the quantity purchased (Besley and Coate, 1991).
For instance, patients in need of medical surgery value the quality of the procedure, not
the number of operations. Similarly, parents do not send their children to more than
one school but instead value the quality of teaching. When consumption is discrete, a
person who chooses to rely on public provision will not demand the same good from the
private market. The formal analysis in this paper treats the case of discrete consumption
goods, although the results are also relevant when public provision can be supplemented
by private purchases, as long as the publicly provided good and the preferred market
alternative are not perfect substitutes.
The present paper shows that universal provision is generally Pareto dominated by
means-tested programs. Indeed, the reditributive optimum with public provision of pri-
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vate goods is always de facto means-tested. Crucially, this implies that the redistributive
optimum is una¤ected by the preferences of the high-productivity individuals in contrast
to the results in Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) who restrict the instruments available
to the government. It is possible to implement the optimum under universal provision
with the use of subsidies on private purchases of market alternatives to the public quality.
But this essentially amounts to means-testing as individuals above a certain income level
are induced to seek private provision. Indeed, there is a formal equivalence, in terms
of equilbrium outcomes, between means-tested equilibria and equilibria with universal
provision and subsidy-induced separation of types, which implies that the above result
makes the strongest possible case against universal provision. The analysis highlights
that the common concern that means-testing provokes undesirable earnings distortions,
because an earnings test functions just like a tax, is not relevant when transfers are in
kind. The only assumption needed for this conclusion is that the government be able to
compensate, through the income tax, those excluded from a program.
The results in this paper have important implications for the design of the modern
welfare state but also for optimal tax policy in socities that have implemented universal
public provision of private goods. Indeed, regardless of societys reasons for publicly
providing private goods the spread of such policies raises the important question of the
appropriate tax treatment of private purchases of substitute goods. Such purchases are
widely observed. For instance, parents often send their children to private schools even
though a free public school is available. Similarly, private hospitals play an increasing role
56
Chapter 2: Public Provision of Private Goods: Optimal Provision Schemes
in countries that have universal public health care. This paper shows that it is optimal
to subsidize purchases of market alternatives to publicly provided private goods. The
optimal subsidy decreases with income when the good is normal. However, the optimum
may be implemented with a uniform subsidy as long as the income tax is su¢ ciently
exible. A policy that makes private expenditures deductible from taxable income does
not implement the optimum.
There is no formal modelling of the justication for public provision to low incomes
in this paper, but I view this feature as a strength, not a weakness. The choice between
universal and means-tested provision should not be a¤ected by the specic reason for
government intervention in the rst place, unless public provision is justied by a global
market failure that a¤ects all citizens alike, or the government has direct preferences over
individual consumption patterns. Thus, the analysis remains valid for any justication
for public provision that does not require the participation of the entire population a
priori.
There is a small existing litterature dealing with public provision of private goods.
Besley and Coate (1991) argue that a number of publicly provided goods are consumed in
discrete quantities. They show that universal provision can redistribute from rich to poor
when the level of public provision is set low enough that the rich opt for private provision.
Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Boadway and Marchand (1995) analyze optimal
public provision when an optimal non-linear income tax is implemented. Blomquist and
Christiansen (1998) consider the design of public provision schemes when the government
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can disallow benet recipients from supplementing the public provision. Besley (1991)
argues that it is always optimal to have at least small user charges on the consumption
of publicly provided private goods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a model with two types and
examines the case for universal provision and the optimal tax treatment of purchases of
publicly provided goods. Section 3 discusses the generality of the results and concludes.
A general model with continuous ability types is presented in the Appendix.
2 Universal Public Provision of a Discrete Good
This section presents a formal analysis of public provision of a discrete consumption
good with variable quality. When there is public provision of a discrete good, people are
essentially forced to pay the public provider whether or not they consume the good in
question. If some consumers are not satised with the quality of the government provision,
the only alternative is to switch entirely to a private provider. This amounts to giving
up on a consumption good that is free at the margin. In this sense public provision of
a private good vastly distorts the relative price of the public quality compared to other
quality levels.1 At the same time, it reduces the disposable income of all citizens forced
to enter the program.
Following Besley and Coate (1991) consumers allocate their spending across a nu-
meraire good c and the quality q of a single unit of the good x. All consumers are
1The publicly provided good need not be free. What is required for the analysis is that the good be
subsidized and that the subsidy is paid for by everyone forced to enter the program.
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assumed to have smooth, well-behaved preferences for the numeraire and the quality of
good x given by u (c; q). As in Stiglitz (1982), the economy consists of two types of
agents, di¤ering only by their earnings ability. Low types, denoted L, have ability nL
and high types, denoted H, have ability nH . An agent with ability n must exert a level
of e¤ort corresponding to y=n to generate income y. The share of low types is given by
. The preferences of agent i = L;H are given by
U (c; q; y) = u (c; q)  v (y=ni) ;
where uc; uq > 0, ucc; uqq < 0, ucq > 0; and v0; v00 > 0. These assumptions ensure that
both c and q are normal goods, which implies that the optimal choice of quality is higher
for type H than for type L. I further assume that conditions are met to always ensure
an interior solution.
It is the governments objective to supply good x to people of type L. The underlying
justication for the governments intervention in goods provision is not explicitly modelled
but a few possible reasons were mentioned in the Introduction. Thus, the analysis builds
on the (weak) assumption that the choice between universal provision and means-testing
is not a¤ected by the reason for supplying good x in the rst place. Since idiosyncratic
productivities are unobservable to government o¢ cials, public provision cannot be made
directly dependent on the individuals type. Instead, public services must be either
means-tested or available to all citizens as is the case with universal provision.
Under universal provision, the government provides good x at a xed quality level qg
implying that all agents can consume the quality level qg at zero (private) marginal cost.
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The government has access to the same technology as the private sector, implying that
the cost per citizen of supplying qg is qg, where  is the relative price of quality of good
x. However, the public provider is only an imperfect alternative to the private market
since agents who choose to rely on public provision must consume the quality level qg
irrespective of their own preferred choice of quality. As a result, the entire consumption
bundle of agent i is a¤ected by the choice of provider of good x. In the following the
subscript gdenotes choices when agent i relies on public provision and the subscript p
refers to the choices of agent i when she seeks a private provider.
The government operates a (possibly) non-linear income tax T (y) that nances all
public expenditures and potentially redistributes income across the two types. The tax
function need not be the result of welfare maximization. The budget constraint of agent
i is
zi  yi   T (yi) =

ci
ci + qi
for qi = qg
for qi 6= qg ;
where zi is the after-tax income of agent i. The budget set of consumer i depends on
whether she settles for public provision at the quality level qg, or opts for a private
alternative. As a reection of the discrete nature of good x, the consumer bears the
entire cost (equal to qi) of deviating from the public provision level.
Under universal provision, agent i chooses private provision if and only if she values
the freedom to choose her preferred quality of good x highly enough to outweigh the cost
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of replacing the publicly provided level2
u (zip   qip; qip)  v (yip=ni) > u (zig; qg)  v (yig=ni) ;
where qip is chosen to satisfy uq (cip; qip) = uc (cip; qip) and yij; j = g; p; satises v0 (yij=ni) =
(1   ij)niuc (cij; qij) with  ij the marginal tax rate for type i when choosing provider j
and qig = qg.3 Naturally, no-one opts out of the public program if the public quality level
exceeds their own preferred quality. Lemma 1 shows that high ability types are always
more likely to opt for private provision (all proofs are in Appendix A).
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium with universal public provision, type H is always more
likely to choose private provision than type L when q is a normal good. Specically, in
any equilibrium where type H is just indi¤erent between public and private provision, type
L settles for the public provider. Further, for any non-degenerate tax function T (), the
earnings of type H are higher whenever she chooses private provision.
When setting the level of public quality, the government initially has the interests of
type L in mind. However, when the provision scheme is universal, the public supply may
prevent a private market from arising, if the quality is su¢ ciently high, i.e.,
u (zHp   qHp; qHp)  v (yHp=nH) < u (zHg; qg)  v (yHg=nH) : (1)
If this condition is met even when the public quality is chosen to serve the interests of
2This expression ignores the budget e¤ect from the savings in public expenditures on x because each
agent is assumed atomistic. Further, it is assumed that, when an agent is indi¤erent between public and
private provision, she opts for public provision. This assumption is completely innocuous but it serves
to make the proof of Proposition A1 (in Appendix) for the continuous type model easier.
3These conditions apply when the tax function is di¤erentiable.
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type L only, the government faces the choice between either (a) forcing people of high
ability to accept the public quality (possibly adjusting qg upwards to better service the
needs of the expanded user group) or (b) settle for a lower public quality that does not
induce type H to opt for the public program. In the former case, while the high types
settle for public provision, the quality provided is inevitably too low from their viewpoint.
That is
u (zHg    (q   qg) ; q) is increasing in q at q = qg (2)
This implies that when public provision discourages high ability individuals from seeking
private providers, their quality choice is distorted (as will be the quality choice of type
L if provision is adjusted to partly reect the wishes of both types). The two conditions
(1) and (2) if met when evaluated at the value of qg that best serves the interest of type
L act as constraints on the government problem. When this is the case the government
cannot implement universal provision at the preferred level of qg without distorting the
consumption choice of type H. In this case, I will speak of universal provision with
public sector dominance. This concept refers to an equilibrium occurrence that acts as a
constraint on the government optimum, not to the optimum itself. From now on, I am
interested in the optimal provision scheme when the problem of public sector dominance
is binding. The section thus proceeds by examining whether the two options (a) and (b)
mentioned above truly represent the best options available to the government. The nding
is that in fact the government can do better by introducing means-tested provision.
The distortion of the consumption decision represents the central cost associated with
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universal public provision of private goods consumed from a single provider. It arises
because of the discrete nature of good x, which implies that the public quality level
cannot be supplemented through market purchases. Therefore, the public quality must
strike a balance between the diverging demands of di¤erent individuals. When the public
supply is nanced through taxation and made available at no or very low marginal cost,
consumers have a strong incentive to choose public provision even if the public quality
level does not match their preferred choice.
An alternative to universal provision applies a means-test to determine eligibility for
the public supply of x. In this case, qg is only available to individuals with income below
a certain threshold y. When y is set below the equilibrium income of type H but above
that of type L there is separation of types in the demand for x. I will assume from now
on, when referring to equilibria with means-testing that there is separation of types in
the demand for x such that only type L seeks the public provider. Let Tmt () denote the
tax function in a means-tested equilibrium, and Tu () the equilibrium tax function with
universal provision. Further, let ~y denote the income of the highest-earning individual
that seeks public provision in the universal equilibrium. Finally, let 1 (y > y) be an
indicator function that takes on the value 1 when y exceeds the income limit for the
means test, y, and 0 otherwise, and let 1 (y > ~y) be similarly dened for the threshold ~y:
The self-selection properties embodied in Lemma 1 imply that the government can
induce e¤ective targeting of the public provision by subsidizing, at an appropriate rate,
purchases of market alternatives to the public q. This further implies that any equi-
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librium with means-testing can be imitated by an equilibrium with universal provision
and subsidies to private purchases of x. Dene, for any qg the equivalent subsidy s (qg)
satisfying
u (zHp   qHp + s (qg) ; qHp)  v (yHp=nH) = u (zHg; qg)  v (yHg=nH) + "; (3)
for some " > 0 and where the left-hand side is evaluated at the means-tested equilibrium
allocations (which induce separation in the demand for x) that we are trying to imitate
and the right-hand side is evaluated at the initial equilibrium with universal provision and
no subsidization. When the equivalent subsidy is implemented under universal provision
(possibly including a change to the income tax function), the same allocations as in
the means-tested equilibrium obtain. Thus, we can imitate the means-tested equilibrium
without introducing a formal means test. Correspondingly, any equilibriumwith universal
provision that induces separation in the demand for x, through subsidization at a rate
s, can be implemented as an equilibrium with means-testing (without subsidization). In
this case, the subsidy in place under universalism constitutes the necessary compensation
to those that fail the income test under means-testing.4
Proposition 1. Any equilibrium with means-testing can be replicated by an equilibrium
with universal provision that implements the equivalent subsidy. The imitating universal
equlibrium is supported by a tax function satisfying the relationship Tu (y) = Tmt (y) +
s (qg)1 (y > y) for any y. Similarly, any equilibrium with universal provision that induces
4Naturally, a means-tested imitating equilibrium can also be implemented by maintaining the subsidy
in place in the universal equilibrium. In fact, since the universal equilbrium already induces separation,
a formal means-test can be implemented without changing the equilibrium allocations.
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separation of types can be replicated by a means-tested equilibrium that eliminates the
subsidy s (if in place), implements a means-test at the income level ~y; and is supported
by Tmt (y) = Tu (y)  s  1 (y > ~y) for any y.
Whenever an equilibrium induces e¤ective targeting of the public supply, I will speak of
de facto means-testing.5
Proposition 1 claries that a justication for universalism amounts to arguing that
subsidy-induced separation of types is undesirable. This would only be the case if public
sector dominance of the market for x enhances the redistributive scope of the govern-
ment. According to Proposition 1, the traditional concern that means-testing provokes
undesirable earnings distortions is not warranted as long as the tax system is su¢ ciently
exible to compensate those not included in the public program. Even so, the required
compensation transfers ressources to the rich, which may be undesirable from a redis-
tributive point of view. Thus, the question remains if the government would rather solve
the problem of public sector dominance by adjusting the level of qg downwards or sim-
ply by including type H in the public program. Proposition 2 shows that both of these
alternatives are dominated by de facto means-testing.
Proposition 2. The social optimum implements de facto means-testing and sets qg to
service the interests of type L only.
5It might seem that formal means-testing is more cost-e¢ cient than universalism because public
provision becomes less attractive when there is an eligibility cap on earnings. While this is true it
does not imply that means-testing can attain a better equilibrium than universalism with subsidization.
Indeed, the scope for redistribution is determined by the utility of type H when she mimicks the low
type, which is independent of the means test.
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Proposition 2 demonstrates that the social optimum is una¤ected by the problem of public
sector dominance. Governments that implement public provision of a private good with
the objective of aiding, directly or through increased redistribution, those less well o¤
should set the level of public provision according to the interests of the target group only,
even if provision is made universal. It may be optimal to adjust the quality level if there
are innate di¤erences in preferences between types as shown by Nichols and Zeckhauser
(1982) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), but only when the adjustment serves the
interests of type L by increasing redistribution. The most direct implementation of
the social optimum applies a means-test to ensure that the public q is only provided
to those individuals whose earnings do not exceed the equilibrium earnings of type L.
However, as Proposition 1 shows it is also possible to implement the optimum under
universal provision by subsidizing private purchases of market alternatives. Further, the
two regimes have the same informational requirements. However, since public provision
is e¤ectively targeted at type L in both cases, it is mere semantics to say that provision
is universal.
The lesson from Proposition 2 is that universalism may in fact diminish the govern-
ments scope for redistribution. The distortion of the quality choice of type H when she
is included in the public program lowers her utility and leads her to work less. This loss
of utility brings no benet to type L and thus simply reduces the amount of redistribu-
tion the government can achieve. Alternatively, setting qg lower than would otherwise be
optimal hurts type L. Instead, the government should set qg optimally, target provision
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at type L and compensate type H. Such a policy leaves the utility of type H unchanged,
raises the well-being of type L and saves government funds because the required com-
pensation is less than the savings to the public program.
The conclusion that the redistributive optimum with universal provision is una¤ected
by the preferences of typeH for public versus private provision, as long as the government
can subsidize private purchases, is in contrast to Blomquist and Christiansen (1995).
They analyze the general redistributive optimum with universal public provision and
conclude that it may be optimal to include type H in the public program or that the
redistributive optimum may be a¤ected by the need to ensure that only type L opts
for public provision. The reason for these results is that Blomquist and Christiansen do
not consider the option of subsidizing private purchases of the publicly provided good
nor of making public provision means-tested (which, as we have seen, amount to the
same). Instead, they conclude that it may be optimal to introduce a negative marginal
tax on type H when she is included in the public program. As the logic of Proposition 2
demonstrates, this result is driven by a desire to correct the earnings distortion introduced
by the distortion of the quality choice. But the suggested remedy is only second best
compared to the optimal policy of de facto means-testing. Thus, the well-known result
that the earnings decision of type H is undistorted in the optimum caries over to cases
with public provision of private goods.
The argument against universalism also survives when type H opts for private provi-
sion even without compensation. In this case, the same equilibrium can be attained by
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limiting access to the publicly provided good to those who actually consume it (type L).
This does not a¤ect the IC constraint of the high types who therefore continue to opt for
private provision, Indeed,
u (cH ; qH)  v (yH=nH)  u (cL; qg)  v (yL=nH)
is unchanged whether or not type H has access to the public q provided qH 6= qg. Besley
and Coate (1991) have argued that universal provision can achieve redistribution when-
ever the public quality is su¢ ciently low to induce the more able types to voluntarily opt
out of the public program. While this is certainly true, the argument above makes it clear
that a concern for redistribution cannot in itself justify universalism. Besley and Coate,
themselves, are well aware that in kind transfers do not constitute an e¢ cient means of
redistribution unless there are innate di¤erences in preferences that separate low from
high types. And, even then, the benets must be targeted at the poor to achieve redis-
tribution, either by law through means-testing or by fact through voluntary separation.
In either case, this does not present an argument in favor of universal provision.
In terms of tax policy, Proposition 2 provides guidance to governments that have imple-
mented universal public provision of, e.g., health care or primary education on how to
treat private purchases of such goods. Indeed, Corollary 1 shows that, when the problem
of public sector dominance applies, the government can achieve a Pareto improvement
by subsidizing purchases of market alternatives to the public q at a rate that is less than
the cost of servicing type H in the public program.
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Corollary 1. Any equilibrium with universal public provision of good x and public sector
dominance can be improved upon by subsizing purchases of market alternatives at a lump
sum rate s <   qg. The subsidy is just su¢ cient to induce type H to opt for private
provision.
The intuition underlying the result is straightforward: the subsidy required to induce
type H to opt for private provision is less than the reduction in public expenditures
on q because the reform eliminates a distortion of the quality choice of type H. Thus,
the proposed subsidy saves government funds and increases the redistributive scope of
the government. Alternatively, a better equilibrium arises if individuals with equilibrium
earnings in excess of the equilibrium income of type L are denied access to the public x in
return for a decrease in their income tax liability corresponding to the subsidy needed to
induce separation in the demand for x. Note that the optimal subsidy does not depend
on the expenditures of type H when she chooses private provision. This is because
the subsidy only needs to correct a wedge between public and private provision. If a
traditional subsidy were implemented such that the value of the subsidy is s = s0qp, the
quality choice of agents seeking private provision would be distorted. This is uncalled for
since the governments savings when an agent opts for private provision are independent
of the individuals private quality choice.
In Appendix B, the results in this section are generalized to a setting with continuous
ability types. The benet of the general approach is that is allows a more complete under-
standing of the optimal subsidy. Specically, Proposition A1 in Appendix B demonstrates
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that the e¤ective subsidy decreases with income. Also, no subsidy should be granted to
individuals whose income is high enough that they are willing to opt for private provision
even without tax incentives. The government can then always improve upon an equilib-
rium with universal provision by subsidizing the private purchases of x for all agents not
belonging to the target group. Since the preference for quality monotonically increases
with income, the subsidy required to induce a shift to private provision is smaller the
higher is the individuals income.
There are many ways to implement the optimal policy. The most direct way is to link
the size of the lump sum subsidy to income. However, this calls for a possibly complicated
formula for calculating the subsidy which is likely to decrease continuously with income.
Alternative and more practical implementations would apply either a single lump sum
subsidy irrespective of income or a stepwise decrease of the size of the subsidy. This
requires that the subsidy at any stage be determined by the preferences of the least able
among the eligible agents. Further, less variation in the subsidy requires more adjustment
of the income tax, which must be su¢ ciently exible to correct for the excess transfer
awarded to higher incomes. Yet another possible implementation exploits the simple
relationship between income and spendings on q when private provision is chosen. In this
case, the subsidy is instead made dependent on spendings on q such that lower spendings
tricker higher subsidies (in absolute terms).
Importantly, we know from Proposition 1 that the social optimum can be directly
implemented through a formal means test. Proposition A1 then gives the adjustments
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to the income tax function that are necessary to compensate those who fail the income
test. And these compensations decrease with income because the alternative of private
provision is relatively more attractive to people with higher incomes.
The crucial insight from the general model is not the various implementation methods,
but rather the conclusion that the subsidy decreases with income. An important corollary
is that the optimum is not implemented by a tax expenditure type policy in which
spendings on private purchases of q, e.g., through ones employer, may be subtracted
from taxable income. Such a policy yields higher subsidies to higher incomes and to
higher spendings on q.6 This also highlights the nature of the subsidy argument. The
purpose of subsidizing is not to let the induced public savings accrue fully to individuals
opting for private provision, but rather to induce to exit those individuals who may be
pushed to seek private providers at a lower cost than the cost of including them in the
public program.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 are robust to a number of variations to the underlying
model:
Consumption technology. The above results carry over to situations when good x is
consumed in more than one unit (extending to the case of continous consumption) and
possibly from di¤erent suppliers as long as the quality of the service provided is variable.
If the government supplies a xed quality qg that di¤ers from the optimal choice of
type H, then the choices of type H are distorted when she chooses to (at least partly)
6This type of policy is currently in place in Denmark.
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rely on government provision. The severity of the distortion depends on the number of
units consumed from the public supplier and the ability of the consumer to compensate
for the insu¢ cient quality of the inframarginal units by purchasing a higher quality at
the margin than would otherwise be chosen. Also, note that even if x is consumed in
varying quantities, as is the case with health care for instance, and the poor consume
more than the rich, universal public provision of x continues to be an ine¢ cient means
of redistribution because the quality choice of the rich is distorted.7
Preference heterogeneity. The case against universalism survives if good x is inferior or
preference di¤erences between types L and H imply that L consumes a higher q than
does H. It is easily seen that the relation s < qg does not depend on the quality
choice of type H exceeding qg. Thus, a policy that abandons universalism, implements
the preferred quality of type L, and compensates type H at the rate s, corresponding to
the equivalent subsidy, saves government funds. More generally, the results carry over
to the general preference specication Ui = u (c; q; y; ni) as long as conditions are met
to ensure that types can still be separated using income-dependent subsidies. In this
case, the government may exploit the preference di¤erences between types, including any
correlation between preferences for q and work e¤ort to discriminate true type Ls from
masquerading type Hs. This increases the scope for redistribution as pointed out by
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) but does not make
7An interesting question concerns the design of the optimal subsidy when good x is consumed in
more than one unit. In this case, the subsidy will depend on the extent of private replacement of public
services but the precise relationship is likely to be complicated.
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a case for universal provision.
Uncertainty about preferences. When the government is uncertain about the preferences
of its citizens, this may a¤ect the distribution of the benets from moving away from
universal provision but does not a¤ect the size of the potential gain. Any compensation
that is less than the cost of the public provision represents a Pareto improvement. The
public administration may then use whatever information it possesses to identify the
lowest amount that compensates the rich for the loss of eligibility for the publicly provided
good.
3 Concluding Remarks
The superiority of means-testing over universal provision (with public sector dominance)
depends crucially on the ability of the government to compensate consumers through the
income tax. Thus, while the income tax need not be optimized initially, it is necessary
that the government have su¢ cient exibility in adjusting the tax function. Further,
this line of reasoning clearly does not translate to cash benets which, when targeted at
certain income groups, by denition introduce earnings distortions. But cash transfers
are also simply part of the tax-transfer schedule. However, the (weak) dominance of
means-testing does extend to any type of in kind transfer, whether the good is consumed
in discrete or continuous quantities and whether the good comes in di¤erent qualities.
As long as the means test applies the same income measure as the income tax and the
income tax can be adjusted to compensate the income groups left out of the provision
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scheme, universalism cannot improve the equilibrium.
Social security is an example of a continuous consumption good that is provided by
governments in most OECD countries. At the same time, the case of social security high-
lights the importance for the logic of Corollary 1 of a exible income tax. It is commonly
argued that universal social security has the merit that it avoids distorting individual
savings (see, e.g., Feldstein, 2005). This argument is based on the implicit assumption
that the income test uses retirement income or asset holdings to determine eligibility.
In this case social security is equivalent to an income transfer. However, in principle
targeting need not be distortionary if the earnings test applies an income measure that
depends on earnings prior to retirement and the income tax can be made dependent on
the same income measure. Further, to make sense, this income measure must be di¤er-
ent from lifetime income. Whether the government would be interested in conditioning
social security on such an income measure depends on the governments motivation for
providing social security in the rst place. A di¤erent issue is whether the government is
even interested in making social security non-distortionary, or if this provides an e¢ cient
means of redistribution (see Diamond, 2003, and Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006).
Naturally, the superiority of means-testing builds on the assumption that there are no
direct reasons to supply the private good to all citizens. The Introduction alluded to the
most common justications for government intervention in the provision of private goods:
asymmetric information and market failure, paternalism, and redistribution. The above
analysis claries that a concern for redistribution can never justify universalism. As to
74
Chapter 2: Public Provision of Private Goods: Optimal Provision Schemes
market failure, there may be reasons for the government to introduce universal public
provision of q if a private market for q is not sustainable for any income group . But
this requires the existence of a global market failure. Focusing on the case of insurance
markets, Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976) have demonstrated that there may be situations
under asymmetric information where the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto dominated by
a privately non-sustainable pooling equilibrium.
As to paternalism, it is clear that if agents from all income groups su¤er from a behav-
ioral weakness, which leads them to, e.g., underconsume a certain good, the government
may nd it optimal to supply the good to all groups. While there may be examples of
such generel weaknesses, Bertrand et al. (2003) argue that bounded rationality is likely
to have more severe consequences for the welfare of poor individuals.
There could be other reasons to opt for universal provision directly related to the
attributes of the good in question. It is possible that the government has distributional
preferences over certain goods such as health care. This might reect social norms that
value the health of di¤erent citizens equally, irrespective of individual preferences, or a
discrepancy between willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay for health care at the
individual level. The latter may lead poor citizens not to purchase high quality health
care although they would not re-sell the right to high quality treatment at the going prices
if it were given to them. Now suppose the supply of quality is limited, e.g., because not
all doctors are equally procient. Then the government may prefer an allocation where
everyone has access to the high quality services in some cases to one where this privilege
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is limited to the wealthiest individuals. In this case, however, we should see outright bans
on private supplies of health care. And the central lesson from this paper is that social
preferences for universalism come at a cost in terms of reduced e¢ ciency.
Finally, there may be political reasons for universal provision. It is sometimes argued
that means-testing may limit public support for the welfare state. If so, universalism
may be a necessary means, even if the government is only interested in aiding those least
well-o¤.
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A Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. LetQi  fqgj u [zip   qip; qip]  v (yip=ni) > u [zig; qg]  v (yig=ni)g
be the set of qg0s for which agent i opts for private provision. Note that qip > qg for any
qg 2 Qi. Consider some qg 2 QL. If the equilibrium is such that either type L or type H
masquerades with public provision, the result follows immediately. If not, there are two
cases to consider:
a) yLp  yHg. It follows from optimization by type L and revealed preference that
u (zLp   qLp; qLp)  v (yLp=nL) > u (zHg; qg)  v (yHg=nL)
m
u (zHp   qHp; qHp)  v (yHp=nH)  u (zLp   qLp; qLp)  v (yLp=nH)
> u (zHg; qg)  v (yHg=nH)
since for y0  y
d [v (y0=n)  v (y=n)]
dn
= v0 (y=n)
y
n
  v0 (y0=n) y
0
n
 0:
b) yLp < yHg. By revealed preference
u (zLp   qLp; qLp)  v (yLp=nL) > u (zLg; qg)  v (yLg=nL)
 u (zLp; qg)  v (yLp=nL) :
The complementarity of q and c in u () ensures that for q  qg
@ [u (z   q; q)  u (z; qg)]
@z
= uc (z   q; q)  uc (z; qg) > 0:
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Since zHg > zLp and q is a normal good it must be that
u (zHp   qHp; qHp)  v (yHp=nH)  u (zHg   q; q)  v (yHg=nH)
> u (zHg; qg)  v (yHg=nH) ;
where the rst inequality is due to revealed preference. The arguments in a) and b) hold
for any feasible choices for type H, and in particular also if type H masquerades with
private provision. Since utility is continuous in qg, it follows that QL  QH .
Since qHp > qg it follows immediately that uc (zHg   qHp; qHp) > uc (zHg; qg). As a
result, zHp  zHg with strict inequality if there is some y > yHg and z > zHg such that
u (z   qHp; qHp)  u (zHg; qg) > v (y=nH)  v (yHg=nH).8 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an equilibrium with means-testing. For earnings
below the means test y, the tax function in the modied equilibrium with universal
provision is Tu (yi) = Tmt (yi). Therefore the set of available gross incomeconsumption
pairs (yi; ci) is the same as in the equilbrium with means-testing. For incomes above
y the set of available gross incomeconsumption pairs is the same as in the equilbrium
with means-testing when agent i opts for private provision since ci = yi   Tu (yi) =
yi   Tmt (yi) + s (qg)   s (qg) = yi   Tmt (yi). When agent i opts for public provision,
consumption at any income level above y is less than in the equilibrium with means-
testing since ci = yi Tu (yi) = yi Tmt (yi) s (qg). Thus, any agent who chose yi  y and
public provision in the equilibrium with means-testing does so in the modied equilibrium
8When the tax function is di¤erentiable, zHp satises v0 (yHp=nH) =
(1  Hp)nHuc (zHp   pqHp; qHp) which clearly implies zHp > zHg.
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with universal provision. And any agent who chose yi > y and private provision in the
equlibrium with means-testing does so in the imitating equilibrium as well. Since type
L satises the former condition, and type H the latter, the equlibrium outcomes in the
modied equilibrium with universal provision are identical to the equlibrium outcomes
with means-testing. A similar line of reasoning shows that any equilibrium with universal
public provision that induces separation in the demand for x through a subsidy (possibly
equal to 0) can be replicated by an equilbrium with means-testing without subsidization.

Proof of Proposition 2. Let s be a lump sum subsidy on private purchases of q that
is just su¢ cient to induce high types to seek private provision when their income is kept
constant. Such a subsidy satises
u (zHg   qp (s) + s; qp (s)) = u (zHg; qg) + ";
for some " > 0, and where qp (s) is the optimal choice of quality for type H given income
zHg and the subsidy s. It follows from (1) that s exists and s > 0. Further, whenever
u [zHg    (q   qg) ; q] is increasing in q at q = qg, it is true that (a) qp (s) > qg and (b)
s < qg:
(a) Assume qp (s)  qg. It follows that s  qp (s), but then qp (s) cannot be
optimal, since
argmax
q
u fzHg    [q   qp (s)] ; qp (s)g > qg
by (2). Thus, qp (s) > qg.
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(b) Assume s  qg. From the denition of s it follows that " > 0 exists such that
u (zHg; qg) = u (zHg   qp (s) + s; qp (s))  "
 u (zHg   qp (s) + qg; qp (s))  "
> u (zHg   qg + qg; qg) ; as qp (s) 6= qg
= u (zHg; qg) ,
which is a contradiction. Thus, s < qg.
Let s = s and consider a modication of the initial tax function such that the new
tax function T 0 (y) o¤ers only two contracts: [yLg; T (yLg)] and [yHg; T (yHg)]. Then, by
Lemma 1, type L continues to opt for public provision and the contract [yLg; T (yLg)].
Furthermore, type H chooses private provision and the contract [yHg; T (yHg)] since
u [zHg   qHp (s) + s; qHp (s)]  v (yHg=nH)
 u (zLg; qg)  v (yLg=nH)
> u [zLg   qLp (s) + s; qLp (s)]  v (yLg=nH) ;
again by Lemma 1. Thus, in the new equilibrium the indirect utilities of both types are
the same as in the initial equilibrium.
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The change in government revenue from the initial to the new equilibrium is
R0  R = T (yLg) + (1  )T (yHg)  qg   (1  ) s
  [T (yLg) + (1  )T (yHg)  qg]
= (1  ) (qg   s)
> 0
from (b) above. This leaves scope for a Pareto improvement. Since a Pareto improvement
materializes from any equilibrium with public sector dominance, the social optimummust
involve separation in the demand for x. It then follows from Proposition 1 that the
social optimum entails de facto means-testing. Further, when only type L chooses public
provision, qg should be set to serve the interests of type L only. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Follows immediately from the rst part of the proof of Proposi-
tion 2. 
B Appendix B
This appendix extends the results of Section 2 to continuous productivity types. Every
agent i is identied by her productivity ni which is drawn from the set [0;1]. The
density of agents with productivity n is f (n) and the number of persons with productity
no higher than n is F (n). I assume that there is no bunching. The level of public
provision is qg and the marginal user of the public service is n (qg) satisfying
u (znp   qnp; qnp)  v (ynp=n) = u (zng; qg)  v (yng=n) : (B-1)
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It follows that qnp > qg and thus
u (zng    (q   qg) ; q) (B-2)
is increasing in q at q = qg. Lemma A1 establishes that n is truly the marginal user of
the public service.
Lemma A1. The demand for q is monotonically increasing in ability whenever q is a
normal good. Specically, qn = qg for n  n (qg), and qn > qg for n > n (qg).
Proof. The no bunching condition ensures that every n earns more when choosing
private provision than when choosing public provision. Subtracting the right-hand side
from the left-hand side of the condition for participation in the public program (which is
(B-1) evaluated at n) and di¤erentiating w.r.t. n yields
v0 (ynp=n)
ynp
n2
  v0 (yng=n) yng
n2
> 0
since ynp > yng. Since the participation condition is satisied with equality fro n = n (qg),
the result follows. 
Lemma A1 implies that the government budget constraint may be written as follows
R =
Z 1
0
T (yn) f (n) dn 
Z n
0
pqg =
Z 1
0
T (yn) f (n) dn  F (n) pqg  0:
The government implements universal public provision of qg and wishes that all in-
dividuals n < ~n are serviced by the public sector, irrespective of individual preferences.
In addition, the government cares about the well-being of all citizens. Let qg be the
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optimal level of qg when the government does not operate subsidies to private purchases
of q. There is no need to specify qg more precisely, what matters is that for any choice
of qg there is a marginal user, n
 
qg

; given by (B-1). Presumably, qg is chosen such that
n
 
qg

is a xed point of the social welfare function that determines the optimal qg as a
function of the marginal user, n (qg). Further, let qg (~n) be the optimum when qg is set
to serve the interests of n < ~n only. When D  fnj ~n  n  n qg (~n)	 6= ; the problem
of public sector dominance exists.
We may now state the main proposition.
Proposition A1.When the problem of public sector dominance exists, a Pareto improve-
ment arises if the government subsidizes private purchases of q at a rate just su¢ cient
to induce n to opt for private provision. Further, under universal provision the optimal
policy scheme subsidizes private purchases of q for all individuals with ability n  n at
a decreasing rate and sets qg = qg (~n).
Proof. Let s be a lump sum subsidy on private purchases of x available to all agents
and let ns be the marginal user of public provision. By Lemma A1, the e¤ect of s on the
government budget is
R
s
=
Z 1
0
T (yn)
s
f (n) dn  [F (ns)  F (n)] pqg   [1  F (ns)] s
=
Z 1
ns
T (yn)
s
f (n) dn  [F (ns)  F (n)] pqg   [1  F (ns)] s:
It follows that a marginal subsidy increases revenue
s  ! 0 =) R
s
 ! dR
ds
= [T (ynp)  T (yng) + pqg] f (n) > 0;
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since T (ynp)  T (yng) by Lemma A1. This creates scope for a Pareto improvement since
the introduction of the subsidy leaves the utilities of all agents una¤ected (except for n
whose utility marginally increases).
The proof now evolves as follows. First, I show that it is optimal to implement type-
specic subsidize to private purchases of q for all agents n  ~n. Then, I show that the
optimal policy can be implemented using only observable earnings.
For any choice of qg , some individuals will satisfy (B-2). Take any such individual n
0.
If it were possible to provide n0 with an idiosyncratic lump sum subsidy on her private
purchases of q, the government would wish to do so. The required subsidy sn0 satises
u (zn0p   qn0p + sn0 ; qn0p)  v (yn0p=n0) = u
 
zn0g; q

g
  v (yn0g=n0) + " (B-3)
for some " > 0. It is easily seen that qn0p > qg . Assume that sn0  pqg . In this case, there
exists an " > 0 such that
u
 
zn0g; q

g
  v (yn0g=n0) + " = u (zn0p   qn0p + sn0 ; qn0p)  v (yn0p=n0)
 u zn0p     qn0p   qg ; qn0p  v (yn0p=n0)
 u zn0g     qn0g   qg ; qn0g  v (yn0g=n0)
> u
 
zn0g; q

g
  v (yn0g=n0) + "
by (B-2). This is a contradiction and, thus, sn0 < qg must hold. It follows that a policy
of subsidizing the private purchases of q by n0 at the rate sn0 sligthly increases the utility
of n0, leaves everyone else una¤ected, and saves government funds. Therefore, if feasible,
this policy must be part of the optimum. As a result, it is optimal to introduce type-
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specic subsidies to all agents that satisify (B-2) at the initial qg . Since the demand for q
is monotonically increasing in ability, the new optimum must have an optimal qg that is
less than qg . Repeating the above argument it is then optimal to introduce type-specic
subsidies to all agents that satisify (B-2) at the new optimum qg. Iterating the argument
shows that it is optimal to operate type-specic subsidies to all agents n  ~n.
It is possible to implement the optimal policy by only conditioning subsidies on ob-
servable earnings. Indeed, an income-dependent subsidy prole, dened by the sequence
of equalities given by (B-3) for n  ~n gives the same marginal utility premium at all
income levels and thus does not disturb the truthful revelation. It follows directly from
Lemma A1 that s is decreasing in income. Further, s = 0 for n > n (~qg) where ~qg is the
optimal value of qg when only individuals with n < ~n opt for public provision.
An alternative implementation applies a uniform subsidy to all citizens (or, everyone
except n > n). The optimal subsidy, s, is then given by
u (z~np   q~np + s~n; qn0p)  v (y~np=~n) = u
 
z~ng; q

g
  v (y~ng=~n) + ":
The tax function should then be adjusted to e¤ectively phase-out the excess subsidy. The
resulting increase in marginal tax rates simply corrects the excess transfer embodied in
the uniform subsidy. It is clear that other implementations are possible such as a stepwise
decrease in the subsidy as long as the income tax is adjusted accordingly. The common
feature across all implementations is that the e¤ective value of the subsidy decreases with
income and equals zero for all income above ynp. 
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Abstract
This paper presents a general framework to analyze the optimal provision of
public goods. There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature.
The traditional approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and
distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by
adjusting the non-linear income tax, and nds that this reinvigorates the simple
Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide
a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic
formula. Using the principles of the new approach, we derive a fully general, in-
tuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good. This formula shows that
distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the traditional approach. How-
ever, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely di¤erent and the
traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case.
Keywords: Public goods; Samuelson rule, Social marginal cost of public funds, Benet
principle
JEL classication: H41; H23; H11
Chapter 3: Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis
1 Introduction
The practice of cost-benet analysis is hugely inuential in everyday government deci-
sionmaking on public projects throughout the developed world. According to the Danish
Ministry of Finance, the evaluation of public projects in Denmark assumes that the cost
of nancing is 1.2 times the actual expenditure (corresponding to the o¢ cial Danish Mar-
ginal cost of funds, MCF). Similarly, a CBPP report (Stone et al., 2008) explains that the
Congressional Budget O¢ ce assumes that 25% of the proceeds from environmental taxes
are lost due to the impact of behavioral responses on revenues from, e.g., the income tax.
This corresponds to an MCF of about 1:3. While it is common practice to assume that
the nancing of public projects involves an excess burden as captured by the MCF, the
theoretical foundation for such a practice is much less clear.
Historically, the study of the optimal supply of public goods has formed three waves
(Kaplow, 2004) di¤ering by the underlying assumptions. The rst wave originates from
Samuelson (1954), which established the famous Samuelson rule that equates the sum of
the marginal willingness to pay for the public good of all citizens to the marginal rate
of transformation (MRT). This result is derived in a rst best setting where individual
lump sum taxes are available. Atkinson and Stern (1974) later critisized the Samuelson
rule on the grounds that the rst best is not attainable. Instead, their analysis relies on
distortionary taxation and arrives at an extended Samuelson rule where the e¤ective cost
of public goods is identied as MCF times MRT. This approach has been very inuential
and also underlies the survey of Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
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The second wave approach has since been further developed to allow for hetero-
geneity in earnings abilities across households (Dahlby, 1998). This has lead Slemrod
and Yitzhaki (2001) and Gahvari (2006) to argue that the evaluation of public projects
should take account, not only of MCF, but also of the marginal benet of projects. Thus,
distributional concerns are shown to matter for the optimal level of public goods.
In contrast, the third wave of the theory of public goods argues that distributional
concerns are irrelevant to the evaluation of public projects. This line of research, initi-
ated by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and further pursued by Christiansen (1981) and
Kaplow (1996), holds that unintended distributional e¤ects can be undone by the income
tax. Formally, Christiansen (1981), in the context of the optimal non-linear income tax,
and Kaplow (1996), more generally, show that the original Samuelson rule applies when
preferences are separable in leisure and other goods, including the public good. However,
less e¤ort has been devoted to the study of the optimal policy rule when the separability
assumption fails.
The divergent results have created a state of confusion as illustrated by the debate in
the wake of Kaplows (2004) survey (see Goulder et al., 2005, and the reply by Kaplow).
The recent developments in the second wave have directed attention to cases when the
weak separability assumption is not fullled but have, at the same time, made a depar-
ture from the benet principle that underlies the third wave. The benet principle builds
on the exibility of the non-linear income tax and holds that each individual should con-
tribute to the nancing of the public good corresponding to her own marginal willingness
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to pay. This eliminates any distributional concerns due to the specics of the nancing
scheme and instead focuses on the public goods problem itself. By deviating from this
principle, it becomes unclear whether the results of the second wave are driven by genuine
distributional concerns or whether they are due to the assumed nancing scheme.
This paper uses a completely general framework to reconcile the results of the second
and third waves. Specically, we demonstrate that both approaches derive from the same
general formula requiring that a public project is completed only when the social marginal
benet of the project (SMB) exceeds the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF).
However, a discrepancy arises between the two waves because the second wave does not
impose any systematic restrictions on the nancing scheme underlying the public project.
Our analysis begins by generalizing the fundamental result of the second wave (Gahvari,
2006) and then applies a dual approach to show that the third wave originates from the
same formula.
We further apply the benet principle to analyze the optimal provision of public
goods in a fully general model of earnings and preference heterogeneity. We derive an
intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good that identies the correlation
between ability and the marginal willingness to pay for the public good as the driving
force behind any deviations from the Samuelson rule. By applying the benet principle
the policy rule derived in this paper eliminates any distributional concerns related to the
nancing scheme rather than to the public goods problem itself.
Using our approach, we can generalize the result of Kaplow (1996) to functional forms
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that allow income to directly a¤ect the willingness to pay for the public good. Indeed,
a correlation between the marginal willingness to pay and income has vastly di¤erent
implications for the optimal level of a public good than does correlations with ability,
although the two are observationally equivalent. Only the latter leads to a departure from
the Samuelson rule since correlations with income can be made distributionally neutral
through appropriate adjustments of the income tax.
We nally show that there is equivalence between the results of the second and third
waves only in a special case when the willingness to pay for the public good is linear in
ability. In this case, the basic second wave formula with its emphasis on the MCF obtains
even when marginal tax changes are determined by the benet principle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model with a continuum
of agents and preference heterogeneity. Section 3 derives a general formula for the optimal
level of a public good when there are no restrictions on the nancing scheme as in the
second wave. Section 4 shows the relationship between the second and third wave and
derives a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good when marginal
tax changes are governed by the benet principle. In Section 5 we provide a special case
when the two approaches lead to identical results, and the standard second wave formula
with its emphasis on MCF applies. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers a few concluding remarks.
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2 The Model
This section presents a fully general framework to analyze the optimal provision of public
goods. The model has a continuum of agents, each characterized by an innate ability n,
which is also our index of identication. The distribution of abilities across the population
is given by the non-degenerate density function f (n). Consumers allocate their income
to consumption c, which could be thought of as either a vector of consumption goods or
a single composite good. Gross earnings or, more generally, taxable income is denoted z.
The utility of agent n is given by
u (c; g; z; n) ; (1)
where uc = @u=@c > 0, ug > 0, uz < 0, and u () is quasiconcave. This utility speci-
cation embodies preference heterogeneity across individuals of di¤erent abilities. It also
encompasses the traditional Mirrleesian specication, u (c; g; z; n), as a special case. The
term z=n builds on the notion that more able persons must exert less e¤ort to attain a
given income level. If this logic is extended to other domains of everyday life, as in Becker
(1965), it seems natural that ability should have an impact on the utility of consuming,
as long as the skills of home production are correlated with market productivity. The
theory of household production views market goods as an input in a production process,
which, along with individual skills, determines the output that ultimately enters individ-
ual utility. Thus, persons of di¤erent skills may benet di¤erently from a given input
of c or g. For instance, an individuals ability to cook determines the utility derived
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from a basket of groceries. Similarly, the utility derived from public goods such as the
police or the judicial system depends on both the skill and need to benet from such
institutions, which is likely inuenced by individual ability. Thus, the formulation in (1)
captures both innate preference di¤erences between individuals of di¤erent abilities and
preference di¤erences due to the technology of home production.
Since the government cannot condition taxes on the unobservable ability it is forced to
operate a (possibly) non-linear income tax function T (z; ), where  is a shift parameter
used to capture the e¤ects of changes to the tax function. The budget constraint of agent
n is
c  z   T (z; ) + I (n) ; (2)
where I () is non-labor (net) income. The rst-order conditions for the choice of c and z
imply
MRScz   u
0
z ()
u0c ()
= 1 m; (3)
where m  @T () =@z is the marginal tax rate at the income level z. The earnings choice
of the household may be written as z = z ((1 m) ; y; g), where (1 m) is the marginal
net-of-tax rate and y  mz   T (z; ) + I is virtual income.
The indirect utility function is v (n)  u (c (n) ; g; z (n) =n) and gives the utility level
of individual n when consumption and labor supply are chosen optimally. We follow the
standard approach in optimal taxation and contract theory and assume that (i) utility
is increasing in ability, i.e., @u=@n > 0, and (ii) the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing
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condition is satised (e.g., Salanié, 2003):
MRScz is decreasing in n. (4)
The rst assumption along with the Envelope Theorem ensures that the indirect utility
is increasing in ability, dv=dn = @u=@n > 0. The second assumption ensures that the
tax system is implementable, i.e., that higher ability individuals always choose higher
equilibrium earnings, implying that the government can use income as a signal of the
underlying ability.
The government cares about redistribution as well as the provision of public goods.
The preferences of the government are captured by a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function of the form

 =
Z
n
	(u ()) f (n) dn; (5)
where 	() is a concave function reecting the distributional concerns of the policymaker.
The cost of producing g units of the public good in units of the numeraire is normalized
to g, without any loss of generality. The government budget constraint is
R 
Z
n
T (z; ) f (n) dn  g ()  0;
where the public goods nature of g is seen from the fact that g enters only once in the
government budget constraint but still appears in everyones utility functions.
Changes to the reform parameter  capture both the changes in the supply of g and
the associated adjustment of the tax function. Di¤erentiating (5) using the rst-order
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condition (3) yields the e¤ect of a marginal reform, d, on social welfare
d

d
1

=  
Z
n
! (n)
@T (z; )
@
f (n) dn+
dg
d

Z
n
! (n)
ug
uc
f (n) dn; (6)
where   R
n
	0 ()uc () f (n) dn and ! (n)  	0(u())uc() denotes the social welfare weight
of agent n. Similarly, the e¤ect of a reform on government revenue is given by
dR
d
=
Z
n

@T (z; )
@
+m
dz
d

f (n) dn  dg
d
; (7)
where the rst term under the integral is the direct revenue e¤ects and the second term
captures the e¤ect of behavioral responses on government revenue. These behavioral
responses are driven by changes to the tax schedule as well as by e¤ects of government
consumption on household utility.
3 Second Wave
The second wave view of optimal public goods supply is due originally to Atkinson and
Stern (1974) and has exerted a tremendous inuence on the practice of cost-benet analy-
sis (e.g., Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). This approach to deriving a formula for the optimal
public goods supply does not impose any restrictions on the nancing scheme other than
the requirement that the reform is fully nanced, i.e., dR=d = 0. From (7) this yields
dg
d
=
R
n

@T (z;)
@
+m

@z
@y
@y
@
  @z
@(1 m)
@m
@

f (n) dn
1  R
n
m@z
@g
f (n) dn
;
where the behavioral responses to taxable income have been decomposed into tax e¤ects
and an e¤ect from the change in g.1 A marginal expansion of g is desirable if it increases
1When deriving the behavioral responses to the tax reform, we follow the second wave literature and
assume that the tax schedule is piece-wise linear. This ensures that there is no feed-back e¤ect from the
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social welfare, i.e., if d
=d  0. Insert the above expression in (6) and apply this test
to get R
n
! (n) ug
uc
f (n) dn
1  R
n
m@z
@g
f (n) dn

R
n
! (n) @T
@
f (n) dnR
n
h
@T
@
+m

@z
@y
@y
@
  @z
@(1 m)
@m
@
i
f (n) dn
: (8)
The uncompensated elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate is
dened as "  1 m
z
@z
@(1 m) . From the Slutsky-equation, it may be decomposed into a
compensated elasticity and an income e¤ect, that is " = "c  where "c is the compensated
elasticity and     (1 m) @z
@I
is the income e¤ect.2 Further, let
  @m=@
@a=@
; s (n)  @T
@
=
Z
n
@T
@
f (n) dn

;
where a is the average tax rate. The parameter  captures the progressivity of the
implied tax reform, and s (n) is the share of the direct tax changes that is borne by agent
n. Using this we can rewrite (8) in terms of behavioral elasticities to arrive at Proposition
1.
Proposition 1 A marginal expansion of a public good is desirable i¤
R
n
! (n)MRScgf (n) dn
1  R
n
m@z
@g
f (n) dn

R
n
! (n) s (n) f (n) dnR
n
 
1  m
1 m (  "c   )

s (w) f (n) dn
: (9)
change in z to the marginal tax rate, and thus no additional earnings responses beyond those triggered
directly by the tax reform. Mathematically, we avoid including second derivatives of the tax function
into the formula T 00. The assumption of piece-wise linearity implies that there will be bunching at the
various kinks in the tax schedule. This does not constitute a problem for our nal results but may imply
that taxable income elasticities are zero at a kink point because marginal changes are not su¢ cient to
move the individual away from the kink point.
2Previous contributions have dened hours-of-work elasticities. The elasticity of taxable income
captures hours-of-work responses as well as all other behavioral responses that are relevant for total
tax payments, and the empirical evidence indicates that this elasticity is signicantly larger than the
hours-of-work elasticity (e.g. Gruber and Saez, 2002).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Expression (9) gives a completely general formula for the optimal g and generalizes the
result in Gahvari (2006) to a continuous setting with a more general utility specication.
Intuitively, a marginal expansion of the public good is desirable when the social marginal
benet (SMB, the left-hand side) of the public good exceeds the distribution-weighted
social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF, the right-hand side), i.e., SMB  SMCF.
Indeed, the right-hand side is the continuous-setting equivalent to the social marginal
cost of public funds derived in Dahlby (1998).3
Proposition 1 shows that distributional considerations a¤ect the optimal level of a
public good. This includes both the distribution of the benets from an expanded g
and the distribution of the costs of nancing the expansion. However, condition (9)
su¤ers from the absence of any restrictions on the nancing scheme. Indeed, the second
wave does not impose any systematic relationship between individual benets from g and
individual contributions to the nancing of the expanded g. In principle, the marginal
tax changes implied by the reform could follow any arbitrary pattern. This ignores
the exibility of the non-linear income tax, and thereby assigns a role to distributional
considerations that are unrelated to the problem of public goods provision (see also
Auerbach and Hines, 2002). Instead, distributional consequences of the specic nancing
scheme a¤ect the optimal g. This approach may have merit when there are exogenous
3A similar formula for the marginal cost of public funds appears in Kleven and Kreiner (2006), who
include extensive responses as well. We have chosen to follow the tradition in analyses of the optimal
provision of public goods and MCF by focusing on intensive responses only.
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constraints that limit the adjustment of the tax schedule as emphasized by Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2001) and Gahvari (2006), but is not a useful principle for general normative
prescriptions. The latter should reect all available instruments as is the case with
analyses of the optimal non-linear income tax. As an example, consider a public good
that yields uniform benets to all individuals. Now suppose that the nancing scheme is
proportional and simply adjusts everyones marginal tax rate slightly upward to nance
the public good. In this case, the policy rule (9) might reject the public project even when
the sum of the benets exceeds the direct cost because the nancing scheme introduces
unnecessary distortions of the earnings decision. If we instead used our knowledge of
the distribution of the benets of g, we would choose lump sum nancing, avoid any
distortions, and approve the project whenever the Samuelson rule is satised.
4 Third Wave
This section takes the analysis of public goods provision a step further by imposing a
restriction on the relationship between the benets of an expanded g and the individual
marginal tax changes implied by the associated tax reform. Thus, the change to the
entire tax schedule is endogenous, i.e., at every income level both the direct change to
the tax burden and the change in the marginal tax rate are determined endogenously
by the individual benets from the reform. This approach, which we labelled the third
wave in the Introduction, keeps individual utilities unchanged. As a result, we cannot
apply the same method to derive the optimal level of g as in the second wave approach
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of the previous section. Instead, we use an alternative approach that keeps social welfare
una¤ected and determines the desirability of a marginal expansion of g by calculating the
e¤ect of the reform on government revenue. If the e¤ect is positive, the reform is socially
desirable. We show in Appendix B that setting d
=d = 0 implies that dR=d  0 is
equivalent toR
n
! (w) ug
uc
f (n) dn
1  R
n
m@z
@g
f (n) dn

R
n
! (w) @T
@
f (n) dnR
n
h
@T
@
+m

@z
@y
@y
@
  @z
@(1 m)
@m
@
i
f (n) dn
; (10)
which is identical to (8). The fact that we arrive at the same formula as in the second
wave is not surprising since we have merely applied the dual approach to determine the
optimal level of g. Importantly, the equivalence of (8) and (10) provides a link between
the second and third wave. Indeed, both approaches derive from the same basic formula.
The di¤erences lie in the assumptions made regarding the associated tax reform.
Unlike the second wave, which does not impose any restrictions on the nancing
scheme other than budget balance, the procedure advanced in this paper evaluates the
benets of an expansion of the public good by use of the benet principle, introduced by
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and applied by Christiansen (1981) and Kaplow (1996,
2004). According to this principle, a (marginal) expansion of g should be nanced by a
benet-o¤setting, or distribution neutral, change in the tax function. Since the reform
keeps individual utilities una¤ected the merits of a marginal expansion of g depend on
the implied changes to government revenue, i.e., if dR=d  0 the expansion of g should
be implemented. Thus, we consider a reform, d, that a¤ects g as well as the tax function
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T () such that
dv (n)
d
= 0 for all n; (11)
dv0 (n)
d
= 0 for all n: (12)
The benet-o¤setting expansion of g adjusts the tax function to capture the benets of
the additional g from each individual n. Since the tax function depends on income, not
ability, the reform may have distortionary e¤ects on the incentive to work.
It follows from (11) and the envelope theorem that
@T (z; )
@
=
u0g ()
u0c ()
 dg
d
= MRScg  dg
d
: (13)
Further, di¤erentiating (12) and using the budget constraint gives
dz
d
=
u00cn () @T ()@   u00gn () dgd
u00cn () (1 m) + u00zn ()
: (14)
For any given individual n, the rst term in the numerator captures the cost of the
increased tax burden, while the second term captures the benets of the expanded g. Any
discrepancy between individual costs and individual benets functions just like a change
in the marginal tax rate and thus a¤ects earnings. Only when costs and benets are
exactly aligned is there no change in individual income since in this case the incentive to
supply earnings remains unchanged. This is entirely consistent with the benet principle,
which cannot condition reform changes on the unobservable ability. Generally speaking,
(14) shows that we cannot separately evaluate the costs and benets of a public program.
Indeed, it is the individual net benet that determines any income responses.
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We show in Appendix B that (14) may be rewritten to
dz
d
=
@MRScg (c; g; z) =@n
@MRScz (c; g; z) =@n
 dg
d
; (15)
where the single-crossing condition implies that the denominator is negative. The partial
derivatives in this expression measure the e¤ect of ability on the marginal rates of sub-
stitution between, respectively, c and g in the numerator and c and z in the denominator
for given c, g and z.
The application of the benet principle implies that the expansion of g and the ac-
companying change in the tax function keeps everyones utility, and thus social welfare,
unchanged. We may rewrite (10) asR
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:
Now (13) gives
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;
where the second term in the parenthesis under the integral is simply dz=d. By inserting
(13) and (15), we get Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 A marginal expansion of a public good is desirable i¤
Z 
MRScg +m  @MRScg=@n
@MRScz=@n

f (n) dn  MRT. (16)
Proposition 2 shows that the Samuelson rule must be amended by a term that is a¤ected
by the partial correlation between ability and the marginal willingness to pay for the
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public good. The additional term corrects for the revenue implications of the behavioral
responses to the reform. The optimal level of g is a¤ected by correlations with the unob-
servable n because the tax function is constrained to depend on the imperfect signal that
is income. Generally, the use of any government instrument that indirectly redistributes
based on ability should reect the desire to redistribute income in the most e¢ cient way.
Thus, the optimal g is adjusted according to who benets the most from the public good
as long as the di¤erences in benets are due to di¤erences in ability. This result does not
require that the income tax is optimized, only that the associated tax reform is guided
by the benet principle. It is important to note that the partial e¤ects on the MRSs
in (16) are evaluated at a given income level. Thus, variations in MRS due entirely to
variations in z do not a¤ect the optimal public goods supply. Rather, the crucial test
is whether the slope of the indi¤erence curves of people of di¤erent ability di¤er when
evaluated at the same consumption-income bundle. If this is the case, the public good
e¤ectively redistributes based on the unobservable ability.
Intuitively, when marginal tax rates are positive, the supply of public goods is reduced
relative to the rst best if the marginal willingness to pay for the public good increases
with ability. In this case, the benet principle implies that higher incomes must contribute
more to the nancing of the public good. However, part (or all) of the additional benet
enjoyed by persons with higher incomes stems from their innate ability and is realized
independently of the chosen income level. Thus, the additional taxes implied by the
reform reduce the incentive to work. The size of the additional distortion depends on
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the responsiveness of earned income as captured by the denominator of the second term
above. Also, the stronger is the inuence of ability on the marginal willingness to pay,
the more di¢ cult it is for the government to nance g in a non-distortionary fashion. An
alternative way to view this result focuses on how the concern for redistribution a¤ects
the optimal level of g. When persons of higher ability benet relatively more from the
presence of the public good, the supply of g adversely a¤ects the governments scope for
redistribution. Indeed, the public good e¤ectively redistributes in favor of the rich. This
point applies the same logic as do Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and Blackorby and
Donaldson (1988) in the context of in kind transfers. Also, Kaplow (2008) provides a
similar intuition for the case of public goods but does not arrive at our general formula
(16). A reversal of this argument explains why the public goods supply is higher than
in the rst best when there is a negative correlation between ability and the marginal
willingness to pay for the public good. In this case, supplying g provides an additional
means to redistribute in favor of the poor.
A theater performance is an example of a public good that may be valued higher by
the more able for a given income. If so, the optimal public nancial support for theaters
is less than the Samuelson rule predicts because such support e¤ectively redistributes
income towards the more able. In contrast, public transportation is likely to benet
persons of lower ability more for a given income. E¢ cient public transportation reduces
the travel time to and from the workplace, leaving more time for other activities. A low
ability individual must work longer hours to uphold a given income and therefore, pre-
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sumably, values her sparetime more. Thus, subsidies to public transportation e¤ectively
redistribute income towards the less able, over and above what is attainable through
the income tax. Importantly, consumption patterns across incomes do not necessarily
reveal the desirability of public transport subsidies. If low income individuals choose
public transport because they cannot a¤ord a car, not because they are of low skill, the
Samuelson rule still applies.
Proposition 2 also claries when the rst best obtains. The su¢ cient condition is
that there is no partial e¤ect from ability to the willingness to pay for the public good.
Remember that the partial e¤ects from ability to MRS in (16) are evaluated at a given
income level. Thus, the crucial question for the determination of the optimal g is whether
the marginal willingness to pay is di¤erent for a person of high ability when she imitates
the choices of a lower ability individual. If this is not the case, and people of di¤erent
ability have the same MRScg for given z, the Samuelson rule applies and distributional
considerations should not a¤ect the level of the public good. This does not rule out that
people of di¤erent ability, as they position themselves at di¤erent income levels, have
di¤erent willingnesses to pay in equilibrium. In this case, the nancing of the public
good is not uniform under the benet principle and, as a result, marginal tax rates are
a¤ected. But these tax variations are not distortionary as the marginal willingness to
pay also varies with income. Di¤erential nancing is only distortionary when taxpayers
can avoid the additional burden without reducing the benet they enjoy from the public
good. Thus, armed with Proposition 2 we can generalize the result of Kaplow (1996) to
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a more general utility function.4
Corollary 1 Assume that individual utility is separable:
u (c; g; z; n) = ~u

w1 (c; g; z) ; w2 (z; n)

:
Then an expansion of g is socially desirable whenever the Samuelson condition holds, i.e.,
Z
MRScgf (n) dn  MRT.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The above utility specication implies that variations in the marginal willingness to pay
for the public good derive from income directly, not the underlying ability. If the marginal
willingness to pay increases with income, the benet principle implies that marginal tax
rates increase as a result of the reform but these changes are not distortionary as the
individual benet from the public good also increases with income (see Blomquist et al.,
2008, for a similar point).
When utility is given by the standard Mirrleesian specication u (c; g; z=n) the formula
for the optimal g can be written in terms of correlations between the marginal willingness
to pay for g and labor supply, l = z=n. This is because with the standard utility function
any correlation with n implies a correlation with l.
4Observe that a comparison of the second wave formula (9) to the Samuelson rule reveals that when
preferences are weakly separable in ability and the consumption of c and g the tax reform that results
from the benet principle implies that
ug
uc
1
1 m (  "
c   ) + @z
@g
= 0:
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Corollary 2 When individual utility is given by
u (c; g; z; n) = ~u (c; g; z=n)
an expansion of g is socially desirable whenever
Z 
MRScg +m
@MRScg=@l
@MRScz=@l

f (n) dn  MRT.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When ability is restricted to a¤ect utility only through l, the evaluation of a public project
departs from the Samuelson rule if the marginal willingness to pay for the public good
depends on individual labor supply. Thus, if MRScg decreases with l the optimal level
of the public good is less than predicted by the Samuelson rule. In this case, the public
good is valued relatively more by those who must deliver fewer working hours to attain a
given income, i.e., people of higher ability. Therefore, the public good impacts negatively
on the governments ability to redistribute income. However, the opposite situation is
equally plausible. When MRScg increases with l the optimal g is higher than the rst
best level. But remember that the importance of correlations with l is merely an artifact
of the special shape of the utility function.
5 An Example of Equivalence Between The TwoWaves
Generally, the formula for the optimal g deviates from Proposition 2 when the associated
tax reform is not governed by the benet principle. Thus, the second wave approach
generally leads to di¤erent results than those obtained in the previous section. However,
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in one special case the two approaches are equivalent and the simplest form of the second
wave formula obtains. The latter holds that public goods should be expanded ifZ
MRScgf (n) dn  MCF MRT,
where MCF is the marginal cost of public funds. In fact, the role assigned to MCF in
the determination of the optimal g is somewhat misleading, since the determination of
MCF builds on a conceptual experiment that ignores the purpose of the tax change. In
contrast, according to the benet principle, the implied tax change is closely linked to
the use of public funds. The discrepancy between these two approaches stands out most
clearly when ability does not a¤ect the marginal willingness to pay for the public good.
As we have seen, the implied tax changes have no distortionary e¤ects in this case, and
therefore do not a¤ect the optimal level of g. In contrast, the same tax reform would
obviously distort earnings if the additional revenue was not put to valuable use. As it
turns out, the simple correction for the distortionary e¤ects of taxation obtains only in
a special case.
Assume utility is given by
u = c+ nw (g; z)  n  h (z=n) ;
where the functional form of the disutility of labor is taken from Saez (2001) and implies
that n reects potential earnings. We show in Appendix C that a marginal expansion of
g is desirable i¤ Z
u0g ()

1  m
1 m"

f (n) dn  MRT; (17)
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which identies MCF as a central determinant of the optimal g. If, in addition, the
income tax is linear and the elasticity of taxable income is constant across individuals,
the condition simplies to
Z
MRSf (n) dn  1
1  m
1 m"
MRT = MCF MRT,
which is identical to the simple second wave formula (Browning, 1987, Dahlby, 1998, and
Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). Thus, only when utility from the public good is linear in
ability and the tax system is proportional is the traditional MCF correction valid.
6 Concluding Remarks
The central challenge involved in decisions on the optimal level of a public good is that
correlations between the marginal willingness to pay and, respectively, ability and income
are observationally equivalent but have vastly di¤erent policy implications as rst noted
by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). For instance, are wealthy people overrepresented
among opera audiences because they are wealthy, or because they are, generally, better
educated? For some purposes casual observation may be su¢ cient to decide on the
desirability of a public project. When more detailed analyses are called for, one is left to
search for observable characteristics that have a known (or estimable) relationship with
ability.
While the analysis in this paper has focused on public goods, the results may be di-
rectly applied to the correction of externalities. We may think of g as a global externality
and MRScg as the willingness to pay for a marginal reduction of the externality. The cost
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of reducing g is then the costs of, e.g., abatement or alternative production methods. As
argued by Kaplow and Shavell (2002), the most e¢ cient way to regulate externalities is
through a price scheme that reects marginal harm. When consumption patterns di¤er
across individuals, the costs and benets of such a scheme may be unevenly distributed.
However, any distributional e¤ects that are driven by preference variations due directly
to income can be undone through adjustments of the income tax (see also Kaplow, 2006).
Only when the willingness to pay for harm reduction is correlated with ability should the
externality correction depart from rst best rules.5
5If the externality is not global but a¤ects only part of the population, it is necessary for the results
that the income tax can follow the same demographic patterns. For instance, pollution in a major city
mainly a¤ects its citizens and compensation schemes must then be designed to a¤ect only the citizens
of that same city. This is possible if regional taxes are in place and can be adjusted freely. However,
local tax functions are often subject to constitutional restrictions. In this case, and when the externality
a¤ects subsets of the population that cannot be explicitly targeted, the benet principle can no longer
be applied and alternative methods must be used.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: The e¤ect of the tax changes on government revenue is
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which is identical to the numerator on the right-hand side of (8). The change in virtual
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where "  1 m
z
@z
@(1 m) is the uncompensated elasticity of taxable income. We may rewrite
this using the Slutsky equation
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to obtain formula (9) in Proposition 1.
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A Appendix B
This appendix describes the steps needed to arrive at the equation (15) in Section 4,
which is central to Proposition 2. The earnings response is derived from (12), which we
repeat here for convenience
dv0 (n)
d
= 0;
where v0 (n) = u0n (c; g; z; n). This gives
 unc () dc
d
  ung () dg
d
  unz () dz
d
= 0
:
Using dc=d = (1 m) dz=d   @T () =@ we can solve for dz=d above
dz
d
=
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;
which is identical to (14). Consider the MRS between c and g
MRScg 
u0g
u0c
=) @MRScg
@dn
=
1
u0c

u00gn  
u0g
u0c
u00cn

;
and that between c and z
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where we have used (3). Insert this above and use (13) to get
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:
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When utility is of the traditional Mirrlessian form, u (c; g; z=n), we can use the relation
z = n  l to express the change in z as a function of the dependence of MRS on l instead.
Indeed,
@MRS
@l
=
@MRS
@n
@n
@l
=) dz
d
=
@MRScg=@l
@MRScz=@l
dg
d
:
Insert this in (16) to arrive at Corollary 2.
Proof of Corollary 1: When utility is given by
u (c; g; z; n) = ~u

w1 (c; g; z) ; w2 (z; n)

;
the marginal willingness to pay for g is
MRScg =
u01 ()w10g ()
u01 ()w10c ()
=
w10g (c; g; z)
w10c (c; g; z)
;
which is independent of n. Thus, @MRScg=@n = 0 and (16) reduces to the Samuelson
rule. Note that u = ~u (w (c; g) ; l) as used in Kaplow (1996) is simply a special case of
the utility function above, where w1 (c; g; z) = ~w1 (c; g) and w2 (z; n) = z=n.
B Appendix C
Special Case (Section 5): From (14)
dz
d
=
u00cn
@T ()
@
  u00gn dgd
u00cn (1 m) + u00zn
:
When u = c+ nw (g; z)  n  h (z=n), u00cn = 0. The FOC for the choice of z implies
h0 () = 1  T 0z () =)
dz
d (1 m) =
n
h00 () ;
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which gives the (compensated) elasticity of earned income w.r.t. the take-home rate as
"  dz=z
d (1 m) = (1 m) =
nh0 ()
zh00 () :
The cross-derivative u00zn then becomes
uzn = h
00 () z
n2
= (1 m) 1
n
1
"
:
Using this in the expression for dR=d (7) shows that g should be expanded as long as
Z
u0g ()

1  m
1 m"

f (n) dn > MRT,
which is (17) in the main text.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes taxation and cue regulation in the presence of cue-triggered
consumption (Laibson, 2001). Exposure to a visceral cue is random and increases
consumption of the cue-related good. When there are no errors in individual
decision-making, it is optimal to subsidize cue-triggered consumption. When in-
dividuals are boundedly rational, it is optimal to tax sin good purchases. In any
case, the optimal sin tax (or subsidy) decreases as cue regulation is tightened. This
suggests that cue regulation and sin taxes are substitutable instruments. Finally,
hassle policies such as smoking bans in public places are shown to be generally
ine¢ cient.
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a surge in the interest of the economics profession in the
role of temptation and self-control in human decision-making. This research has been
motivated, as has behavioral economics in general, by the failure of traditional, neoclas-
sical models to accurately capture central aspects of human behavior. At the same time,
numerous countries have chosen to operate paternalistic policies such as sin taxes on
cigarettes and advertisement bans for alcoholic beverages. However, the literature has
generally failed to converge towards a unifying framework and widespread disagreement
remains as to the degree of rationality on the part of human beings. Not surprisingly,
di¤erent assumptions about rationality often lead to starkly contrasting policy implica-
tions.
This paper addresses a particular type of temptation-based consumption that is inu-
enced by random external cues, or so-called cue-triggered conditioned responses (Laibson,
2001). In this setting, a visceral cue (the smell of freshly baked bread or the sight of some-
body smoking) triggers an anticipatory response that a¤ects demand. The temptation
following cue exposure poses a challenge for welfare economics. Should it be given full
hedonic value when assessing the well-being of an individual? Or is it more appropriate to
assume that anticipatory emotions do not a¤ect true long-run welfare? This comes back
to the central question of the appropriate departure from full rationality. At the same
time, the formal acknowledgement and inclusion of a role for external cues in determining
consumption demands allows for a study of cue regulation, i.e., policies that a¤ect the
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risk of cue exposure such as legislation directed at the advertising industry. This is an
important issue in practical policy about which economics has so far had little to say.
The notion of cue-triggered consumption was rst formalized by Laibson (2001) in a
model of addiction that follows the tradition of Becker and Murphy (1988) and assumes
that choices are always aligned with true preferences. This corresponds to giving full
weight to any temporary emotional response in the wake of cue exposure. In contrast,
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) refer to evidence from neuroscience indicating that cues for
addictive goods inhibit the proper functioning of the chemical process through which the
human brain forecasts the expected pleasure from consuming. This leads to errors in
individual decision-making.
The present paper provides a simplied and unied framework, encompassing both
the case studied by Laibson (2001) and that considered by Bernheim and Rangel (2004),
to study optimal tax policy and the role of cue regulation. This leads to new results on
optimal paternalism and generates insights into the dependence of policy prescriptions
on the specic modelling assumptions made.
If one assumes that individuals are fully rational it is tempting to conclude that there
is no role for the government to play beyond the correction of externalities. However, the
random nature of cue shocks a¤ects the marginal utility of consumption in a stochastic
sense which creates a demand for insurance. The government can supply partial insurance
by subsidizing the sin good. This result extends to an environment with taste di¤erences
and also with heterogeneous earnings as long as the government has access to a non-linear
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income tax. As in cases of optimal insurance design, the size of the subsidy involves a
trade-o¤ between the benets of consumption smoothing across states and the risk of
moral hazard (i.e., increased consumption of the sin good). I nd that the optimal
subsidy rate decreases in the degree of government cue regulation.
If instead decision utility is misaligned with true utility, standard arguments suggest
using sin taxes to correct so-called internalities. Importantly, the present paper shows
that the optimal corrective tax depends on the degree of regulation of the cue process. As
regulation is tightened, the optimal sin tax decreases. Further, when targeted regulation
is possible, it improves the trade-o¤ faced by the government.
There are two main contributions of this paper. The rst is to demonstrate that the
nature of optimal tax policy depends crucially on the degree of individual rationality. The
second is to show that cue regulation and sin taxation are substitutes, not complements,
irrespective of the degree of individual rationality. Indeed, the two di¤erent treatments
proposed in the literature of the short-term cravings that people experience in the wake of
cue exposure lead to opposing policy recommendations. If one follows Laibson (2001) and
attaches full hedonic weight to short-term cravings, the optimal policy is a subsidy on sin
goods. If, instead, one uses the approach of Bernheim and Rangel (2004), the optimum
involves a tax on sin goods. Naturally, the true degree of rationality is an empirical
question but it seems that today there is more widespread acceptance of the notion of
errors in individual decision-making. However, for the case of conditioned responses there
are more complicated issues involved. Indeed, even if one accepts that demand does not
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always reveal true preferences, it is not clear that conditioned responses should be given
no hedonic weight. The true model may very well be a hybrid of the two polar cases.
In contrast to the model-dependent tax policy prescriptions, tighter cue regulation
always leads to less reliance on the tax instrument. Tighter cue regulation decreases the
risk of cue exposure and thereby reduces the overall gain from distortionary taxation: the
tax (or subsidy) is aimed at helping exposed individuals at the expense of non-exposed.
Thus, the interdependence between policy instruments arises because of the need to rely
on distortionary taxation.
The analysis in this paper can be seen as a contribution to the literature on optimal
paternalism. While still in its infancy, this literature has shown that the government
may well have an important role to play in helping to correct individual errors due to
bounded rationality. Most existing studies of optimal paternalistic policies have pro-
ceeded within the context of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting framework, rediscovered in
the context of individual choice by Laibson (1997) and further explored by ODonoghue
and Rabin (1999, 2001). Within this model, Gruber and Köszegi (2001) derive opti-
mal cigarette taxes while ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) identify conditions under which
optimal sin taxes increase with the average degree of irrationality in the population.
Hansen (2005) presents an argument for providing public transfers in kind when agents
are present-biased. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) suggest a di¤erent interpretation
of temptationist preferences based on an axiomatic, choice-theoretic approach. Their
assumption of full rationality usually implies that there is no corrective role for the gov-
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ernment. A notable exception is Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) who nd that price policies
are generally ine¢ cient and dominated by bans. The present paper di¤ers from this lit-
erature by considering the role of external cues in triggering temptation. This sets the
stage for an analysis of policies of cue regulation and results on the interdependencies
between di¤erent policy instruments. Finally, the paper explicitly contrasts the policy
prescriptions with and without individual bounded rationality.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey outlines the underlying idea of cue-
triggered consumption while Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 explores the Laib-
sonian case of full rationality and presents the case for commodity specic insurance.
Section 5 considers the case of errors in decision-making and analyzes optimal sin taxes
while Section 6 considers cue regulation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Cue-Triggered Consumption
The starting point for this paper is the concept of cue-triggered consumption, which is the
notion that external cues a¤ect consumption decisions. A cue can be interpreted as any
kind of object, whether physical or abstract, that triggers an association to consumption
of a certain good. This broad interpretation naturally encompasses all kinds of direct
advertising but also events such as the sight of others consuming the good or of the good
itself. The idea is based on insights from cognitive neuroscience and psychology where
the concepts of conditioned responses and compensatory conditioned responses have been
introduced. Formally, a conditioned response is a "cue-based anticipatory response to a
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physiological stimulus" and a compensatory conditioned response is a "conditioned re-
sponse that is homeostatic in nature".1 Homeostasis is an equilibrating mechanism that
stabilizes the physiological system. In more mundane terms, a conditioned response is the
bodys preparatory reaction to a cue such as the smell of freshly baked bread. The cue
triggers an anticipation of intake and induces a sense of craving. Compensatory responses
arise when the body prepares itself for future intake upon cue exposure (homeostasis)
as is the case with addictive drugs that have strong physiological e¤ects. It is aimed at
dampening the bodys reaction to the anticipated consumption. For instance in connec-
tion with cocaine abuse, the release of dopamine, which is responsible for the kick, is
split between the time at which anticipation of intake arises and the time of actual con-
sumption. These insights were formalized by Laibson (2001) by introducing a random cue
process and two sets of baseline preferences that are active in the states of exposure and
non-exposure, respectively. Building on the original idea of Becker and Murphy (1988),
Laibson (2001) introduces a cue-triggered reference-point in the basic utility function.
This captures the idea that upon exposure, the marginal utility of consumption increases
but the utility derived from consumption is reduced. In terms of observed behavior,
this will increase the probability of consuming as well as increase the amount consumed
conditional on consuming. The approach of Laibson retains the assumption of rational
choice.
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) make use of a Hedonic Forecasting Mechanism (HFM)
1These denitions are taken from a Lecture Note by David Laibson.
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that responds to the brains production of dopamine. The level of dopamine is used
to forecast the pleasure from consumption, thereby helping the individual to optimize
choices, and is a¤ected by previous experiences with the good in question. This reects
the same anticipatory e¤ect of cue exposure described above. As to decision-making, the
agent may nd herself in one of two states: a cold mode and a hot mode. In the cold
mode, decisions are rationally governed by utility maximization. In the hot mode, the
agent consumes the sin good by default. This approach is motivated by evidence that
cues related to addictive goods can interfere with the proper functioning of the HFM
by increasing the concentration of dopamine. This leads the agent to overestimate the
pleasure from consuming the sin good.
A common trait in this literature is the focus on sin goods and negative cues, where
exposure to a cue triggers a sense of craving but does not add to the experience of
consuming. Indeed, Laibson considers the case when utility is adversely a¤ected by cues.
The present paper follows this tradition by restricting attention to sin goods, where
consumption entails certain costs, and some of the papers conclusions may arguably be
mostly relevant for addictive goods. At the same time, I will maintain the assumption
that individuals would prefer to avoid cue exposure if given the choice. However, many
of the results only require that the marginal utility of consuming the sin good increases
upon exposure.2
2Laibson refers the above-mentioned homeostasis when qualifying the assumption of lower utility in
the state of exposure. One might also argue that since cue exposure is an external event that a¤ects
consumption choices without changing the choice set, individuals must be worse o¤ in the state of
exposure. However, keep in mind that preferences change upon exposure.
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3 Model
In this section the model is laid out in its most general form allowing for income e¤ects on
consumption. This sets the stage for the analysis of the Laibsonian case. The section on
bounded rationality will disregard income e¤ects to simplify the analysis. The model is
intentionally simple. Thus, intertemporal e¤ects of consumption such as the build-up of
an addictive habit are not explicitly modelled. Instead, the focus is on optimal policy and
the relation between di¤erent policy instruments. The analysis in Bernheim and Rangel
(2004) is an example of a full-scale model of addictive consumption. The simplied
framework has the advantage of lending itself easily to several di¤erent interpretations.
Therefore, many of the results would seem to have merit for many di¤erent kinds of sin
goods with very di¤erent characteristics.
The model is static. The economy consists ofN individuals indexed by i. Labor supply
is exogenously, but individually, given and generates income yi for agent i. Agents derive
utility from consuming a composite good x and a sin good z. The budget constraint for
agent i is
xi + qzi  yi;
where q is the relative price of the sin good. The preferences of agent i are represented
by the utility function
ui (xi; zi   s  ri) ; (1)
where s is an indicator variable for cue exposure, equal to 1 when exposed and 0 otherwise.
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Standard assumptions are made about the shape of the utility function. Specically, ui is
strictly concave, increasing in both its arguments, and the marginal utilities of x and z
are innite when consumption is zero.3 Cue exposure activates a reference point, ri, in the
utility function of the exposed agent, capturing the anticipatory nature of the conditioned
response underlying cue-triggered consumption. This has the e¤ect of increasing the
marginal utility of consuming the sin good. In this sense cues make consuming z more
tempting and ri reects agent is sensitivity to cue exposure.4
The process of cue exposure is random. With probability pi agent i is subjected to a
cue, which activates the individual reference point, ri. Both the reference point and the
probability of exposure is individual-specic as captured by the subscript i. This reects
that di¤erent people have di¤erent sensitivities to cues and di¤erent risks of exposure.
The probability of cue exposure is likely to be partly inuenced by actions under the
control of the individual but this process is not modelled explicitly.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, cues are transmitted and the consumption
choices are made after the resolution of uncertainty, i.e., after the state of exposure is
known. The individual thus allocates expenditure across the two consumption goods
3It is perhaps more realistic, but inconsequential to the results, to allow the marginal utility of z to
become negative when consumption exceeds a certain threshold to reect that sin good consumption is
associated with various costs in the form of, e.g., poorer health. A natural benchmark is then the case
of separability in which ui (x; z) = vi (x) +wi (z   s  ri)  ci (z), where ci () represents the health costs
of consuming the sin good. Apart from the presence of cues, this is the functional form analyzed by
ODonoghue and Rabin (2006).
4The form of (1) is not important for the results in this paper. Specically, utility need not drop
following cue exposure. What matters is that the marginal utility of consuming the sin good increases
after exposure to a cue. However, for the purpose of discussing the merits of cue regulation in Section
7, it is assumed that cue exposure implies a loss of utility.
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to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint.5 This leads to individual demand
functions of the form
xi = xi (q; yi; s  ri) ; s = 0; 1
zi = zi (q; yi; s  ri) ; s = 0; 1
Cue exposure leads agents to purchase more of the sin good at the expense of other
commodities, i.e.,
zi (q; yi; ri) > zi (q; yi; 0)
xi (q; yi; ri) = yi   qzi (q; yi; ri) < yi   qzi (q; yi; 0) = xi (q; yi; 0) : (2)
There are two competing interpretations of this set-up. Under one view it considers
the agent at a moment in time and there is an instantaneous risk of exposure which will
a¤ect the consumption choice. With this interpretation the model is best understood as
treating a single out of a large number of independent periods of life as in ODonoghue
and Rabin (2006). Under another view the model is a description of a long-run steady
state where an agent is either exposed, which would then be the equivalent of e.g., having
build an addictive habit, or the agent is not exposed. Again, in the idiosyncratic state
of exposure, consumption of the sin good is higher for any agent than for that same
individual in the state of non-exposure.
5A more general model would endogenize labor supply. Under weak conditions an agent would smooth
the cue shock absorption across all consumption goods and would thus increase labor supply relative to
the state of non-exposure. This is potentially important in public nance analysis but is left for future
work.
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Note that the model abstracts from any external e¤ects of sin good consumption.
While clearly relevant, the consequences of the presence of externalities is well understood
and they are left out to focus the analysis on the novel aspects of the model. This is
in line with similar work on temptation and self-control such as Bernheim and Rangel
(2004) and Gruber and Köszegi (2001).
4 Welfare and the Role of Government
The government sets policy before the realization of cue shocks at a point in time when
individual uncertainty as to future preferences remains. Two di¤erent types of policy
instruments are considered. The government may tax (or subsidize) the sin good at the
rate t, making the consumer price q + t, and it may promote legislation that regulates
the ow of cues.6 Indeed, pi is assumed to be responsive to government regulation of
the cue process. This covers regulation of advertisement as well as public campaigns
that a¤ect social norms but does not include policies that restrict consumption directly
such as bans. I will distinguish two types of government cue regulation: targeted and
non-targeted (general). The former is aimed at a specic, identiable group in society
and a¤ects all members of that group (although not necessarily with equal impact).
The latter covers general policies that a¤ect all members of society (although again not
necessarily with equal impact). For the purpose of targeted regulation, it is assumed
6In this two-good economy, a subsidy on the sin good is, of course, equivalent to a tax on the composite
good. This merely reects the general point that the number of government price instruments is always
no larger than the number of commodities minus one. More importantly, with endogenous labor supply
it may, under certain conditions, be possible to implement the optimum relying only on an income tax.
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that the government observes a number of individual traits, e.g., age and gender, and
is able to target regulatory policies at groups of individuals who share a certain trait.
Groups are indexed from 1 to M and agent i is said to belong to group J if i 2 J .
Regulation is assumed to be measurable on a well-dened scale, and g denotes the
degree of general regulation, whereas J denotes the degree of regulation targeted at
group J . The probability of individual cue exposure is then a function of the degree of
general regulation and the degree of targeted regulation that a¤ects the groups to which
the individual belongs:
pi = pi
 
g; 1; :; M

with @pi=@g < 0, @pi=@J < 0 if i 2 J and @pi=@J = 0 if i =2 J . Note that tighter cue
regulation translates into a lower risk of cue exposure.
The model laid out in section 3 involves each agent having two di¤erent utility func-
tions depending on the idiosyncratic state of mind. This raises the issue of what is an
appropriate welfare criterion. Two competing assumptions have been suggested in the
literature. In the model of Laibson (2001), full weight is given to any sense of craving and
the agent is assumed to be fully rational as in Becker and Murphy (1988). In this case,
utility is truly state-dependent and there is never any conict between choices and self-
interest. Thus, the appropriate welfare criterion takes into account the reference point
when the agent has been subjected to a cue. Section 5 deals with this situation of full
rationality.
In the analysis of Bernheim and Rangel (2004), cue exposure is assumed to drive the
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agent to act irrationally. Thus, while an exposed individual behaves as if preferences
were state-dependent, true utility is in fact represented by (1) with s = 0. This causes
individual choices to diverge from the self-interest of the agent whenever she has been
exposed to a cue. Under this view the government should apply a welfare criterion that
is independent of the idiosyncratic state of mind of the individual agent.7 This leads to
a case for paternalism which is the subject of Section 6.
It is assumed throughout the paper that the government maximizes a utilitarian social
welfare function, and I will use gei and gi to denote the marginal social welfare weights
attached to individual i in the exposed and non-exposed state, respectively.
In the present model cues are always detrimental to individual welfare. A more
complete description would address the issue of the benets of cues as well as the direct
costs of implementing and enforcing cue regulation. However, since these questions are
as yet not well understood in the literature, the rst part of this paper will focus only
on the relation between cue regulation and tax policy. Section 7 contains a less formal
treatment of the question of optimal cue regulation.
5 The Case of Full Rationality
In this section it is assumed that decision-making is always aligned with true preferences.
Further, unless otherwise stated, it is assumed that all agents have the same income,
yi = y for all i. Consequently, there is no corrective role for the government and it
7See the chapter by Bernheim and Rangel (2007) on welfare evaluations with bounded rationality and
a discussion specically within the context of their 2004 model.
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is tempting to conclude that the optimal policy has t = 0. However, cue exposure is
a random event which a¤ects the marginal utility of income. Indeed, it follows from
(2), using the Envelope Theorem, the assumption of full rationality and concavity of the
individual utility function, that
@Vi
@yi
= uix (xi (q; yi; s  ri))) @Vi
@yi
js=1 > @Vi
@yi
js=0; (3)
where Vi (q; yi; s  ri) is the indirect utility function. Naturally, a government that respects
individual preferences will set gei > gi for all i. The marginal utility of income is higher in
the state of exposure because of the temptation to consume z, which leads the consumer to
divert resources away from spending on the composite good. The divergence of marginal
utilities of income across states creates a desire, ex ante, to transfer resources from the
state of non-exposure to that of exposure. This is similar to insurance against an adverse
shock. In the case of cigarettes, alcohol or drug abuse or gambling, the stakes can be
quite high. Conceivably, no private insurance company will provide this kind of insurance
due to obvious problems of adverse selection under asymmetric information about the
state of exposure.8 This leaves room for the government to benecially intervene and
provide insurance against "a¤ective consumption", a point rst made by Bernheim and
Rangel (2004).
8A caveat is in order. If the agent has access to perfect capital markets, she may self-insure by
borrowing against future earnings. This is not possible in the static framework presented here, but
when the model is interpreted as representing a single out of a large number of periods, intertemporal
consumption smoothing is possible. Even in this case, if individual uncertainty remains, agents will
still be better o¤ by pooling idiosyncratic risks. These benets then have to be weighted against the
distortionary e¤ects of taxation. However, under the preferred steady state interpretation of the model,
where the state of exposure is in fact a permanent state of addiction, this caveat has no bearing. I am
grateful to Claus Thustrup Kreiner for pointing this out.
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The case for government intervention does not rest on an assumed informational ad-
vantage over the private insurance market. Even if the government is unable to verify
whether an individual has been exposed to a cue, it may exploit the di¤erence in con-
sumption patterns between exposed and non-exposed individuals to e¤ectively provide
insurance. The crucial observation is that sin good consumption is higher for exposed
individuals. It follows that a policy of subsidizing sin good consumption will provide
commodity specic insurance against the risk of cue exposure.
It is instructive to begin by considering the case of a single (ex ante) representative
agent. The government sets the tax rate to maximize expected utility subject to a budget
constraint
max
t
pV (t; y; s  r) + (1  p)V (t; y; 0)
s:t: t [pze (t) + (1  pi) z (t)] = ;
where superscript edenotes exposed, and  is a lump sum tax. It can be shown that,
starting from t = 0, a small subsidy improves the welfare of the representative agent
whenever
[ze (0)  z (0)]

@V e
@y
  @V
@y

> 0;
which we know from above is always satised, since both consumption and the marginal
utility of income is higher in the state of exposure. A subsidy e¤ectively transfers income
from non-exposed to exposed individuals because the value of the subsidy is higher for
this group than the value of the lump sum tax. At the same time, a small subsidy
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introduces only a negligible distortionary cost when prices are intially undistorted.
When there is heterogeneity in preferences, matters are more complicated. While the
individual demand for insurance continues unabated, there is no longer any guarantee
that a subsidy strictly targets the intended group of exposees. Essentially, a subsidy to
the sin good no longer serves as an actuarily fair insurance contract for everyone. The
expected (monetary) gain to individual i from a small subsidy is
piz
e
i + (1  pi) zi   z;
where z denotes average consumption of the sin good in the population and is the equiv-
alent of the insurance premium. With homogeneous preferences this expression is zero
and the implicit insurance contract is actuarily fair. When preferences are diverse, sub-
sidizing the sin good only provides insurance to those individuals whose consumption of
the sin good is higher than average. Further, the attractiveness of the implicit insurance
contract depends on the individual risk of cue exposure. Thus, a subsidy is more bene-
cial to individuals with a high consumption of the sin good and with a high risk of cue
exposure.9 Indeed, the value of the implicit insurance to individual i is
pi
@V ei
@yi
(zei   z) + (1  pi)
@Vi
@yi
(zi   z) :
9The analysis so far has focused on the case of continuous consumption. It may well be argued
that for many sin goods the extensive margin is more important than the intensive margin. While
there is arguably some dispersion in daily cigarette consumption among smokers, the more important
margin appears to be the decision of whether to smoke or not. The results in this section are robust
to an alternative model where the extensive margin is the only margin of response. In this case, the
governments trade-o¤ will be better if the distribution of gains from consumption is more dispersed.
This opens for the possibility of subsidies that in certain ranges have little or no e¤ect on consumption
decisions.
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In spite of these complications, there is still a strong case for subsidizing purchases of z as,
on average, consumption of the sin good is higher in the state of exposure. If we make the
reasonable assumption that the government has no intrinsic preference for individual sin
good consumption, it is always optimal to subsidize cue-triggered consumption whenever
the following condition holds
X
i2N

pi
 
g; 1; :; M

(gei   gi) (zei   zI)

> 0; (4)
for gei > gi. This condition ensures that (a) the government has no intrinsic preference for
sin good consumption among exposees that overrules the individual demand for insurance
and (b) the risk of cue exposure is positively correlated with sin good demand in the
exposed state.10
Proposition 1. A government with no intrinsic preference for individual sin good con-
sumption will always set t < 0 if (4) is satised for gei > gi.
Further, the optimal subsidy rate is decreasing in the degree of cue regulation, whether
general
 
g

or targeted at group J (J), whenever preferences satisfy a single-crossing
condition.
Proof. See Appendix A.
An important question concerns the interdependence between the di¤erent govern-
ment instruments. Proposition 1 establishes that the optimal subsidy rate decreases (i.e.,
10Part (b) merely requires that cue exposure has a su¢ ciently strong impact on sin good purchases to
make the demand for insurance high enough.
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the tax increases) with the degree of cue regulation. Intuitively, when regulation is in-
creased the frequency of cue exposure decreases such that the risk of experiencing a high
marginal utility of income is reduced. The fact that fewer people become exposed implies
that the gain from subsidizing the sin good is reduced. As a consequence, the optimal
subsidy rate declines as regulation is intensied. In this sense, cue regulation and taxa-
tion are substitutable instruments. As always, comparative statics under heterogeneous
preferences are complicated by the need to ensure global optimality when social welfare
is not necessarily strictly concave in the tax rate. This explains the necessary single-
crossing condition (A-1), which basically assumes that for any t the group of exposees is
always more hurt at the margin by higher taxation than the group of non-exposees.11
I conclude this section by briey considering the case of income heterogeneity. As is
well-known from the literature on optimal commodity taxation (see, e.g., Saez, 2002),
it is generally unnecessary to rely on commodity taxes when the government has access
to a non-linear income tax. The case for commodity specic insurance presented in this
paper is not based on a desire to redistribute across income groups, but rather between
idiosyncratic states of nature. Therefore, it is possible to show that the argument for
a subsidy to z is entirely robust to the inclusion of income heterogeneity as long as an
optimal non-linear income tax is in place. Importantly, this implies that even if low
11This is further complicated by the presence of income e¤ects. Essentially, (A-1) also assumes that if a
sum of money were to be spread evenly across the population, the optimal subsidy would not increase too
much. Increased regulation improves the net scal status of both exposed and non-exposed individuals.
This may change the relative marginal utilities of income of the two groups. In addition, the lower
frequency of exposure makes it less costly to transfer resources to the exposed state which also tends to
increase the subsidy. Finally, the marginal distortionary costs may change as consumption changes due
to income e¤ects and the higher fraction of non-exposees.
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income individuals su¤er a greater risk of cue exposure or are more sensitive to cues,
the optimal sin subsidy is not a¤ected. Redistribution between income groups should be
entirely handled through the income tax. In contrast, redistribution across states is only
possible by use of a commodity subsidy.
6 The Case of Bounded Rationality
In this section, the change in behavior upon cue exposure is attributed to bounded
rationality as in Bernheim and Rangel (2004). Thus, the short term feeling of temptation
that results from exposure to a cue is considered an illusion of the brain. In chemical
terms, the brains release of dopamine as a predictor of the pleasure of intake is disturbed
by the presence of the cue. This causes the brain to overestimate the pleasure from
consuming. As a consequence, if left to herself, an agents choices will be suboptimal in
the exposed state of mind. Specically, the agent acts as if true utility were given by (1)
and thus were state-dependent. But in fact, utility does not vary with the state.12 Thus,
independently of cue exposure, welfare is given by ui (x; z), corresponding to s = 0, while
decisions are made in order to maximize (1) after the realization of the idiosyncratic state.
It is clear that this leads the agent to overconsume the sin good in the exposed state. This
creates scope for government intervention. In the previous section, this was motivated
by a demand for insurance that could not conceivably be satised by the private market.
The case for insurance continues to hold as cue exposure adversely a¤ects the disposable
12This can be considered a normalization. It is straigthforward to allow for some state-dependence of
true preferences but assume that the perceived reference point is higher than the true reference point.
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income for goods other than the sin good. But at the same time, there is a need to correct
an error in individual choices. With perfect information this trade-o¤would not exist but
when the government cannot condition commodity taxes and transfers on exposure, the
concern for income distribution would likely a¤ect the results. However, the subsequent
analysis makes the simplifying assumption that utility is quasi-linear, eliminating the
demand for insurance.13
The utility of agent i is given by
ui (x; z) = wi (z) + x
Meanwhile, consumption choices are made to maximize
wi (z   s  ri) + x;
which deviates from true utility whenever the agent has been subjected to a cue i.e.,
when s = 1. When s = 0 there is no conict between decision utility and true utility. It
is assumed that the rst-order conditions yield an interior solution for all i and in both
states.
The government faces a problem of asymmetric information as cue exposure is unob-
servable and preferences are heterogeneous. Thus, a high consumption of the sin good
can be due to either cue exposure or an innately strong preference for the good. The
government is, therefore, left with the option of a¤ecting behavior through the use of a
13I allow for income heterogeneity in this section, but the assumptions of quasi-linearity and utilitarian
social welfare imply that income distribution is of no importance. Of course, with a concave social welfare
function the government would still wish to redistribute to those with low earnings.
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distortionary commodity tax or cue regulation. As rst shown by ODonoghue and Rabin
(2001) in the context of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, it is optimal for the government to
apply at least a small positive tax rate on sin good consumption as long as the demand
of exposed individuals is not entirely inelastic. This result easily extends to the present
model. Proposition 2 presents the case for an optimal sin tax along with results on the
dependence of the optimal tax rate on the degree of regulation.
Proposition 2. Assume utility is quasi-linear and all individuals choose an interior
solution. Then, as long as wi is strictly concave for all i, the optimal sin tax rate is
(a) Positive, t > 0.
(b) Decreasing in g.
(c) Decreasing in J for all J .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 shows that it is optimal to use a distortionary commodity tax to at least
partially correct the internalitycaused by cue exposure. This is an example of what
the literature has coined asymmetric paternalism(ODonoghue and Rabin 2003).14 At
a zero tax rate, the true average (for each type) marginal rate of substitution between
the sin good and all other goods is less than the price because of the overconsumption
of exposees. By raising the tax rate slightly, no harm is done to non-exposees (to a rst
order) but the welfare of exposees is strictly increased as long as consumption is not
14Other terms have been put forth. Thaler and Sunstein (2003) propose Libertarian Paternalism
while Choi et al. (2003) suggest Benign Paternalism.
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entirely price inelastic. In any case, taxation interferes with the choices of non-exposees
which is at the heart of the trade-o¤ faced by the government.
A second lesson from Proposition 2 is that there is a close relation between regulation
and the optimal sin tax. If the government were to increase regulation of cue emission
at a general level, the optimal sin tax rate would decrease. In this sense, sin taxes
and cue regulation are substitutes, not complements. The reason is simply that cue
regulation ameliorates the problem of overconsumption by lowering the incidence of cue
exposure. Thus, the marginal gain from taxation is reduced. In reality, it seems to
be more frequently the case that countries with stricter regulation also implement high
tax rates. According to the analysis above, this policy is ill-guided. Of course, this is
only casual observation and any observed correlation could, for instance, be due to low
regulation, low taxation countries having implemented insu¢ cient measures. Part (c) of
the result shows that regulatory policies aimed only at specic groups should still a¤ect
the general sin tax. This points to a crucial advantage of targeted (and non-targeted)
regulation: it improves the trade-o¤ faced by the government by easing the need to rely
on the indiscriminate tax instrument. Taxation has the benet of only a¤ecting the
market price, leaving consumption choices to individual agents, but at the same time
forces everyone to face the same tax rate regardless of di¤erences in preferences for the
sin good, thus intervening too much from the viewpoint of certain groups and too little
from the viewpoint of others. However, to assess the overall desirability of using cue
regulation, whether targeted or not, requires knowledge of the potential costs of cue
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regulation. Similarly, it is crucial to consider the feasibility of a¤ecting cue exposure
through regulatory policies, in particular if these are aimed only at certain groups.
7 Cue Regulation
One of the most important advantages of the theory of cue-triggered consumption is
that it provides a framework for discussing policies such as regulation of the advertising
industry. A standard theory of consumer choice would have nothing meaningful to say
about the merits of cue regulation. However, although providing a theory of the e¤ects
of external cues on choice behavior is a crucial step toward a theory of optimal cue
regulation, the most essential element remains the identication of the welfare e¤ects
of cue exposure. It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a theory of the cost
or benets of cues in terms of, e.g., the conveying of information or the nuisance of
interrupted TV-shows. Rather, the analysis in the present section builds on the formalized
notion that cue exposure, by altering individual choices, adversely a¤ects the well-being
of exposees. The analysis centers around the results on the interdependency between
taxation and cue regulation presented in Sections 5 and 6. When combined with a
discussion of the process of cue regulation and the potential costs and benets of cues,
this sets the stage for a rst attempt at identifying the optimal level of cue regulation.
However, because of the speculative and informal nature of this discussion, the present
section constitutes by no means a complete account of optimal cue regulation. Meanwhile,
it remains an important task for future research to identify the costs and benets of cues,
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e.g., through observations of individual cue management.
The most apparent advantage of cue regulation over sin taxation is that it does not
distort prices. Thus, non-exposed individuals are una¤ected by the policy as long as
cues do not serve a role as valuable providers of information. But in contrast to the
tax instrument, cue regulation neither provides insurance nor corrects decision-errors for
those who become exposed. It follows that an important consequence of the optimal tax-
regulation interdependency is that exposed individuals are made worse o¤, ex post, when
regulation is tightened. Therefore, unless cue regulation is able to eliminate temptation-
driven consumption binges altogether, it can never entirely replace the sin tax. The
relationship between regulation and taxation mainly arises because of the need to rely on
a distortionary tax instrument to correct decisions or provide insurance, not because cue
regulation is a direct substitute for corrective taxation. Indeed, stricter cue regulation
only a¤ects the optimal sin tax when consumption in the non-exposed state is price-
sensitive or if some individuals are more sensitive to general regulation than others. In
fact, the smaller is the demand response of non-exposed, the smaller is the impact of
cue regulation on optimal sin taxation. This relationship also holds when individuals
are fully rational, but in a weaker form, since the subsidy also distorts the consumption
of exposees. In terms of practical policy, the tax-regulation interdependency implies,
for instance, that the widespread use of advertising bans and designated smoking areas
should be accompanied by a decrease in excise taxes on cigarettes (whenever these are
initially optimal).
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In a world of heterogeneous people, cue patterns are bound to be very diverse, that
is di¤erent individuals are subjected to di¤erent types of cues. In many cases, cue pat-
terns follow a number of observable traits. For instance, youngsters are highly exposed
to TV-commercials and less so to advertising in newspapers, which, in contrast, provides
an e¤ective forum for reaching certain parts of the adult population. The government
may take advantage of the di¤erence in cue patterns by targeting cue regulation at cer-
tain groups in society. For instance, preventing producers of alcoholic beverages from
engaging in sports sponsorships reduces the risk of cue exposure for the sports-interested
part of the population. Similarly, a ban on advertisement for unhealthy foods and candy
in commercial blocks surrounding TV programs aimed at children provides cue manage-
ment for this group. By reducing reliance on the indiscriminate tax instrument, targeted
regulation can help solve a great ine¢ ciency because the tax must be set to strike a
balance between the interests of a heterogeneous population.15 Thus, group-specic reg-
ulation will be most benecial when aimed at a group whose preferences for the sin good
di¤er substantially from those of the rest of the population. An example where targeted
regulation is both feasible and likely to entail large gains is the case of young people and
a wide range of sin goods such as alcohol and cigarettes. Stretching the interpretation of
the model somewhat, the indirect utility function may be seen as the expected present
discounted value of the future stream of consumption choices with todays choice of sin
15This trade-o¤ would be improved if the government had access to group-specic taxation. However,
in practice group-di¤erentiated commodity taxes are almost never observed - most likely because of
obvious enforcement problems.
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good consumption entailing long run e¤ects. For young people, the present and future
values from consuming the sin good are highly uncertain, which translates into a utility
function that is very concave in the sin good. This makes excessive consumption more
damaging and calls for highly intrusive corrective measures aimed at this group. But
unlike the tax instrument, which invokes a cost on everyone else, targeted cue regulation
a¤ects only the intended group.16
As with any type of regulation there will be attempts at circumventing the legislation
whenever advertising for a product is prohibited. This constitutes an important restric-
tion on the e¤ectiveness of regulation that should be taken into account when assessing
the merits of a policy proposal. It is likely that enforcement may be a bigger problem for
targeted regulation, limiting the scope for using this type of legislation
The discussion so far has focused on cue reduction policies such as advertising bans.
However, policymaking in recent years has witnessed an increasing reliance on what could
be labelled hasslepolicies. An example of a hassle policy is the banning of smoking in
public places. What denes hassle policies is not so much their ability to reduce the
risk of cue exposure (which may be limited) but rather that they reduce the utility from
consuming the sin good. It is possible to address the desirability of hassle policies within
the current model by making a small extension. Assume, similar to the case of cue
16The example of children and young adults points to situations when the optimal policy may extend
as far as banning the sale of specic sin goods to certain groups. A ban is only relevant when the costs of
excessive consumption become so large that they exceed the benets of rational or non-exposed intake.
This scenario is most likely when the consumption of non-exposees is very limited. Obvious examples
include various types of narcotics.
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reduction policies, that the government has access to a set of hassle policies, which may
be targeted at specic groups or directed at the entire population. I will use  to denote
a hassle policy such that g is general hassles whereas J covers hassle policies aimed at
group J (a higher value of  implies more hassles). The hassle e¤ect for individual i is
captured by dening a hassle function, hi = h
 
g; 1; :; M
 2 (0; 1] with hg ; hJ < 0,
that is multiplied on sin good utility. Thus, state-dependent utility becomes
ui

xi; h
 
g; 1; :; M
  vi (zi   s  ri) ; s = 0; 1; (5)
where vi (a) = a except when utility is quasi-linear, in which case vi (a) = wi (a). Apart
from this simple extension to the utility function, the model is as before. In particular,
I will continue to distinguish two cases based on the assumed degree of individual ratio-
nality. It is clear from (5) that hassle policies lower sin good demand as well as utility
for the a¤ected groups. Are hassle policies then ever a part of the optimum? Proposition
3 provides the answer.17
Proposition 3. General hassle policies are always dominated by sin taxation. Targeted
hassle policies can only ever be optimal when individuals are boundedly rational, and then
only for groups where tJ >> t
 with tJ being the optimal group-specic tax for group J .
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The distortion imposed by a sin tax is
entirely captured by its e¤ect on compensated sin good demand. If sin good consumption
17A similar result in the context of illegal drugs appears in Becker et al. (2006).
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is initially too high, a sin tax may improve welfare. The utility loss that results from indi-
vidual consumers having to pay a higher price on all inframarginal units of consumption
is only partial, as the proceeds from the tax are at the governments disposal. Therefore,
income e¤ects have no welfare consequences. In contrast, hassle policies induce a utility
loss on individual consumers that is not compensated by income transfers. As a result,
regardless of the degree of individual rationality and for any functional forms for ui, sin
taxation always dominates general hassle policies.
The only feature giving hassle policies a potential advantage over sin taxation is the
ability to direct the policy at specic groups. Under full rationality any policy that cor-
rects consumption choices is undesirable. When individuals are boundedly rational to
varying degrees, the unconstrained optimum would involve selective taxation. However,
as this is ruled out by assumption, it is possible that a second-best policy of directed
hassles can raise overall welfare. But only if the targeted policy a¤ects a group of indi-
viduals for whom the optimal sin tax provides too little correction, and then only if the
problem of overconsumption is su¢ ciently severe.
There are a few caveats to this analysis. First, hassle policies may provide an ad-
ditional means to lower the risk of cue exposure. Second, they may be e¤ective in
overcoming externalities such as second-hand smoke, although, in principle, internalities
are not very di¤erent from externalities such that similar arguments may apply.
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8 Conclusion
The present paper has explored optimal taxes on cue-triggered consumption goods under
two di¤erent assumptions about the degree of rationality in individual decision-making.
The policy recommendations from the fully rational Laibsonian case are in stark con-
trast to those derived within a framework of bounded rationality. In particular, sin
goods should be subsidized under fairly general conditions when there are no errors in
decision-making. In contrast, when cue exposure increases sin good purchases above the
individually optimal amount, a corrective sin tax is optimal. In either case, reliance on
the price instrument should be reduced as cue regulation is tightened. This implies, for
instance, that stricter laws regulating advertising by cigarette companies should be ac-
companied by lower excise taxes on cigarettes, assuming the tax is initially at its optimal
level. Furthermore, hassle policies, such as smoking bans in public places, are generally
dominated by sin taxation. This indicates that the widespread use of hassles in recent
years may be ill-adviced unless there are political constraints limiting the scope for using
excise taxes. Of course, there may be real-world phenomena not captured by the very
stylized model presented in this paper. It may be, for instance, that the population at
large fails to understand the full damaging e¤ects of consuming the sin good and that
the two signals, regulation and taxation, reinforce each other in the attempt to inform
the public of the true costs of consumption. Further work on the optimal use of di¤erent
forms of regulation is clearly needed.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. The government objective function is
W =
X
i2N

pi
 
g; 1; :; M

eiV
e
i (t; ) +

1  pi
 
g; 1; :; M

iVi (t; )

;
where ei and i denotes the social welfare weights for exposed and non-exposed type is,
respectively. The government budget constraint is
 + tz (t; ) = 0;
where  is a lump sum tax and z  1jN j
P
i2N [piz
e
i + (1  pi) zi] is average demand for
the sin good.
The total derivative of W w.r.t. ttaking into account the budget e¤ect on , is
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dt
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where use is made of Roys identity and d=dt =    z + t@z
@t

=
 
1 + t @z
@

.
Denote by gei  1ei
@V ei
@yi
and gi  1i @Vi@yi the social marginal utilities of income for
exposed and non-exposed type is, respectively. Assume that the government has no
intrinsic preference for individual consumption of the sin good (Saez, 2002), i.e., gi is
such that whenever gei = gi
X
i2N
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 
g; 1; :; M

gi (z
e
i   z) +
X
i2N
 
1  pi
 
g; 1; :; M

gi (zi   z) = 0;
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and the second-order conditions are met such that t = 0 is optimal when gei = gi. Then
it follows that for t = 0
1

dW
dt
=  
X
i2N
pi
 
g; 1; :; M

gei (z
e
i   z) 
X
i2N
 
1  pi
 
g; 1; :; M

gi (zi   z) < 0;
whenever gei > gi and
X
i2N
pi
 
g; 1; :; M

(gei   gi) (zei   z) > 0:
The latter condition ensures that a) on average there is a demand for commodity specic
insurance and b) the government has no intrinsic preference for sin good consumption
among exposees. It follows that a government with no intrinsic preference for individual
sin good consumption will optimally set t < 0 whenever gei > gi for all i.
Now consider the interdependency between general regulation and the optimal sin tax
rate. The derivative, holding t constant, of dW=dt w.r.t. g is
d (dW=dt)
dg
=
X
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The rst summation captures the direct e¤ect of increasing g (disregarding income
e¤ects). It reects that tighter cue regulation lowers the risk of exposure and changes
the composition between exposees and non-exposees. A su¢ cient condition for t to be
increasing in g is that d (dW=dt) =dg > 0 for all t. When this is the case, an increase
in g must imply that there exist a t > t
 that now dominates t, and no t0 < t can
dominate t if t was originally optimal. The latter follows since dW=dt is now higher for
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all t. It follows that
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(A-1)
for all t is a su¢ cient single-crossing condition to ensure that the optimal subsidy rate
decreases with g. A similar argument can easily be made for J for any J . Apart from
the complexity introduced by the presence of income e¤ects, (A-1) basically amounts
to assuming that for any t the group of exposees is always more hurt at the margin by
taxation than the group of non-exposees (the left-hand side of (A-1) is positive). Indeed,
this assumption is su¢ cient to satisfy (A-1) if the marginal welfare e¤ect of taxation
increases with income (corresponding to the right-hand side of (A-1) being negative as
d=dg < 0). Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) The government solves
max
t;figi2N
W =
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s:t:
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jN j
X
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i + tz (t; ) = 0
i = j 8i; j with yi = yj;
where i is an income specic lump-sum tax. By the quasi-linearity of individual utility
and the utilitarian shape of the social welfare function, income distribution is of no
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importance as long as everyone chooses an interior solution. Indeed, using the balanced
budget condition (the arguments in pi () have been suppressed to simplify notation), one
can show that
W =
X
i2N
fpiV ei (t; i) + (1  pi)Vi (t; i)g
=
X
i2N
fpi (wi (zei (t)) + yi   qzei (t)) + (1  pi) [wi (zi (t)) + yi   qzi (t)]g :
The derivative of W w.r.t. t is
dW
dt
=
X
i2N

pi (wiz (z
e
i (t))  q)
dzei (t)
dt
+ (1  pi) (wiz (zi (t))  q) dzi (t)
dt

=
X
i2N
[piwiz (z
e
i (t)) + (1  pi)wiz (zi (t))  q]
dzei (t)
dt
as dz
e
i (t)
dt
= dzi(t)
dt
from the relation zei = zi + ri. Evaluated at t = 0 this becomes
X
i2N

pi (wiz (z
e
i (0))  q)
dzei (0)
dt
+ (1  pi) (wiz (zi (0))  q) zi (0) dzi (0)
dt

=
X
i2N
pi (wiz (z
e
i (0))  q)
dzei (0)
dt
> 0;
as dz
e
i (0)
dt
< 0 by the strict concavity of wi and the assumption of an interior solution for
all i. From the individual FOC, wiz (zei (0)  ri)   q = 0 =) wiz (zei (0))   q < 0. It
follows by continuity, and the fact that dW=dt > 0 for all t < 0, that the optimal tax
rate is positive.
(b) Taking the derivative of dW=dt w.r.t. g, holding t constant, gives
d (dW=dt)
dg
=
X
i2N
@pi
 
g; 1; :; M

@g
fwiz [zei (t)]  wiz [zi (t)]g
dzei (t)
dt
< 0;
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for all t by the strict concavity of wi and the fact that zei (t) > zi (t) for all t. It follows
that the optimal sin tax rate must decrease with g since some t < t
 now dominates
t, and no t0 > t can dominate t if t was originally optimal. The latter follows since
dW=dt is now lower for all t.
(c) The same procedure as under (b) shows that
d (dW=dt)
dj
=
X
i2J
@pi
 
g; 1; :; M

@J
fwiz (zei (t))  wiz [zi (t)]g
dzei (t)
dt
< 0:
Q.E.D.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 3. General hassle policies function exactly like a tax in terms
of consumption responses. Thus, hassles cause sin good demands to fall. But unlike the
tax, hassle policies induce a utility loss on all inframarginal units of consumption. Thus,
general hassle policies are always dominated by a sin tax.
Targeted hassle policies can never be optimal under full rationality, as choices are
optimized and hassles induce a utility loss. In the case of bounded rationality, the e¤ect
on social welfare of a hassle directed at group J , dJ , is
dW =
8>>>><>>>>:
X
i2J
hJ [piw
e
i + (1  pi)wi]| {z }
<0
+
X
i2J
[pi (hw
e
iz   q) dzei + (1  pi) (hwiz   q) dzi]
9>>>>=>>>>; dJ :
It follows that dW=dJ > 0 requires that the last summation is positive. If the optimal
directed tax for group J is smaller than the optimal general sin tax, tJ < t
, it must be
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the case that, when evaluated at t = t (and tJ = 0), a small tax only on group J lowers
welfare, i.e.,
dW =
X
i2J
[pi (hw
e
iz   q) dzei + (1  pi) (hwiz   q) dzi] dtJ < 0;
such that directed hassles require tJ > t
. Further, tJ must be su¢ ciently greater than
t such that when evaluated at t = t
X
i2J
[pi (hw
e
iz   q) dzei + (1  pi) (hwiz   q) dzi] >  
X
i2J
h
pihjw
e
i + (1  pi)hJwi
i
:
Q.E.D.
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Abstract
This paper presents an evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in
15 EU countries using the EUROMOD microsimulation model. First, we show that many
tax-transfer schemes in Europe feature negative jointness dened as a situation where the
tax rate on one person depends negatively on the earnings of the spouse. This stands
in contrast to the previous literature, which has focused on a specic form of positive
jointness. The presence of negative jointness is driven by family-based and means-tested
transfer programs combined with tax systems that usually feature very little jointness.
Second, we consider the labor supply distortion on secondary earners relative to primary
earners implied by the current tax-transfer systems, and study the welfare e¤ects of small
reforms that change the relative taxation of spouses. We present microsimulations showing
that simple revenue-neutral reforms that lower the tax burden on secondary earners are
associated with substantial welfare gains in most countries. Finally, we consider the tax-
transfer implications of marriage and estimate the so-called marriage penalty. For most
countries, we nd large marriage penalties at the bottom of the distribution driven primarily
by features of the transfer system.
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1 Introduction
The tax treatment of couples has been a debating point throughout the existence of the
income tax. Actual policies have varied over time and across countries. Over the past
three decades, there has been an international trend from joint to individual taxation of
husbands and wives, and today the majority of OECD countries use the individual as the
basic unit of taxation. Under fully individual taxation, tax liability is assessed separately
for each family member and is therefore independent of the income of other individuals
living in the household. By contrast, in a system of fully joint taxation of couples, as
operated by for example the United States, tax liability is assessed at the family level
and depends on total family income. Three basic points have been noted in previous
discussions of the choice between individual and joint taxation (e.g., Rosen, 1977; Boskin
and Sheshinski, 1983; Pechman, 1987).
The rst argument is an e¢ ciency argument. It starts from the empirical observation
that the secondary earner in a family typically the wife tends to have a more elastic
labor supply than the primary earner (e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). A Ramsey-
type optimal tax rule then suggests that the labor income of secondary earners should
be taxed at a lower rate than the labor income of primary earners. This is achieved to
a certain degree by a progressive individual income tax, because primary earners have
higher incomes and therefore face higher marginal tax rates than their spouses. On the
other hand, a fully joint income tax creates identical marginal tax rates across members
of the same household and hence does not meet this e¢ ciency criterion.
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The second argument is that tax systems should be neutral with respect to mar-
riage decisions. This can be viewed as an e¢ ciency argument that tax systems should
not distort the marriage market or as a horizontal equity argument that identical cou-
ples (married or cohabitating) should be treated identically for tax purposes. While
individual-based taxation is neutral with respect to marriage, joint tax systems are gener-
ically non-neutral. Jointness may penalize or subsidize marriage depending on the exact
design, and the size of penalties/subsidies generally depends on the distribution of income
within the family.
The third argument is an equity argument, taking as its point of departure that
welfare is better measured by family income than individual income. As a result, two
families with the same total income should, other things being the same, pay equal taxes.
By the same token, if one family receives a higher total income than another family,
then the rst family should face a higher tax liability than the second one. This equity
criterion is satised by a joint income tax that depends on total family income, but not
by a progressive individual tax system, because in that case tax liability depends also on
the distribution of incomes within the family.
This paper attempts to shed light on the three issues discussed above. We start by not-
ing that these issues ultimately pertain to the redistribution scheme as a whole, not just
the tax system, and we therefore present an integrated treatment of the tax and transfer
system. A recurrent theme in the paper is that the transfer system is a crucial element in
understanding and evaluating redistribution schemes a¤ecting married couples. We also
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point out that the focus in previous discussions on the choice between individual tax treat-
ment and joint tax treatment based on family income represents an oversimplication,
because real-world redistribution schemes are almost never fully individual or fully joint.
There are two reasons for this. First, while most countries have adopted individual ling
in the tax system, they tend to retain certain elements of jointness such as the transfer
of unused allowances across spouses, dependent spouse exemptions, etc. Second, transfer
systems are nearly always fully joint, because social benets are means-tested according
to the combined income and assets of the two spouses in the household. This implies
that actual redistribution systems typically combine a form of quasi-individual taxation
with family-based transfer systems, creating a fairly complicated jointness structure that
is di¤erent from the two polar cases typically analyzed.
The paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of mar-
ried couples in 15 EU countries. The analysis has three components. First, we carefully
map the precise nature of jointness in tax-transfer schemes in our sample of countries
using the EUROMOD microsimulation model. EUROMOD is built around country-
specic, but partly harmonized, micro datasets combined with a detailed tax-benet
simulator capturing the full set of institutional features of tax and transfer systems in
each country.1 We nd that many tax-transfer schemes in Europe feature negative joint-
ness dened as a situation where the tax rate on one person depends negatively on the
earnings of the spouse. Such a system is opposite to the form of jointness typically
1An introduction to EUROMOD and a descriptive analysis of taxes and transfers in the EU countries
has been provided by Sutherland (2001), Immervoll and ODonoghue (2003), and Immervoll (2004).
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analyzed in the academic literature fully joint and progressive taxation because such
schemes feature a positive interaction between tax rates and spousal earnings and there-
fore positive jointness. The presence of negative jointness is driven by the interaction
between family-based transfers and individual or almost-individual taxes. To see this,
consider a secondary earner, say the wife, deciding about labor market entry. If she is
married to a low-income husband, the family is in the phase-out range of transfer pro-
grams, and she will face a high e¤ective tax rate. On the other hand, if she is married to
a high-income husband, the family is beyond the phase-out range of transfer programs,
and she will face a low e¤ective tax rate because the income tax is individual. Hence,
the wifes tax is declining in the husbands earnings.
Second, the paper considers the incentives to supply labor for secondary earners rel-
ative to primary earners implied by the existing tax-transfer systems, and studies the
welfare e¤ects of reforms that change the relative taxation of spouses. This issue is sepa-
rate from the nature of jointness discussed above: jointness has to do with the relationship
between tax rates and spousal earnings (a cross-derivative in the tax function), whereas
labor supply incentives have to do with the relationship between tax liability and own
earnings (an own-derivative in the tax function). Previous work has often discussed the
two issues as if they are one and the same, but we nd that the distinction is empirically
important. To study the welfare e¤ects of tax-transfer reform, the paper starts by setting
out a simple theoretical model that incorporates only participation responses, and then
turn to a general model that allows for both participation and hours-of-work responses
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for both spouses in the household. Microsimulations of di¤erent revenue-neutral reforms
that reduce the tax burden on secondary earners show that, for both models and for
most countries, a lowering of the tax burden on secondary earners is associated with
substantial welfare gains.
This part of the paper may be seen as an extension of our previous work based on
single-person households (Immervoll et al., 2007) to the case of two-person households. It
is also related to the recent work by Alesina and Ichino (2007), arguing that tax schemes
should be gender-specic with lower rates on females. We do not consider gender-specic
taxation as such (consistent with real-world tax systems that are anonymous and hence
gender-blind), but consider reforms that change the taxation of primary versus secondary
earners. We dene primary versus secondary, not in terms of gender, but in terms of
relative earnings within the family a concept that is correlated with gender.2 Indeed, it
is shown that in almost all countries more than 80% of secondary earners are women, and
in some countries more than 90% of secondary earners are women. Thus, the reforms
under consideration strongly target married women with low earnings or weak labor
market attachment without formally discriminating based on gender. This is important
because gender-specic taxation per se would be unconstitutional in most countries.
Third, the paper explores the distortions in the decision to marry by simulating the
size of marriage penalties resulting from the combined e¤ect of taxes and transfers. The
presence of fully family-based transfers generally penalizes marriages at the bottom of
2More specically, the lower-earning spouse in each family is dened as the secondary earner. For
one-earner couples, this obviously implies that the non-working spouse is the secondary earner.
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the distribution, implying that marriage penalties at the bottom in practice go hand in
hand with negative jointness.3 Indeed, we nd large marriage penalties at the bottom of
the distribution (but not at the top) in most countries, which raises important questions
pertaining to fairness as well as to e¢ ciency. Transfers and taxes that depend on marriage
are often accused by conservatives of destroying the traditional two-parent family and
leading to high rates of single motherhood. Although empirical studies of the e¤ects on
marriage and divorce from income taxes (e.g. Alm and Whittington, 1997, 1999), welfare
benets (e.g., Hoynes 1997a,b; Mo¢ tt, 1998), or taxes and benets combined (Dickert-
Conlin, 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b) tend to nd modest or no e¤ects, the existence
of marriage disincentives continues to be a controversial point of contention.
Most of the literature studying the optimal design of tax and transfer programs and
the evaluation of tax and welfare reform rests on models of single-person households.
However, real-world tax-transfer schemes for a large part redistribute income across fam-
ilies formed around couples, creating a substantial gap between theory and practice. This
has triggered a recent and growing interest in generalizing the theory of optimal income re-
distribution to explicitly deal with couples. For example, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007,
2008) explore the optimal nonlinear taxation of couples as a multi-dimensional screening
problem, whereby agents (couples) are characterized by a multi-dimensional parameter
(ability and taste-for-work parameters of each spouse) that are unobserved by the prin-
cipal (the government which maximizes social welfare). They nd that, under certain
3However, theoretically it is entirely possible to design a negatively joint tax system that subsidizes
rather than penalizes marriage.
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assumptions, optimal incentive schemes feature negative jointness, which is consistent
with our ndings for Europe. Recent papers by Brett (2006) and Cremer, Lozachmeur
and Pestieau (2006) also analyze the optimal taxation of couples as a multidimensional
screening problem. The rest of the literature (e.g. Schroyen, 2003; Alesina and Ichino,
2007; Apps and Rees, 2007) typically restricts the tax function to be separable (albeit
gender-specic), thereby sidestepping the complexities associated with multi-dimensional
screening.
Our paper may be seen as an applied counterpart to these recent theoretical papers.
By focusing on small reforms rather than the optimal system, we are able to set out a
tractable analysis based on more general and realistic labor supply models than the very
stylized models previously considered.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes the data and the EURO-
MOD model. Section 3 maps out the existing tax-transfer treatment of married couples
in our sample of European countries. Section 4 sets out a joint labor supply model to
evaluate reforms that reduce the tax burden on second-earner participation, and goes
on to present a microsimulation study of specic reforms. Section 5 studies marriage
penalties, while Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 Data
Our data source is EUROMOD, a microsimulation model for the EU built around partly
homogenized micro datasets that include data on earnings, labor force participation and
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demographics. The version available for this study relates to 1998 and covers the 15 coun-
tries that constituted the EU at that time. Based on detailed algorithms capturing the
full range of institutional features of tax and transfer systems in each country, the model
is able to compute a wide range of taxes and benets for each observation unit in rep-
resentative samples for the various countries. The main policy instruments incorporated
in EUROMOD are income taxes, social security contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by
employees, benet recipients, and employers as well as universal and means-tested social
benets including housing assistance.4 The model fully accounts for the complicated
interaction of di¤erent types of taxes and benets with earnings, assets, employment
status, marital status, housing situation and children, and its considerable level of detail
makes it an ideal tool for comparative tax analysis.5
We restrict the sample to married couples where both husband and wife are between
16 and 64 years of age, where the couple as a whole reports positive annual earnings,
and where at least one member of the household has been working the entire year. We
exclude those who are currently receiving pension, early retirement, or disability benets.
In each couple, we dene the primary earner (PE) as the highest-earning member and
the secondary earner (SE) as the lowest-earnings member of the household. Together
4In the results reported here, we do not include unemployment insurance (UI) benets in the calcu-
lation of e¤ective participation tax rates. This is due in part to di¢ culties associated with accounting
properly for the implications of limited UI duration in our static tax rate measures. At a more concep-
tual level, it is likely that UI schemes providing insurance against involuntary and temporary job loss
have very di¤erent incentive implications than poverty alleviation programs o¤ering permanent income
guarantees to all non-workers.
5For further information on EUROMOD, the reader is referred to Sutherland (2001) as well as the
Internet at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod
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with our sample restriction, this implies that, in one-earner couples, the primary earner
works the entire year while the secondary earner is non-employed throughout the year.
In two-earner couples, the secondary earner works either part of or the entire year but
always has relatively low earnings.
While we feel that it makes sense to dene primary versus secondary earner in terms
of earnings (and indirectly labor market participation), the earnings-based denition is in
practice highly correlated with a gender-based denition. To demonstrate this, Table 1
displays the share of women among secondary earners according to our denition. We see
that, in one-earner couples, more than 90 percent of secondary earners (non-participants)
are women in all countries except the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. In two-
earner couples, the second-earner denition is slightly less skewed towards women, so
that on average the share of secondary earners that are women varies between 80 and 90
percent across most of the 15 countries in our sample. The close relationship between
relative earnings within families and gender implies that a purely earnings-based couple
tax function can be targeted to gender without being formally gender-based. This is
important because gender-specic taxation per se would be unconstitutional in most
countries.6
6Despite the economic equivalence between gender-based taxation and a¢ rmative action (which has
been aproved by the courts on many occations), the two policies would be viewed very di¤erently by the
courts. See Rubenfeld (1997) for a discussion of this point in the context of race.
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Country One-earnercouples
Two-earner
couples
One- and two-
earner couples
Austria 0.96 0.87 0.90
Belgium 0.92 0.73 0.78
Denmark 0.83 0.82 0.82
Finland 0.65 0.76 0.75
France 0.93 0.74 0.80
Germany 0.91 0.78 0.83
Greece 0.98 0.75 0.90
Ireland 0.96 0.78 0.89
Italy 0.94 0.81 0.88
Luxembourg 0.99 0.77 0.89
Netherlands 0.95 0.88 0.91
Portugal 0.95 0.78 0.85
Spain 0.97 0.73 0.89
Sweden 0.66 0.76 0.75
United Kingdom 0.78 0.83 0.81
Note: Secondary earners are defined as the spouses with the lowest earnings in
the couples. Source: EUROMOD Microsimulation Model.
Table 1. Share of women among secondary earners
3 The Tax-Transfer Treatment of Couples in Europe
Based on EUROMOD, this section maps out the tax-transfer treatment of married couples
in our sample of European countries. Table A3 in the appendix summarizes the most
important institutional features of tax and benet systems a¤ecting married couples in
each country.
It is useful to start by distinguishing between two di¤erent properties of a tax-transfer
scheme for couples: (i) the relative tax rates on husbands and wives, and (ii) the jointness
of the tax schedule. In most of the existing literature, these two properties have been
studied as if they are one and the same, with joint taxation being dened as a situation
with identical marginal tax rates on the two spouses and individual taxation being dened
as a situation with a higher marginal tax rate on the primary earner. However, this close
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relationship between relative tax rates and jointness is present only under very strong
restrictions on the tax schedule. In general, jointness is related to the cross-relationship
between tax rates and spousal earnings (a cross-derivative in the tax function), whereas
tax rates reect the relationship between tax liability and own earnings (an own-derivative
in the tax function). In principle and in practice, it is entirely possible to combine forms
of jointness with, say, lower tax rates on secondary earners.
To make the discussion precise, it is helpful to dene the tax function for couples as
T (zp; zs), where zp denotes primary earnings and zs denotes secondary earnings. Below
we often refer to this as a tax function, but we want to think of T (:) as the net pay-
ment by a couple to the government embodying taxes as well as transfers. The e¤ective
marginal tax rate (including benet phase-out) on each spouse is given by T 0p (zp; zs)
and T 0s (zp; zs). Marginal tax rates are of course important for determining hours worked
for those who are working (the intensive margin of labor supply). We report marginal
tax rates in Appendix A for the interested reader, but focus instead on a di¤erent tax
rate measure the participation tax rate. This is a more interesting tax rate measure
because the extensive margin of labor supply is empirically more important. We dene
the participation tax rate on a particular family member as the total change in T (:)
as this family member enters into employment as a share of earnings generated by the
entry. In order to calculate participation tax rates, one has to make assumptions about
the sequence of participation choices within the household because, with jointness in the
tax-transfer code, the tax liability change associated with a person entering depends on
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whether the spouse is working or not. We make the natural assumption that the primary
earner enters rst and the secondary earner enters second. In Section 4.1, we provide a
microfoundation for this model, which has been adopted in many empirical labor supply
studies (e.g., Eissa, 1995; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).
Under the assumed sequence of labor market entries in the household, the participa-
tion tax rates on the primary and secondary earners are given by
 p  T (zp; 0)  T (0; 0)
zp
;  s  T (zp; zs)  T (zp; 0)
zs
: (1)
These tax rates are simulated by EUROMOD in the following way. For the computation of
 s, we consider the subsample of two-earner couples and start by computing actual taxes
net of transfers T (zp; zs) at each observed earnings pair, accounting for other relevant
household information (place of residence, number of kids, etc.). We then recompute taxes
and transfers in the alternative (hypothetical) situation where the secondary earner does
not work, T (zp; 0), and calculate  s as in eq. (1). Analogously for  p, we use the sample
of one-earner couples to simulate taxes net of transfers in the original situation, T (zp; 0),
and in the alternative situation where the primary earner is not working, T (0; 0), and
then apply formula (1).7
Table 2 shows participation tax rates and labor market outcomes for primary and
7Our tax-rate estimates are therefore calculated for those currently working. As a result of sample
selection, one would expect tax rates to be di¤erent for non-working individuals considering a transition
into work. As we do not observe the earnings potential of non-working individuals, calculating their
participation tax rates would require jointly estimating a wage and participation model for couples. In
the microsimulation exercise in Section 4, we deal with the selection issue indirectly by considering a a
decreasing prole of participation elasticities such that new labor market entrants tend to be located at
the bottom end of the income distribution.
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secondary earners in each country (averages for each country sample). As one would
expect, Scandinavia and Northern-Continental Europe feature higher overall tax rate
levels than Anglo-Saxon and Southern European countries. More interestingly, the tax
rate on primary earners is higher than on secondary earners in all but the four Southern
European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). This is a result of the impact
of family-based and means-tested welfare benets, which are a¤ected more by the rst
than by the second entrant. We do not observe the same e¤ect in Southern Europe where
welfare benets are less generous. Although most countries impose a higher participation
tax rate on the primary earner, there are substantial di¤erences in the relative rates
across countries. In particular, the UK system stands out by being much more favorable
to second-earner participation than all other countries.
Relative participation Relative earnings
Country PE tax / SE tax  ( PE / SE )  ( PE / SE )
Austria 0.63 0.36 1.72 1.66 2.18
Belgium 0.73 0.74 0.98 1.38 1.95
Denmark 0.73 0.53 1.38 1.13 1.74
Finland 0.60 0.36 1.65 1.05 1.66
France 0.85 0.63 1.35 1.53 1.67
Germany 0.63 0.51 1.22 1.53 1.99
Greece 0.27 0.28 0.97 3.13 1.61
Ireland 0.54 0.44 1.22 2.55 2.18
Italy 0.35 0.46 0.77 2.15 1.51
Luxembourg 0.50 0.32 1.54 2.52 2.25
Netherlands 0.56 0.44 1.28 1.68 2.61
Portugal 0.37 0.41 0.90 1.74 1.56
Spain 0.34 0.41 0.83 3.25 1.61
Sweden 0.66 0.51 1.28 1.07 1.53
United Kingdom 0.56 0.20 2.79 1.47 2.20
Note: The first two columns list the average effective participation tax rates for primary earners in one-earner couples and secondary earners in
two-earner families, respectively. Colums 4 shows relative participation rates of primary and secondary earners and column 5 lists the relative
average earnings of primary and secondary earners conditional on working. The calculation of the tax rates is descibed in the text. Source:
EUROMOD Microsimulation Model.
Table 2. Participation tax rates and labor market outcomes
Secondary earners
participation tax
Primary earners
participation tax
The ratio of the primary-earner tax rate to the secondary-earner tax rate is interesting
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because it can be compared to optimal tax rules expressing relative tax rates as a function
of elasticities (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983; Kleven and Kreiner, 2006). In the
special case of separability in utility of spousal labor supplies, the optimal tax rate on
each spouse is given by an inverse elasticity rule and the optimal relative tax rate  p= s
is therefore given by the participation elasticity of the secondary earner relative to the
primary earner. This implies that the tax ratios in the table can be seen as critical
values for relative participation elasticities. For example, in the United Kingdom, if the
second-earner elasticity is more than 2.79 times as high as the primary earner elasticity,
it would be e¢ cient to shift some of the tax burden from secondary earners to primary
earners. In view of the evidence on the responsiveness of labor force participation of
married women, the table seems to suggest that in many countries the relative tax rate
on secondary earners is ine¢ ciently high. We return to this issue in Section 4.
Finally, the table shows that both participation and earnings (conditional on par-
ticipation) tend to be strongly skewed in favor of primary earners in most countries.
Although the countries we consider di¤er along many dimensions (besides tax rates) that
may have direct imlications for labor market outcomes, it is interesting that the cross-
country variation in relative participation rates is somewhat consistent with the variation
in relative participation taxes. For example, Southern European countries are charac-
terized by lower participation taxes along with higher participation rates for primary
relative to secondary earners compared to most other countries. At the other end of the
spectrum, Denmark, Finland, and the UK are associated with higher relative tax rates
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and lower relative participation for primary earners.
Let us now consider the jointness of the couple tax function T (zp; zs) and therefore
the cross-derivative T 00ps. One benchmark case is that of fully individual taxation, i.e.
T (zp; zs) = Tp (zp) + Ts (zs), which is associated with a zero cross-derivative T 00ps = 0.
In practice, the functional forms Tp (:) and Ts (:) would typically be the same, in which
case we have a so-called anonymous individual tax. Another benchmark case is the
fully joint couple tax T (zp + zs) as adopted in the United States and in some European
countries. If the system additionally features a progressive marginal tax rate structure
(T 00 > 0), the couple tax would be associated with a positive cross-derivative T 00ps > 0.
More generally, there is a whole range of joint couple tax functions T (zp; zs) with T 00ps 6= 0.
Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007) dene positive jointness as a system where the tax on
one person depends positively on spousal earnings (T 00ps > 0), and negative jointness as a
system where the tax on each partner depends negatively on spousal earnings (T 00ps < 0).
Because a fully joint schedule is associated with positive jointness, individual taxation can
be seen as an intermediate (rather than polar) case in between full jointness and negative
jointness. This is interesting because we show below that many real-world schedules
feature negative jointness, implying that they have moved further away from fully joint
taxation than the individual system.
The above denitions of jointness are stated in terms of cross-derivatives of marginal
tax rates. Consistent with the analysis of tax rate levels, we will state a denition of
jointness in terms of participation tax rates. In particular, we say that a system is
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positively joint if @s
@zp
> 0, negatively joint if @s
@zp
< 0, and separate if @s
@zp
= 0. While the
denitions of jointness in terms of marginal tax rates are local, the denitions in terms
of participation (average) tax rates reect that a tax schedule is joint on average over a
range of incomes.8
Before turning to the empirical results, it is helpful for a moment to separate the
tax and transfer system. Denote by t (zp; zs) the tax payment and by b (zp; zs) the ben-
et payment, so that T (zp; zs) = t (zp; zs)   b (zp; zs). Consider then a tax-transfer
scheme that combines an individual income tax and a fully joint transfer system, i.e.
T (zp; zs) = tp (zp) + ts (zs)   b (zp + zs). The denition in eq. (1) then implies  s =
[ts (zs) + b (zp)  b (zp + zs)] =zs. Means-testing corresponds to b (zp)   b (zp + zs)  0,
which creates an extra tax on second-earner participation. However, as zp increases, the
family is pushed beyond the phase-out range of the various transfer programs (at any
given zs), which tends to lower b (zp)  b (zp + zs) and create a pattern where @s@zp < 0 at
the bottom. This explains a pattern we nd for many countries.
For our measurement of jointness, we construct a number of hypothetical households
that vary with respect to household earnings and the number of children, and apply
EUROMOD to calculate e¤ective tax rates for these hypothetical families.9 We base this
part of the analysis on hypothetical households (instead of data on actual households)
8In Appendix A, we present empirical measures of jointness based on marginal tax rates. The qual-
itative results are similar to those presented below, but participation tax rate measures are smoother
because they reect average jointness of marginal tax rates over a range of incomes.
9Because we are working with hypothetical households, it is necessary to make an assumption about
the living arrangements of the families. We have chosen to assume that all families reside in rental
housing, and have then imputed rental costs for all countries.
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in order to adequately isolate the interdependence between spouses in the tax-benet
legislation. If we were to use sample data and compare the net-tax burden of actual
households at di¤erent earnings levels, the results would be a¤ected by selection e¤ects.10
To illustrate the jointness in the tax-transfer system, we plot the participation tax rate
of married individuals at di¤erent income levels as a function of the earnings of the spouse.
We consider married individuals at four di¤erent income levels: the 5th, 10th, 50th, and
90th percentiles of the earnings distribution of secondary earners (denoted below by SEp5,
SEp10, SEp50, and SEp90). For each of these individual income levels, we calculate the
participation tax rate at 20 di¤erent earnings levels of the spouse, corresponding to
the 5th, 10th, 15th,..., 100th percentiles in the earnings distribution of primary earners
(denoted below by PEp5, PEp10, ..., PEp100). Our results are shown in Figure 1 for
families with two children. A corresponding gure for childless couples is provided in
Appendix B.11
The most striking result is that most countries display substantial negative jointness at
the bottom of the income distribution. As explained above, this can be largely attributed
to means-tested benets such as social assistance, housing benets and child benets that
are phased-out as a function of total household income.12 Indeed, the high claw-back
10For instance, marriage patterns are known to display positive assortative matching, which in itself
would tend to produce a positive relationship between individual tax rates and spousal earnings.
11When considering a couple with one spouse belonging to the bottom of the earnings distribution
for primary earners and the other spouse located at the top of the earnings distribution for secondary
earners, it may actually be the second spouse who has the highest earnings. This is, however, only
relevant for the lower part of the two grey curves because the earnings of the secondary earners in the
data are substantially lower than primary earnings. Moreover, the slopes of the curves still reveal the
type of jointness at these earnings combinations.
12In Germany and Belgium, there is an initial slight increase in the second-earner tax rate at low levels
of primary-earner income provided that the secondary earner also enters at a low earnings level. This is
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rates used in many countries tend to generate participation taxes that are very high for
secondary earners married to low-wage primary earners, often above 70% and sometimes
close to 100%.
Countries with negative jointness at low income levels may be divided into two groups
depending on the pattern at higher income levels. Countries that operate an individual
income tax (possibly apart from some family-based tax expenditures at the bottom)
and/or have a fairly at tax rate structure at the top tend to converge towards no
jointness as the income of the primary earner becomes high.13 Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Sweden and the United Kingdom display this pattern, which we may label negative-
neutral jointness. The strongest example of this pattern is perhaps the United Kingdom
where negative jointness at the bottom is driven by both the welfare and the tax system.
The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), an in-work cash benet provided through
the tax system, is based on household income and is phased out at a rate of 70%. The
combination of the WFTC and the withdrawal of housing benets and social assistance
creates participation taxes on secondary earners married to low-earning spouses around
70-90%. While second-earner labor market entry in the UK is strongly discouraged in
low-income families, it is encouraged in higher-income families due to the individual
income tax system. In particular, because working spouses with low earnings are not
because these countries employ an earnings disregard in the transfer system, so that the lowest-income
families are not a¤ected by benet withdrawal.
13Notice that a at (linear) income tax, even if it is based on family income, e¤ectively implies
separability in the tax treatment of spouses. As an example, this is important for Denmark, which
operates a form of joint taxation by combining individual ling with the possibility of transferring
certain allowances and exemptions across spouses. However, because the marginal tax rate structure is
quite at there is very little jointness at the top.
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liable to pay either income tax and social insurance contributions, the second-earner tax
rate at SEp5 and SEp10 drops to zero once primary-earner income exceeds PEp30 and
stays at zero as primary earnings increase.
Another group of countries combine negative jointness at the bottom with positive
jointness at the top. Countries with this pattern of negative-positive jointness are Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. All of these countries op-
erate a progressive tax system based on family income causing the secondary-earner
participation tax to be increasing in primary-earner income once the family is beyond
the phase-out range of welfare programs. However, the degree of positive jointness at
the top is generally quite weak and much less salient than the negative jointness at the
bottom. This may seem surprising but can be explained by the fact that the marginal
tax rate structure is quite at in most European countries, partly as a result of upper
contribution limits built into social security contribution schedules. Indeed, as discussed
above, a completely linear tax system, even if it is based on family income, e¤ectively
implies separability in the tax treatment of spouses. Notice also that, in France, the curve
is relatively at both at the bottom and at the top because the withdrawal of various
family benets and housing assistance occurs at di¤erent income levels and tends to o¤set
the presence of positive jointness in the income tax.14
Greece, Italy, and to some extent the Netherlands are the only countries that show
14In France, the drop in the participation tax rate for low-wage secondary earners (at SEp10) when
the primary-earner income becomes very high (at PEp95) is due to complicated features of the income
test for family benets (Allocations Familiales) that were in place only in 1998, the year of our sample.
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virtually no jointness. All three countries operate individual income tax systems, and
in Greece and Italy only very limited means-tested benets are available.15 The Nether-
lands does o¤er family-based social assistance, but primary earnings are higher in the
Netherlands than in most other countries, implying that transfer phase-out plays a lim-
ited role for second-earner labor market entry.16 Spain is the only country characterized
by positive jointness. There is no social assistance and the design of the Spanish income
tax implies that, for low-income families, it is optimal to le under the optional joint tax.
For higher-income families, it is typically optimal to le separately, which explains why
there is less jointness if the secondary earner is at the median or above.
4 A Welfare Evaluation of Cutting Taxes for Sec-
ondary Earners
It is often argued that the tax burden on secondary earners should be reduced in order to
increase economic e¢ ciency. Indeed, a traditional Ramsey-type e¢ ciency argument calls
for a low marginal tax rate on secondary earners because their labor supply is relatively
elastic (Rosen, 1977; Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983). The traditional argument is derived
in a model with only hours-of-work responses and where the tax system is restricted to
be linear (albeit gender specic). However, the modern empirical labor supply literature
15In Greece, no means-tested benets are available for married couples. In Italy, such benets are very
limited, especially for couples without kids as reected by the almost completely at curve (in appendix)
for those couples. Further, family benets in Italy are phased-out in discrete amounts at di¤erent income
levels, which accounts for the small bumps visible for low-income families.
16The small bump around PEp40 reects mandatory health insurance contributions for non-working
spouses that apply to primary earners with earnings below a certain threshold. Above this earnings
level, health insurance constributions for non-working spouses are voluntary and hence not counted as
taxes.
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shows that the strong responsiveness of the labor supply of married females is driven by
labor force participation, not by hours worked for those who are working (e.g., Heckman,
1993; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). This calls for a policy that reduces the participation
tax rate on secondary earners.
A policy change should be evaluated, not just in terms of e¢ ciency, but also with
respect to its consequences for distributional equity. A revenue-neutral reform reducing
the participation tax rate on secondary earners necessarily implies a redistribution in
favor of two-earner couples at the expense of one-earner and/or zero-earner couples. To
the extent that two-earner couples are better o¤ than zero- and one-earner couples such
reforms come at the cost of a reduction in distributional equity. While the statement
that two-earner couples are better o¤ than zero-earner couples seems noncontroversial,
the comparison between one- and two-earner couples is less clear-cut. Notice rst that,
for a given level of primary earnings, the notion that two-earner couples are better o¤
than one-earner couples is consistent with the underlying assumption in all of the op-
timal income tax literature that higher household income is a signal of higher utility.17
Whether two-earner couples are better o¤ on average depends also on the sorting in
the marriage market. Positive sorting in earnings (such that two-earner couples tend to
have higher primary-earner income along with the presence of secondary-earner income)
reinforces the view that two-earner couples are better o¤. On the other hand, if there is
17In the presence of general non-linear tax instruments, the relevant comparison for the determination
of the optimal tax on secondary entry is indeed between di¤erent types of couples at a given level of
primary earnings (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2007).
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negative sorting whereby rich people tend to have non-working spouses, it is theoretically
possible that one-earner couples are better o¤ on average. However, as shown by Kleven,
Kreiner, and Saez (2008) for the UK, there is a positive correlation in spousal earnings
(conditional on working) combined with a very weak correlation between primary-earner
income and spousal labor force participation. All this suggests that two-earner couples
are better o¤, so that lowering the participation tax on secondary earners comes at a cost
of distributional equity.
In this section, we start by setting out a simple extensive labor supply model allowing
us to evaluate the e¢ ciency-equity trade-o¤ for reforms aimed at increasing second-earner
participation. In particular, we consider small (marginal) tax reforms, which provide a
transfer to two-earner couples nanced by either a tax on both zero- and one-earner
couples or a tax on one-earner couples only. The taxes and transfers implemented by
the reforms are lump sum conditional on family participation status and therefore do
not a¤ect marginal tax rates. Reforms of this type could be implemented in practice by,
for example, changing the structure of family allowances. At the end of the section, we
generalize the labor supply model to incorporate both intensive and extensive responses
for both spouses, and consider reforms that reduce the tax burden on secondary earners
by changing marginal tax rates.
4.1 A Simple Joint Labor Supply Model
We consider couples where each spouse decides whether or not to work, but where hours
worked (and earnings) conditional on working are xed. Labor force participation varies
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across couples due to heterogeneity in earnings potential and work costs, and households
can be grouped into three di¤erent categories: no-earner, one-earner, and two-earner
couples. In each household, we identify a primary earner and a secondary earner where,
by denition, the primary earner enters the labor market rst and has higher earnings
conditional on working. Each spouse is characterized by a xed earnings potential, which
we denote by
 
zhp ; z
h
s

for the two spouses in a household of type h. Letting zi (i = p; s)
denote the actual earnings choice, the participation choice for each spouse then amounts
to choosing between zi = 0 and zi = zhi . The number of households of type h is denoted
Nh, h = 1; :::; H, and the total population of households equals N 
PH
h=1Nh.
All households share a common quasi-linear utility function given by
u (c; zp; zs) = c  qp  1 (zp > 0)  qs  1 (zs > 0) ; (2)
where c is household consumption, and qp; qs denote work costs for the primary and
secondary earner, respectively. The work costs capture all costs associated with labor
market entry such as a distaste for participation, the value of lost home production, costs
of child care and commuting, etc. The indicator function 1 (:) takes on the value 1 when
a given spouse works (zi > 0; i = p; s) and zero otherwise. The above utility specication
rules out income e¤ects which simplies considerably the theoretical analysis (Kleven,
Kreiner, and Saez, 2007, 2008) as well as the welfare aggregation.
The household faces a non-linear income tax schedule T (zp; zs; ), where  is a shift
parameter that we use below to capture the e¤ects of a tax reform. The tax function
constitutes a net payment to the public sector, embodying both taxes and transfers. The
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consumption of each household equals their total net-of-tax earnings, such that eq. (2)
can be written as
u = zp + zs   T (zp; zs; )  qp  1 (zp > 0)  qs  1 (zs > 0) : (3)
Households choose earnings zp and zs so as to maximize eq. (3). For households
of type h (i.e., earnings pair zhp , z
h
s ), there is a distribution of xed costs described by
a continuous joint density function fh (qp; qs) dened over [0;1)  [0;1). We dene
the unconditional density and distribution functions of qp as fh (qp) and Fh (qp), and the
conditional density and distribution functions of qs as ph (qs jqp ) and P (qs jqp ), and hence
the joint density can be written as fh (qp; qs) = ph (qs jqp )  fh (qp).
Consistent with much empirical work in this area, we consider households making
a sequential labor force participation decision. First, it is decided whether or not the
primary earner should enter the labor market and then, conditional on primary-earner
participation, it is decided if the secondary earner should join the labor force as well. We
need to ensure that the assumed entry sequence is consistent with household optimization,
which amounts to a restriction on the joint distribution of xed work costs. Figure 2
illustrates the problem by depicting the possible joint labor supply choices of the two
spouses. The crucial assumption we make is that, both before and after a tax reform,
couples are observed only in the shaded areas (0, 1 and 2). The part of the assumption
that concerns the initial (before-reform) distribution of couples is innocuous, because we
simply dene the primary earner (i.e., the highest-earning spouse) in such a way that
it is consistent with the permissible pattern. However, when we consider tax reforms
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Figure 2: The double-deviation problem.
that induce families to change participation status, we must make sure that no families
move to region ? in the gure. This problem is reminiscent of the double-deviation
problem in optimal multi-dimensional pricing theory (e.g. Armstrong and Rochet, 1999)
and in the theory of optimal taxation with more than one dimension of unobserved
household characteristics (e.g., Mirrlees, 1976, 1986; Kleven et al., 2007). While the
double-deviation problem poses considerable complexity for studies that attempt to solve
for the optimal incentive scheme in a multi-dimensional screening context, it is easier to
deal with the issue here because we consider only small pertubations (marginal reforms)
around an initial equilibrium. Appendix C shows how we deal with the double-deviation
issue by imposing restrictions on the distribution of xed costs.
Given the assumed sequence of labor market entries, a primary earner decides to enter
if the net household utility gain of doing so, conditional on spousal non-participation, is
183
Chapter 5: Tax-Transfer Treatment of Married Couples in Europe
positive. For household h, this implies
qp  zhp  

T
 
zhp ; 0; 
  T (0; 0; )  qhp ; (4)
where qhp is the net-of-tax income gain of primary-earner entry for household type h.
Primary earners with qp  qhp decide to enter the labor market at zp = zhp , whereas
primary earners with qp > qhp stay outside the labor force. Conditional on primary-earner
entry, the secondary earner in household h enters if
qs  zhs  

T
 
zhp ; z
h
s ; 
  T  zhp ; 0;   qhs ; (5)
where qhs is the net-of-tax income gain of second-earner entry.
LetEh0 = Nh

1  Fh
 
qhp

, Eh1 = NhFh
 
qhp
 Eh2 andEh2 = Nh R qhp0 Ph  qhs jqp  fh (qp) dqp
denote, respectively, the number of zero-earner, one-earner, and two-earner couples of
type h. Consistent with our assumed sequence of labor market entry, we dene the
participation elasticities for primary and secondary earners as
hp 
@Eh1
@

zhp
 
1  ahp
 zhp  1  ahp
Eh1
; hs 
@Eh2
@ [zhs (1  ahs )]
zhs
 
1  ahs

Eh2
;
where ahp 

T
 
zhp ; 0; 
  T (0; 0; ) =zhp is the participation tax rate for primary earners
in household type h, and ahs 

T
 
zhp ; z
h
s ; 
  T  zhp ; 0;  =zhs is the participation tax
rate for secondary earners.
Because no households are observed with only the secondary earner working, govern-
ment revenue can be written as
R =
X
h

T
 
zhp ; z
h
s ; 

Eh2 + T
 
zhp ; 0; 

Eh1 + T (0; 0; )E
h
0

;
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which is simply the sum of the tax proceeds (net of transfers) from two-earner families
(rst term), one-earner families (second term), and zero-earner families (third term).
4.2 A Microsimulation Study of Reform
This section studies the e¤ects of small tax reforms, d, that reduce the tax burden
on second-earner participation, @ahs=@ < 0, and are revenue-neutral, dR=d = 0. As
explained above, such reforms necessarily imply a redistribution in favor of two-earner
couples at the expense of one- and zero-earner couples, and thus are associated with a
trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency. We derive theoretical measures of the equity-
e¢ ciency trade-o¤s associated with two specic reforms as a function of behavioral elas-
ticities and parameters of the tax-transfer system, and apply the analytical results to our
samples of married couple populations in 15 EU countries using EUROMOD.
Following Browning and Johnson (1984) and Immervoll et al. (2007), we divide the
population into those who gain from the reform and those who lose from the reform. We
denote by dG  0 the aggregate welfare gain of those who gain from the reform and by
dL  0 the aggregate welfare change of those who loose from the reform. Notice that a
Pareto improving reform (no losers) implies dL = 0, whereas a Pareto worsening reform
(no gainers) implies dG = 0.
Due to the e¢ ciency e¤ects of changing distortionary taxes and transfers, the decline
in welfare for those who lose from the reform (i.e., zero- and one-earner couples) is
generally di¤erent from the gain in welfare for those who gain from the reform (i.e., two-
earner couples). In particular, because we consider reforms designed to increase e¢ ciency
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by subsidizing second-earner participation, we would expect that the gain for two-earner
couples is higher than the loss for zero- and one-earner couples. On the other hand,
because two-earner couples tend to be better o¤ than the rest of the population, policy
makers may put a lower social welfare weight on the gain for two-earner couples. A
critical question then becomes how to evaluate the desirability of reforms involving such
inter-household utility trade-o¤s. The standard approach has been to postulate a social
welfare function associated with certain welfare weights across di¤erent households, but
the problem is that the inter-household comparisons implied by the adopted social welfare
function are subjective and this limits the applicability of such an analysis as an input
into the policy-making process. Following Immervoll et al. (2007), we therefore adopt
a di¤erent approach, which consists in estimating critical values for the social welfare
weights that would make a reform break even in terms of social welfare.
To make this precise, we dene the inter-household utility trade-o¤	 in the following
way:
	 =   dL
dG
:
The resulting number may be interpreted as the Euro-value of the welfare loss for those
who lose from the reform (zero- and one-earner couples) per additional Euro transferred
to those who gain (two-earner couples). If the reform succeeds in increasing e¢ ciency
(dL + dG > 0), the value of 	 is below 1, implying that it costs less than one Euro for
zero-earner and one-earner couples to transfer an additional Euro to two-earner couples.
However, to the extent that the social marginal welfare weight on two-earner couples
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relative to other couples is below one, 	 < 1 does not necessarily make the reform
desirable. Generally, the lower is 	, the more desirable is the reform, and if 	 = 0 the
reform represents a Pareto-improvement.
The rst reform (Reform A) reduces tax rates on secondary earners by uniformly
lowering the tax burden on two-earner couples nanced by uniformly increasing the tax
burden on zero- and one-earner couples. The size of the extra tax on zero- and one-
earner couples is determined endogenously to balance the government budget taking into
account the revenue implications of behavioral responses. The reform increases second-
earner participation, but has no e¤ect on primary-earner incentives to enter the labor
market as the tax increase is uniform across households with one earner and no earners.
The trade-o¤ measure for Reform A may be derived as (see Appendix C)
	A =
1 Ph eh2 ahs1 ahs hs
1 + e2
1 e2
P
h e
h
2
ahs
1 ahs 
h
s
< 1; (6)
where e2 is the share of two-earner couples in the total population of couples, and eh2
is the share of two-earner couples that are of type h. This type of reform is always
associated with an inter-household trade-o¤ 	 below 1: the increase in second-earner
participation (at unchanged primary-earner participation) raises revenue, implying that
the government can nance a welfare increase of one Euro to two-earner couples by
imposing a welfare cost of less than one Euro on all other couples. It is clear from eq. (6)
that the key determinants of the inter-household trade-o¤ are the participation tax rates
and participation elasticities of secondary earners, and that 	 is decreasing in ahs and 
h
s
as one would expect.
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The second reform (Reform B) nances the tax cut on two-earner couples by taxing
only one-earner couples, thereby avoiding a reduction in the welfare of zero-earner fami-
lies. While reform B is associated with a better distributional prole than Reform A, the
e¢ ciency e¤ects may be less desirable for Reform B because it increases participation tax
rates on primary earners. The trade-o¤ measure for Reform B can be expressed as (see
Appendix C)
	B =
1 Ph eh2 ahs1 ahs hs
1 Ph eh1 ahp1 ahp hp + e2e1 Ph eh2 ahs1 ahs hs ; (7)
where e1 is the share of one-earner households in the population, and eh1 is the share of
one-earner households that are of type h. As for the rst reform, the trade-o¤ associated
with Reform B is decreasing in second-earner participation tax rates and participation
elasticities. The trade-o¤	B additionally depends on primary-earner parameters: higher
participation tax rates and higher participation elasticities for primary earners increase
the trade-o¤. This reects the negative e¢ ciency e¤ect associated with some one-earner
couples dropping back to the zero-earner schedule as the tax on one-earner couples in-
creases. Although the negative participation responses of primary earners tend to worsen
the trade-o¤ of reform B compared to reform A, there is an o¤setting e¤ect that tends to
make the reform more desirable. The impact on the second-earner participation incentive
is larger for reform B, because it nances the tax cuts for two-earner families entirely
by higher taxes on one-earner families and therefore has a larger e¤ect on the utility
di¤erence between two-earner and one-earner couples. Thus, it is theoretically possible
that reform B improves e¢ ciency by more than reform A, and this is more likely to occur
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if the share of one-earner households e1 is low, in which case reform B leads to a large
tax increase for one-earner households.
We now turn to numerical simulations based on EUROMOD. As described, we identify
the primary earner as the highest-earning member of the couple, and construct pre-tax
earnings distributions for primary and secondary earners. Because the theoretical analysis
is based on a discrete formulation dividing the population of couples into H earnings-
groups, we have to dene these subgroups in the empirical application. We divide the
sample based on earnings quintiles (conditional on working) for primary and secondary
earners, which yields 30 household groups (5  5 two-earner families and 5 one-earner
families). For each household group, we calculate a participation tax rate using the
approach described in Section 3.
We calibrate participation elasticities based on the empirical labor supply literature.
There is an extensive literature on the labor force participation of married couples based
on data from the United States and European countries. This literature has been surveyed
by, among others, Blundell (1995) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). The literature
nds that participation elasticities for married women (secondary earners) are substantial
across a wide set of countries with values ranging from 0.5 to 1, whereas participation
elasticities for prime-age males (primary earners) tend to be very small. Moreover, there
is evidence that participation elasticities tend to be larger at the bottom of the earnings
distribution than at the top of the earnings distribution, although some studies have
found that elasticities for married women may still be substantial at the top (e.g. Eissa,
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1995).
Results of the simulations are presented in Table 3. We consider four di¤erent elas-
ticity scenarios. The rst three scenarios assume that the participation elasticities are
constant across earnings groups, whereas the last scenario assumes that elasticities are
higher at the bottom. Average elasticities for primary and secondary earners are shown
in the table for each scenario.
We start by focusing on Reform A. Recall that the inter-household trade-o¤associated
with this reform (eq. 6) does not depend on the participation elasticity for primary
earners, only the elasticity for secondary earners matters. The rst scenario assumes
a participation elasticity of 0.5 for secondary earners. In this scenario, many countries
show a quite favorable trade-o¤. In Germany, one- and zero-earner couples incur a
loss of just 0.14 Euros for an additional Euro distributed to two-earner couples. In
Belgium, Denmark, and France, second-earner tax rates are so high that a tax cut to two-
earner families creates La¤er e¤ects and therefore a Pareto improvement. In general, the
favorable trade-o¤s for this reform and elasticity scenario reect the high participation
tax rates on secondary earners (compared to elasticities) that we saw in Table 2. In
accordance with the pattern in Table 2, Reform A is less attractive in Greece, the UK,
and Spain than in Northern-Continental European countries and Scandinavia.
Not surprisingly, Reform A becomes better (worse) as the participation elasticity of
secondary earners increases (declines). In the second scenario where the second-earner
elasticity is set equal to 0.7, the reform is costless or nearly costless to zero- and one-earner
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couples in half of the countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
and Sweden). On the other hand, in the third scenario where the second-earner elasticity
is set equal to 0.3, it is only Belgium that has no losers from the reform. Nevertheless,
even in this scenario, nine countries have trade-o¤s at or below 1/2. Scenario 4 assumes
the same average elasticity as in the rst scenario but with a declining prole as a
function of earnings.18 The results do not change much compared to scenario 1, although
there is a general tendency for the trade-o¤ measure to increase. The reason is that the
positive feedback e¤ect on government revenue from higher participation is lower when
the additional participation is generated at lower earnings levels where second-earner
participation tax rates are typically lower.
The consequences of Reform B depend also on the primary-earner participation elas-
ticity. In scenario 1, where the primary-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.1, we see that
	 increases compared to Reform A but that the di¤erences between the two reforms
are small for all countries. Hence, the two counteracting e¤ects on economic e¢ ciency
discussed above more or less cancel out in this elasticity scenario. When we look across
the di¤erent scenarios, the e¤ects of Reform A and B are roughly comparable except
for Scenario 3 where we assume equal responsiveness for primary and secondary earners.
This scenario is not realistic but highlights the importance of the relative participation
elasticities when evaluating reforms of type B that a¤ect zero- and one-earner couples
18The primary-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.3 at the lowest quintile of the primary earner income
distribution (PEq1), 0.1 for PEq2 and PEq3, and 0 for PEq4 and PEq5. For secondary earners, the
elasticity equals 0.8 for the lowest quintile of the secondary earner income distribution (SEq1), 0.6 for
SEq2, 0.2 for SEq3, and 0 for SEq4 and SEq5.
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di¤erently. In this scenario, ten countries would experience lower e¢ ciency by imple-
menting reform B (i.e., 	 > 1), and in seven of those countries nobody gains from the
reform (Pareto worsening). The explanation is that, for most countries, primary earners
face higher participation tax rates than secondary earners. This implies that, with iden-
tical elasticities, that primary-earner labor supply is more distorted than second-earner
labor supply, and it is therefore suboptimal to induce additional second-earner entry at
the expense of primary-earner exit.
4.3 Evaluating Reforms that A¤ect the Intensive Margin of La-
bor Supply
The reforms considered so far shift the tax burden across couples without changing mar-
ginal tax rates. Such reforms do not a¤ect the intensive margin of labor supply (in the
absence of income e¤ects), and the assumption of xed hours of work is therefore innocu-
ous in the context of those reforms. But to analyze reforms associated with changes in
marginal tax rates, it is necessary to extend the model to allow for both intensive and
extensive responses for both spouses. Appendix D extends the model in this way, and
derives the e¤ects of a reform (Reform C) that uniformly reduces the marginal tax rate
on secondary earners nanced by uniformly increasing the marginal tax rate on primary
earners in one-earner couples. Zero-earner couples are left una¤ected. Like Reform B
considered above, the reform considered here shifts participation taxes from secondary
earners to primary earners, but the prole of the tax changes is di¤erent. Compared to
the previous reform, changes in participation taxes are now higher at the top and lower
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at the bottom.
Table 4 presents the inter-household utility trade-o¤ implied by reform C for three
di¤erent elasticity scenarios. In all three scenarios, the participation elasticities are set at
our preferred levels of 0.1 for primary earners and 0.5 for secondary earners. To establish
a benchmark, the rst scenario assumes that hours-of-work elasticities are equal to zero
for both spouses. In this case, Reform C is associated with slightly more favorable trade-
o¤s than Reform B. The reason is that the participation tax rates of secondary earners
often have an increasing prole (due to the progressivity of the tax system), whereas
the participation tax rates of primary earner often display a decreasing prole (due to
the impact of means-tested transfers for the rst entrant). This implies that reform C
(relative to Reform B) is associated with larger tax cuts to secondary earners facing the
highest participation tax rates, while the tax increases tend to hit primary earners with
the lowest initial participation tax rates. The second scenario sets the intensive elasticity
to 0.1 for both primary and secondary earners. This generates an additional e¢ ciency
gain on the intensive margin for secondary earners, but also an e¢ ciency loss from the
intensive responses of primary earners. The total e¤ect is that trade-o¤s are slightly more
favorable. Scenario 3 features the same overall responsiveness on the intensive margin
as Scenario 2 (the sum of the two elasticities is unchanged), but the response is now
concentrated entirely on secondary earners. This makes reform C even more attractive
and ve countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden) can implement
the reform at no distributional cost.
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Our conclusion is that the incorporation of hours-of-work responses into the analysis
(assuming realistic elasticities) does not change the qualitative insights o¤ered above and
has a fairly small quantitative impact. If anything, the conclusions regarding the welfare
e¤ects of cutting taxes for secondary earners are reinforced by this generalization.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Country εp = εs = 0 εp = εs = 0.1 εp = 0  εs = 0.2
Austria 0.42 0.34 0.18
Belgium No Losers No Losers No Losers
Denmark 0.01 No Losers No Losers
Finland 0.05 0.03 0.00
France No Losers No Losers No Losers
Germany 0.11 0.00 No Losers
Greece 0.66 0.63 0.51
Ireland 0.26 0.15 0.01
Italy 0.30 0.23 0.11
Luxembourg 0.44 0.34 0.17
Netherlands 0.29 0.21 0.09
Portugal 0.18 0.11 0.03
Spain 0.48 0.45 0.35
Sweden 0.03 0.01 No Losers
United Kingdom 0.66 0.65 0.51
ηp = 0.1            ηs = 0.5
Constant Elasticity
Table 4. Inter-household utility trade-off for reform C
Note: The trade-off is calculated using formula (A-9) in Appendix D. ηp is the participation
elasticity of primary earners (PE) and ηs is the participation elasticity of secondary earners
(SE). Similarly, εp is the intensive elasticity of the PE and εs is the intesive elasticity of the
SE. The participation elasticities are set at 0.1 for ηp and 0.5 for ηs in all scenarios. The
elasticities never vary with income groups.  Source: Authors' own calculations based on
the EUROMOD microsimulation model.
5 Marriage Penalties in Europe
We now turn our attention to the tax-transfer implications of marriage. We present
estimates of the marriage penalty dened as the increase in the combined tax liability
net of transfers of two individuals following marriage.19 The marriage penalty has at-
19While we use the term marriage penalty throughout the paper, it would perhaps be more precise
to use the label formal cohabitation penalty. In principle, income transfers are based on family income
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tracted signicant interest historically, especially in the United States where tax acts
a¤ecting married couples have often been motivated by an attempt to x the prob-
lem of marriage penalties. The concern about marriage penalties has been motivated
by notions of fairness in the tax treatment of families (horizontal equity across married
and cohabitating couples), and by the possibility that tax and transfer incentives distort
the decision to marry. A number of papers have studied the e¤ects on marriage and
divorce from income taxes (e.g., Alm and Whittington, 1995a,b, 1997, 1999), welfare
benets (e.g., Hoynes, 1997a,b; Mo¢ tt, 1998; Bitler et al., 2004), or taxes and benets
combined (Dickert-Conlin, 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b). Although these studies tend
to nd either modest or no e¤ects, the implications of marriage disincentives continue
to be a controversial point of contention and marriage-dependent taxes and transfers are
frequently accused by conservatives of destroying the traditional two-parent family and
creating higher rates of single motherhood.
Almost all existing studies of marriage penalties focus on the United States and
account only for the implications of the tax system (e.g., Rosen, 1987; Feenberg and
Rosen, 1995; Alm and Whittington, 1996; Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1998; Bull et al.,
1999; Alm et al., 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000a). An exception to this strong US-
orientation in the literature is the comparative study of marriage taxes by Pechman and
Engelhardt (1990) who considered a subset of the European countries in our sample
(Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom).
regardless of marital status, although in practice it is di¢ cult for the authorities to verify cohabitation
when there is no marriage certicate.
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While Pechman and Engelhardt considered only the tax system, we have seen in this
paper that most of the jointness in redistribution schemes in Europe is driven by the
welfare system suggesting that there may be important transfer-consequences to marriage.
EUROMOD allows us to undertake a comparative study of marriage penalties across a
large set of countries, and to incorporate fully the implication of both the tax and the
transfer system.
It is helpful to start by considering some general properties of marriage penalties.
Denoting by T i (:) the tax function (net of transfers) that applies to individual lers and
by T c (:) the tax function applying to couples, the marriage penalty is dened as
MP  T c (zp; zs) 

T i (zp) + T
i (zs)

: (8)
Individual income tax treatment of couples, i.e. T c (zp; zs) = T i (zp) + T i (zs), is the
only income tax system that does not introduce a distortion of the marriage decision,
MP = 0. On the other hand, jointness generally implies MP 6= 0, and the sign of MP
depends on the design of the joint schedule and on the pair of incomes zp; zs in a given
family. If MP is negative, we say that there is a marriage subsidy. An example of a tax
system giving rise to marriage subsidies (ignoring the welfare system) is a progressive and
fully joint tax scheme with income splitting, so that each spouse is liable to pay taxes
on half the couples combined earnings. Formally, this is a system where T c (zp; zs) =
T i
  zp+zs
2

+ T i
  zp+zs
2
  T c (zp + zs). Income splitting subsidizes marriage by allowing
a couple to avoid part of the progressivity of the tax system.
Family-based and means-tested transfers generally give rise to marriage penalties.
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As in Section 3, let us separate the T -functions into taxes (tc (:) ; ti (:)) and benets
(bc (:) ; bi (:)). The combination of individual taxation and family-based transfers then
implies MP  bi (zp) + bi (zs)   bc (zp + zs). Then, if the bi (:) and bc (:) functions are
the same (so that marital status is not an eligibility criterion in its own right), we have
MP > 0 because b0 (:) < 0 as a result of means-testing. Moreover, if there is additional
targeting to single parents (in which case bc (z) < bi (z) given the presence of children),
the marriage penalty is even higher. Because family-based, means-tested transfers as well
as targeting to single motherhood tend to be very important at the bottom of the distri-
bution, we would expect to nd signicant marriage penalties at the bottom. Moreover,
these features would be particularly important in countries where welfare systems are
relatively generous (such as the Nordic countries).
The marriage penalty in eq. (8) is calculated using EUROMOD by measuring the
change in the combined tax liability net of transfers of a couple following a separation,
holding individual earnings constant.20 We consider households at ten di¤erent earnings
congurations, ranging from both spouses being out of work to both spouses earning at
the top decile in their respective earnings distributions, and we consider families with
either two children or no children. When children are involved, we assume that each
spouse takes custody of one child after the divorce.21 We also assume that, following the
20Although individual earnings are likely to change following a separation, it is important to keep
earnings constant in order to obtain the correct tax price on marriage. Notice that, if earnings were
allowed to change at separation, even a fully individual-based redistribution scheme would appear to
feature marriage penalties or subsidies.
21The assumption of a 1-1 split of custody is di¤erent from the usual assumptions in the (US-based)
literature on marriage taxes. This literature typically assumes that either (i) the children reside with
the mother (Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1998; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000a) or (ii) custody is determined by
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divorce, each spouse faces half the rental cost of the couple when they were married.22 The
marriage penalties are shown in Table 5 for the case of two children. A corresponding table
for families without children is shown in Appendix E. Marriage penalties are reported on
an annual basis and in 2007 Euros.
The results reveal substantial marriage penalties in most countries, and the penalties
depend primarily on the income of the lowest-earning spouse. Indeed, marriage penalties
are often very high even when the primary earner is at the top decile as long as second-
earner income is low. Moreover, marriage penalties are almost everywhere considerably
higher when the couple has children, often more than twice as high. These patterns
point to the benet system as an important determinant of marriage penalties. In fact,
in all countries, the strong targeting of transfer programs to single parents is the single
most important factor contributing to marriage penalties. The tax system per se is not
very important. As a result, the highest marriage penalties are found in countries that
have the most generous benet programs such as the Nordic countries, the Netherlands,
France and Germany. Because of highly targeted transfers to single parents, the United
Kingdom and Ireland also show substantial marriage penalties for families with children,
although their social assistance programs are on the whole less generous than those of
the Nordic countries. The reason is of course the high degree of targeting to lone parents
a tax minimization strategy (Rosen, 1987; Feenberg and Rosen, 1995). Because the second assumption
implies that typically the higher-earnings spouse takes custody of all the children, whereas the rst
assumption implies that typically the lower-earnings spouse gets the kids, our assumption of an equal
split lies in between these two extremes.
22Our approach to the calculation of marriage penalties is closely related to the so-called Resource
Pooling Approach(see Bull et al., 1999). Our calculations do not include unearned income and therefore
capture only the marriage penalty arising from the tax-transfer treatment of earned income.
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in the Anglo-Saxon system.
There are some exceptions to thit general pattern of high marriage penalties. Italy
o¤ers non-trivial marriage subsidies resulting from family benets available only to mar-
ried couples with children. The tax-transfer system in Greece is virtually neutral with
respect to marriage for couples without children but does feature minor penalties for
couples with children. This is the result of an individual income tax combined with fairly
small social assistance benets that are available only to single parents. Spain tends to
subsidize marriage for couples without children but penalize it for couples with children.
In France, marriage subsidies are considerable for higher-income families.23
6 Conclusion
The standard Mirrleesian theory of optimal income taxation assumes that all tax payers
and transfer recipients live in single-person households. In reality, most individuals live in
families, and the tax-transfer rules applying to a married person are often di¤erent from
the rules applying to single individuals. A number of recent papers have attempted to
generalize the theory of optimal income taxation to explicitly deal with couples. Instead
of characterizing the optimal tax-transfer treatment of families, this paper characterizes
the actual tax-transfer treatment of couples and identies welfare-improving reforms for
23An additional important factor determining marriage penalties are housing benets. In results not
reported here, we have calculated marriage penalties under alternative assumptions about housing costs
following separation. For example, if rental costs for each spouse are at the same level as the combined
rental costs of the couple (reecting economies of scale in two-person households), the size of marriage
penalties are considerably a¤ected in some countries (in particular, the UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria,
Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands).
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15 European countries.
We have considered three aspects of a tax-transfer system for couples: the form of
jointness, the distortion of second-earner labor supply, and the size of marriage penal-
ties. A general insight from the analysis is that the transfer system is a crucial element
in understanding and evaluating redistribution schemes a¤ecting married couples. For
example, it is the presence of family-based and means-tested transfer programs that ex-
plains the observation in many countries of negative jointness, i.e. a negative relationship
between the e¤ective tax rate on one person and the earnings of the spouse. Interestingly,
negative jointness is in accordance with prescriptions from the recent optimal tax liter-
ature (Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2007, 2008). At the same time, family-based transfers
tend to create substantial marriage penalties at the bottom of the distribution, which
raise issues pertaining to fairness and to some extent e¢ ciency.
Our analysis of tax-transfer distortions at the extensive margin of labor supply sug-
gests that the e¤ective taxation of secondary earners relative to primary earners is too
high given the empirical evidence on participation elasticities. Simple revenue-neutral
reforms that shift some of the tax burden from two-earner couples to one-earner and/or
zero-earner couples could reduce the distortion of second-earner labor supply and may
generate large welfare gains. In fact, for some countries, a tax cut on secondary earners
may realistically pay for itself and give rise to a Pareto improvement. For countries where
La¤er e¤ects are not present, a tax cut for two-earner families does require a higher tax
on other couples, but the required tax increase tends to be reasonably small. In a ma-
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jority of countries, it is possible to transfer 1 euro to two-earner couples by taking away
less than 1
2
a euro from one- and no-earner couples. If the reform is nanced by raising
taxes for one-earner couples only, their burden will be somewhat higher but this avoids
making the poorest families worse o¤.
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Appendix A: Marginal Tax Rates and Jointness
This section presents evidence on marginal tax rates that corresponds to the information
on participation tax rates found in Table 2 and Figure 1.
Country Primary earners Secondary earners PE tax / SE tax
Austria 0.52 0.44 1.19
Belgium 0.65 0.60 1.08
Denmark 0.58 0.54 1.07
Finland 0.54 0.47 1.16
France 0.53 0.53 0.99
Germany 0.54 0.59 0.92
Greece 0.37 0.28 1.32
Ireland 0.43 0.43 1.01
Italy 0.52 0.48 1.07
Luxembourg 0.41 0.44 0.95
Netherlands 0.52 0.47 1.12
Portugal 0.44 0.42 1.03
Spain 0.37 0.32 1.17
Sweden 0.59 0.54 1.09
United Kingdom 0.37 0.31 1.21
Note: Average effective marginal tax rates for primary earners and secondary earners
conditional on working. Source: EUROMOD Microsimulation Model.
Table A1. Average marginal tax rates
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Appendix C: Derivation of eqs (6) and (7)
We derive the inter-household utility trade-o¤ under the assumption that there are no
households with only the secondary earner working either before or after a reform. To
ensure that this is consistent with household optimization we must restrict the distribu-
tion of the xed costs of work for secondary earners. In terms of Figure 2, we must make
sure that a marginal reform does not induce any families to position themselves in area
?. We denote by Vh () the indirect family utility function, which depends on the work
status of the two spouses. The conditions we will impose on the distribution of xed costs
of work for the secondary earner amount to saying that, following a marginal reform, the
indirect utility is greater for all families if they are in area 0 of Figure 2 than if they are
in area ?. A su¢ cient condition makes sure that no couples have a high xed cost of
work for the primary earner qp and at the same time a relatively low qs for the secondary
earner.
Let qhs (0)  Vh (0; 1) V (0; 0) be the gain from secondary earner entry for household
type h when the primary earner is not working, and let qhp (1)  Vh (1; 1) Vh (0; 1) be the
gain from primary earner entry when the secondary earner is already working. Further,
let qhp  min

qhp (1) ; q
h
p
	
where qhp is determined by (4). We will assume a lower bound
on the secondary earner xed costs of work depending on the primary earners xed costs
of work, qhs (qp), such that Ph

qhs (qp) jqp

 0. The lower bound assumption is
qhs (qp) > q
h
s (0) for qp > q
h
p : (A-1)
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The reason for the two di¤erent thresholds for the primary earner is that we must consider
both the potential movement from area 2 to area ? and from area 0 to area ? in Figure
2.
With this assumption, there will be no households with only the secondary earner
working either before or after marginal reforms. Government revenue can then be written
as
R =
X
h
Nh
"Z qhp
0
Z qhs
qhs (qp)
T
 
zhp ; z
h
s ; 

ph (qs jqp ) fh (qp) dqsdqp
+
Z qhp
0
Z 1
qhs
T
 
zhp ; 0; 

ph (qs jqp ) ph (qs jqp ) fh (qp) dqsdqp
+
Z 1
qhp
Z 1
qhs (qp)
T (0; 0; ) ph (qs jqp ) fh (qp) dqsdqp
#
=
X
h

T
 
zhp ; z
h
s ; 

Eh2 + T
 
zhp ; 0; 

Eh1 + T (0; 0; )E
h
0

; (A-2)
where Eh2 is the number of two-earner households of type h, or equivalently, the number
of working secondary earners of type h, Eh1 is the number of one-earner households of
type h, and Eh0 is the number of type h households without any labor force attachment.
The e¤ect of a small reform, d, on government revenue is given by
dR
d
=
X
h

@Th (1; 1)
@
Eh2 +
@Th (1; 0)
@
Eh1 +
@Th (0; 0)
@
Eh0
+Th (1; 1)
dEh2
d
+ Th (1; 0)
dEh1
d
+ Th (0; 0)
dEh0
d

=
X
h

@Th (1; 1)
@
Eh2 +
@Th (1; 0)
@
Eh1 +
@Th (0; 0)
@
Eh0
+ [Th (1; 1)  Th (1; 0)] dE
h
2
d
+ [Th (1; 0)  Th (0; 0)]

dEh1
d
+
dEh2
d

;(A-3)
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because
dEh0
d
=  

dEh1
d
+
dEh2
d

:
The rst three terms in (A-3) reect mechanical e¤ects while the last two terms capture
the e¤ects of the behavioral responses. The mechanical revenue e¤ects are simply the
direct e¤ects on tax revenue with unchanged behavior. The behavioral responses consti-
tute new entry of secondary earners (term 4) as well as new entry by primary earners
(term 5).
The employment e¤ects of the reform can be expressed using the participation elas-
ticities from the main text. The change in total employment among couples is
dEh1
d
+
dEh2
d
=
@Eh1
@qhp
dqhp
d
=   @E
h
1
@zhp
 
1  ahp
zhp @ahp@ =   11  ahp @a
h
p
@
hpE
h
1 ; (A-4)
where we have used
@ahp
@
=

@Th (1; 0)
@
  @Th (0; 0)
@

=zhp (0) : (A-5)
The change in secondary employment is
dEh2
d
=
@Eh2
@qhs
dqhs
d
=   @E
h
2
@zhs (1  ahs )
zhs
@ahs
@
=   1
1  ahs
@ahs
@
hsE
h
2 ; (A-6)
where use is made of
@ahs
@
=

@Th (1; 1)
@
  @Th (1; 0)
@

=zhs (A-7)
Using (A-4) and (A-6) we can rewrite (A-3) as
dR
d
=
X
h

@Th (1; 1)
@
Eh2 +
@Th (1; 0)
@
Eh1 +
@Th (0; 0)
@
Eh0

 
X
h
"
ahp
1  ahp
@ahp
@
hpz
h
pE
h
1 +
ahs
1  ahs
@ahs
@
hsz
h
sE
h
2
#
:
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Reform A. The rst reform has
@Th (1; 0)
@
=
@Th (0; 0)
@
=
@T (1; 0)
@
> 0;
@Th (1; 1)
@
=
@T (1; 1)
@
< 0 8h;
where the tax increase to one- and no-earner families is determined endogenously. Because
the reform is purely redistributive, government revenue must remain unchanged,dR
d
= 0,
implying
 @T (1; 0)
@
=
@T (1;1)
@
E2

1 Ph Eh2E2 ahs1 ahs hs
N   E2
P
h
Eh2
E2

1  ahs
1 ahs 
h
s
 ;
where E2 =
P
hE
h
2 is the total number of two-earner households in the economy and
where we have used (A-7). From the envelope theorem and the marginal nature of the
reform, monetary gains and losses are simply the direct changes in tax liabilities. Because
all two-earner couples gain and all zero- and one-earner couples lose, we have
	A =  
 Ph @T (1;0)@  Nh   Eh2 
 Ph @T (1;1)@ Eh2 =
 @T (1;0)
@
(N   E2)
@T (1;1)
@
E2
=
(N   E2)

1 Ph Eh2E2 ahs1 ahs hs
N   E2
P
h
Eh2
E2

1  ahs
1 ahs 
h
s
 :
By inserting e2  E2=N and eh2  Eh2 =E2, we obtain expression (6).
Reform B. The second reform implies
@Th (0; 0)
@
= 0;
@Th (1; 0)
@
=
@T (1; 0)
@
> 0;
@Th (1; 1)
@
=
@T (1; 1)
@
< 0 8h;
again with the tax increase for two-earner couples exogenously given. We nd
 @T (1; 0)
@
=
@T (1;1)
@
E2

1 Ph Eh2E2 ahs1 ahs hs
E1

1 Ph Eh1E1 ahp1 ahp hp+PhEh2 ahs1 ahs hs ;
where E1 =
P
hE
h
1 is the number of one-earner households and where we have used eqs
(A-5) and (A-7) as well as the fact that only primary earners in one-earner couples respond
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to the reform. The trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency equals 	B =   
@T (1;1)
@
E2
  @T (1;0)
@
E1
.
By inserting the derivatives from above and the denitions e1  E1=N , eh1 = Eh1 =E1,
e2  E2=N and eh2  Eh2 =E2, we obtain expression (7).
Appendix D: The intensive-extensive model
We introduce intensive responses by allowing individuals to choose working hours subject
to the costs of working time given by vp (zp=np) for primary earners and vs (zs=ns) for
secondary earners, where z=n is working time for an individual with earnings z and innate
ability n. The household utility function is now given by
u (c; zp; zs) = c  npvp

zp
np

  nsvs

zs
ns

  qp  1 (zp > 0)  qs  1 (zs > 0) :
Conditional on working, the primary earner chooses working hours according to
1 mhp (l) = v0p
 
zhp (l)
nhp
!
for l = 0; 1;
where mhp ()  T 0p is the marginal tax rate faced by the primary earner, which may
depend on the work status of the secondary earner. Thus, l = 1 denotes a working
spouse and l = 0 represents a non-working secondary earner. Similarly, the number of
working hours for the secondary earners conditional on participation satises
1 mhs = v0s

zhs
nhs

;
where mhs  T 0s denotes the marginal tax rate for the secondary earner (which does not
depend on the work status of the primary earner because a working secondary earner is
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always married to a working primary earner). Household behavior along the intensive
margin is captured by the intensive elasticities
"hp (l) =
1 mhp (l)
zhp (l)
@zhp (l)
@

1 mhp (l)
 for l = 0; 1; "hs = 1 mhszhs @z
h
s
@(1 mhs )
;
which give the change in earnings in response to a change in the net-of-tax rate rates
for the primary and the secondary earner, respectively. Since the marginal tax rates of
an individual may now depend on spousal income, so may the choice of earnings. In
particular, the earnings of the primary earner are likely to change when the secondary
earner enters the labor market. Behavior along the extensive margin is governed by
the exact same logic as in the simpler model: the primary earner in household h enters
whenever entry increases the familys utility, i.e., when Vh (1; 0) V (0; 0)  qp. Similarly,
the secondary earner in household h enters whenever Vh (1; 1) Vh (1; 0)  qs.24 Compared
to the simpler model, the correct denition of the secondary earner participation tax
rate now includes the tax implications of the change in primary earnings, i.e., ahs =
T
 
zhp (1) ; z
h
s ; 
  T  zhp (0) ; 0;  =zhs .25
The denition of government revenue R is unchanged. The change in R as a result of
24Assumption (A-1) is again su¢ cient to solve the double screening problem.
25In the empirical simulations, we are forced to assume that primary earnings remain unchanged when
the secondary earner enters.
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the reform, d, is
dR
d
=
X
h

@Th [1; 1]
@
Eh2 +
@Th [1; 0]
@
Eh1 +
@Th (0; 0)
@
Eh0
+ [Th (1; 1)  Th (1; 0)] dE
h
2
d
+ [Th (1; 0)  Th (0; 0)]

dEh1
d
+
dEh2
d

+mhp (1)
dzhp (1)
d
Eh2 +m
h
s
dzhs
d
Eh2 +m
h
p (0)
dzhp (0)
d
Eh1
#
: (A-8)
As before, the employment e¤ects can be rewritten using elasticities to nd
dR
d
=
X
h

@Th (1; 1)
@
Eh2 +
@Th (1; 0)
@
Eh1 +
@Th (0; 0)
@
Eh0
  a
h
p
1  ahp
@ahp
@
hpz
h
p (0)E
h
1  
ahs
1  ahs
@ahs
@
hsz
h
sE
h
2
  m
h
p (1)
1 mhp (1)
@mhp (1)
@
"hp (1) z
h
p (1)E
h
2
  m
h
s
1 mhs
@mhs
@
"hsz
h
sE
h
2
  m
h
p (0)
1 mhp (0)
@mhp (0)
@
"hp (0) z
h
p (0)E
h
1
#
:
Reform C. The details of the reform are
@mhp (1)
@
=
@Th (0; 0)
@
= 0;
@mhp (0)
@
=  =) @Th (1; 0)
@
= zhp (0) ;
@mhs
@
=  t =) @Th (1; 1)
@
=  tzhs 8h;
where t > 0 is exogenous while  is endogenously determined by government budget
neutrality, dR = 0. This implies
 =
t
P
h z
h
sE
h
2

1  ahs
1 ahs 
h
s   m
h
s
1 mhs "
h
s

P
h z
h
p (0)E
h
1

1  ahp
1 ahp 
h
p +
Eh2
Eh1
ahs
1 ahs 
h
s   m
h
p (0)
1 mhp (0)"
h
p (0)
 :
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Using this expression, the trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency becomes
	C =  
 Ph @Th(1;0)@ Ehp
 Ph @Th(1;1)@ Ehs =

P
h z
h
p (0)E
h
1
t
P
h z
h
sE
h
2
=
1 Ph shs  ahs1 ahs hs + mhs1 mhs "hs
1 Ph shp  ahp1 ahp hp   eh2 e2eh1 e1 ahs1 ahs hs + mhp (0)1 mhp (0)"hp (0) ; (A-9)
where shp  zhp (0)Ehp =
 P
h z
h
p (0)E
h
p

is the share of all earnings in one-earner fami-
lies that accrues to households of type h, and shs  zhsEhs =
P
h z
h
sE
h
s is the share of all
secondary earnings accruing to household h.
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Table A3: Summary of taxes on workers
Income Tax7 SSC (employee) SSC (employer) and Payroll Tax
lowest/highest 
tax band limit1,2
lowest/highest 
rate [%] main tax credit
1 tax unit family-related tax provisions
thres-
hold1
rate [%] ceiling1
tax 
deductible
thres-
hold1
rate [%] ceiling1 taxable
Austria 17/231 21/504 rates 5 individual
deduction for single earners; 
tax credits for lone parents 15 18.8 193 yes
15
-
21.3
4.5
193
- no
2nd earner: phase-out of single-earner 
credit
Belgium 24/318 25/557 rates - individual
parts of taxable income 
transferrable to spouse; 
additional tfa for children 
and lone parents
- 11.9 - yes - 45.4 - no
2nd earner: phase-out of amount 
transferrable from higher-earning 
spouse
Denmark 12/100 40/59
4
3 rates
- individual unused deductions transferrable to spouse -
9
+ flat amount - yes -
2
+ flat amount - no
Finland 35/223 24/56
4
6 rates
- individual -58
7.6
0.5 - yes - 24.5 - no
earned income tax allowance (20% of 
earnings above 11)
phase-out of earned income tax and 
basic allowances (starting at earnings 
> 31 and 76 respectively)
France 30/336 11/546 rates - family
-
-
-
136
-
0.9
9.6
2.84
3.6
7.6
-
136
409
545
-
yes
yes
yes
yes
partly
-
-
-
136
19.8
13.4
4.1
5.3
-
136
409
545
no reduced employer contributions rates for wages < 130% MW.
Germany
30
133
252
27.3
37.2
55.75
-
married 
couple 
(individual 
optional)
choice of tfa or child benefit 15 7.713.4
156
208 yes 15
7.7
13.4
156
208 no
Greece 56/478 5/455 rates
max. 15% of 
accepted hshld. 
expenditure
individual 0.9-1.8 non-refundable tax credit per child - 15.9
200; 
none for 
new jobs
yes - 28.2
200; 
none for 
new jobs
no
Ireland 25/80 24/462 rates -
married 
couple 
(individual 
optional)
- 4186
4.5
2.3
193
- no
-
112
-
8.5
12.0
4.0
12
231
231
no no tax if income below 33 (higher limit if children)
tax-free status phased out above the 
33 limit.
Italy 0/118 19/465 rates up to 6 individual
up to 2 tax credit for each 
dependent family member
-
56
9.04
1
- yes - 33.04 - no
phase-out of main tax credit;
2nd earner: phase-out of tax credit for 
dependent spouse;
Luxembourg 25/250 6/4717 rates -
married 
couple
deductions for lone parents 
and care expenditure; 3 tax 
credit per child
- 13.1 259 yes - 14.64 259 no
2nd earner: additional tax deduction if 
both spouses work
Netherlands 20/212 36
8/60
3 rates
- individual additional tfa for lone parents
54
-
5.3
1.7
156
105
yes
no
54
-
-
6.4
5.6
7.94
156
105
156
no
yes
no
Portugal 0/490 5
9/40
5 rates
3 married couple
additional 1.5 tax credit per 
child - 11 - no - 23.8 - no
Spain 22/492 20/568 rates 3
family 
(individual 
optional)
up to 2 tax credit per child 
(additional amounts in some 
regions)
46 30.8 177 yes 46 6.4 177 no earning < 55 are tax-exempt
"spike" in METR once above 
exemption limit; phase-out of main tax 
credit adds 5 pct. points to METR
Sweden 4/92 30
4
554
- individual - 3 6.95 121 yes 0.4 33 - no
United Kindgom 29/220 20/403 rates - individual
2 tax credit for married 
couples; 13 tax deduction for 
lone parents
23 8.4 to 10 177 no
2310
40
56
76
3
5
7
10
- no
10 all  earnings are subject to the applicable rate once they exceed these threshold levels
Explanatory Notes: Reference year is 1998. Except where noted, all information is for private-sector employees with no other income and not claiming itemised expenses. Income taxes include local and regional taxes 
where applicable. Multiple lines of SSC entries are shown where payment schedules differ for the different programs (e.g. for pensions, health, unemployment, etc.). Further information, and data for later years, can be found 
in the EUROMOD country reports (www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/documentation/countries/ ), the OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase) and the OECD series Benefits and Wages 
( www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives ) .
6 West Germany
7 including regional income taxes where applicable
8 including pension contributions (same tax base as income tax)
9 effective rate taking into account the allowance of 70% of the tax base for low incomes
1 in % of median gross earnings of primary earners (not including employer social security contributions)
2 after adding any standard tax free allowances, deductions or exemptions available to single employees
3 insurance is voluntary
4 averages: rates differ between municipalities and/or employers
5 including "Solidarity Surplus Tax" for German unification. MTR increases linearly inbetween lower and middle; and middle and top tax band limits.
features increasing METR and PTRfeatures reducing METR and PTR
Appreviations: SSC = social security contribution; METR = marginal effective tax rate; PTR = participation tax rate; tfa = tax free allowance; MW = statutory minimum wage.
Table A3: Summary of taxes on workers
Social Assistance Housing Benefit2 Family Benefits3 Employment-conditional Benefits
max. amount1 disregard1
withdrawal 
rate taxable max. amount
1 withdrawal rate amount1 withdrawal rate amount1 work/income conditions withdrawal rate
Austria 52 - 100% IT: noSSC: no - - 5-7 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
Belgium 53 10 for each working adult 100%
IT: no
SSC: no - - 4-13 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
Denmark
90
+ housing 
allowance
9 for each 
working adult 100%
IT: yes
SSC: no 11 75%
3-4 per child; higher for 
lone parents
none
(universal payment) - - -
Finland
58
+reasonable 
housing cost
- 100% IT: noSSC: no 34 80%
5-9 per child; plus 2 per 
child for lone parents; plus 
day-care subsidy
none
(universal payment) - - -
France 49 - 100% IT: noSSC: no 20 34%
main benefit: 7 to 12 for 
second & further children; 
special benefits for young 
children
main benefit: 100% once 
income > 174-261 - - -
Germany
474
+ reasonable 
housing costs
4 for each 
working 
family 
member
75-100% IT: noSSC: no
45
(if not receiving 
social assistance)
40%
main benefit: 5-9 per child; 
child-raising allowance for 
very young children: 
additional 5-7
main benefit: none 
(universal payment);
child-raising allowance: 20-
40% once income > 62
- - -
Greece - - - - 0.5-1 per child plus additions for large families
reduced in steps for 
incomes > 65 - - -
Ireland 56
19
(only for 2nd 
earner)
100% IT: noSSC: no 53 100% 3-4 per child
none
(universal payment)
60% of family gross earnings 
exceeding 88 (higher limit for 
larger families)
couple jointly working at 
least 20 hours per week
60% (of gross family 
earnings)
Italy - - - -
3-17 per family member (also 
spouses) depending on family 
type
must work at least 3 
days per week; reduced 
benefits if working less 
than full-time
reduced in steps for 
family incomes > 73
Luxembourg 64 13 100% IT: yesSSC: reduced
6
(must receive social 
assistance)
100%
8-13 per child; plus 
education allowance for 
children aged 3-
none
(universal payment) - - -
Netherlands 49 - 100%
yes, but max. 
amount is 
shown on net 
basis
6 54% 2-7 per child none(universal payment) - - -
Portugal 59 - 100% IT: noSSC: no 4 per child
reduced to 3 per child 
once income > 71 - - -
Spain 2 for first child, 0.2 for further children 100% once income > 55 - - -
Sweden
35
+reasonable 
housing cost
- 100% IT: noSSC: no 17
33%
(disregard of 18) 4-8 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
United Kindgom 51 2-4 100% IT: noSSC: no
100% of recognised 
rent; 100% of 
council tax
65% (housing benefit); 
20% (council tax 
benefit)
3-5 per child none(universal payment)
18 + up to 13 per child + 4 if 
working > 30 hours per week; 
only entitled if >= 1 child
at least one person 
working >= 16 hours per 
week
70% of family 
income > 29
3 in addition to family-related tax concessions shown in the companion table under income tax. Does not include any benefits available for pregnancy, childbirth, parental leave, or childcare benefits.
1 in % of median gross earnings of primary earners (not including employer social security contributions)
2 cash assistance for privately rented accommodation. Housing benefits may be paid through the social assistance program. In this case, they are already reflected in the social assistance amounts shown in this table.
Abbreviations: IT = income tax; SSC = social security contributions.
4 West Germany
none at the national level
none at the national level
Explanatory Notes: Reference year is 1998. Rules for social benefits can vary between regions or municipalities. Where social assistance is subject to job-search or other conditions (e.g. in Denmark), it is assumed that both spouses 
comply with the relevant requirements. All information is for families with two children. IT = income tax; SSC = social security contributions. Further information, and data for later years, can be found in the EUROMOD country reports 
(www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/documentation/countries/ ), the OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase) and the OECD series Benefits and Wages ( www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives ) .
none at the national level none at the national level
see employment-conditional benefits
none at the national level
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